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The Supervisory Assemblage: A Singular Doctoral Experience 
In this thesis, I apply Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's ontology of becoming 
to my own learning, thinking and writing. The adopted method - nomadic 
inquiry, is derived from the philosophising of Deleuze, whose concepts function 
as pedagogic values that I mobilise throughout my writing and perform - not 
merely explain, to problematise common perceptions of the thesis, supervision 
and doctoral experience. Deleuze resists models that inhibit context-specific 
creativity, yet I can readily identify the defining features of my own supervision: 
resolutely student-centred, facilitative of free experimentation, supportive of my 
becoming as an academic subject and the writing through which this was 
achieved. Non-teleological nomadic writing does not preclude strategic intent. 
Hence, the thesis records the process of my learning but equally functions as a 
crucial resource for additional and post-doctoral writing. It was conceived as a 
'body without organs' - a surface of inscription for affective learning processes 
arising in a supervisory assemblage where rigid distinctions between self and 
other proved unsustainable. Contra characterisation of doctoral research as 
solitary scholarly activity, the heterogeneity and relationality of learning emerges 
through my writing and in the areas to which I am drawn in my theoretical 
engagement. I consider former academic experiences and characterise my 
current supervisory assemblage as rhizomatic - a complex relational space 
where connections are continually made, but not fixed, in the knowledge-
seeking process. Such connections are not wholly undetermined but reveal 
processes of stratification and destratification. I seek to show that the creative 
potential of the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage lies in the tensions thereby 
generated. I also lay bare sedimented resistances that arise as I mobilise the 
concept of theoretical assemblage and connect with writers like Butler and 
Cixous. This thesis defies the ascetic ideal pervading normative accounts of 
doctoral experience, academic textual production and theoretical engagement. 
It embodies my desire to embrace an ontology of becoming and its pedagogic 
corollaries. 
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Introduction 
The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) distinguishes the direction of 
contemporary research across a diverse range of disciplines (Reggio 2007: 
145), and it is certainly the case that my most recent doctoral experience would 
not have been the same without him. I have come to think of the supervisory 
relationship in Deleuzean terms, or more accurately, through concepts or 
figures provided by both Deleuze and by Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1930 -
1992) in their collaborative writings. The latter conceive texts as productive of 
affects in the reader and inviting multiple readings rather than as self-
transparent vehicles of authorial intent. Following Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 
2004), both the text and the supervisory relationship can be viewed as 
assemblages. Assemblage is the first of many neologisms that will be 
encountered in this thesis given the productive nature of their collaboration. I 
shall therefore offer a preliminary outline of the concepts adopted in the thesis 
title for orientation purposes. 
The assemblage is a constellation of forces or entities that varies in its 
spatio-temporal scale and in its effects. It should not be thought of as a static 
structural unity or as a self-reproducing functional whole because it lacks an 
organisational or structuring principle, and this is precisely what permits 
disparate elements to be drawn into the body of any particular assemblage and 
the variability of its effects. Nevertheless, assemblages imply varying degrees of 
spatial and temporal identity, and therefore in Deleuzean terms, they spatially 
and temporally territorialise. Conversely, they deterritorialise when they break 
down and lose that identity. The concept of assemblage is linked to an ontology 
of becoming in Deleuze and Guattari (ibid.). Our becoming within an 
assemblage is the movement through which we are constituted as subjects and 
becoming therefore refers to a continual process of individuation. Accordingly, 
the doctoral student may be viewed as a singularity generated through the play 
offerees within the supervisory assemblage rather than as a pre-existent 
unitary subject who participates in that assemblage and remains fundamentally 
unchanged by the doctoral experience. The concept of multiplicity is also 
relevant in this context as it indicates that the qualities of parties to the 
supervisory assemblage are not fixed, and that there must always be something 
unattributable or vague about what has happened, and what will happen, within 
any supervision as it is precisely this vagueness or multiplicity that allows the 
new to emerge. It is about the play of free differences within a whole conceived 
as open and complex - differenciation rather than categorical difference; hence 
it is a constructivist logic that is proposed. Any sense of continuity derives from 
the fact that singularities are iterable or repeatable, but it is important to note 
that attempts to define them will concomitantly change the nature of the open-
ended system in which they manifest (Rajchman 2000: 58). Deleuzean 
singularities are consequently better thought of as impersonal or sub-individual 
points that exist prior to fixed predicates - hence the logic of sensation 
preferred by Deleuze (1981 / 2005) and the possibility of unforeseen lines of 
flight - lines of creative becoming (Deleuze and Guattari ibid.). It is a logic that 
is evocative of the Bergsonian emphasis on qualitative, not quantitative, 
multiplicity as creative evolution, and as Rajchman states, the continuation of a 
multiplicity means entry into a zone that invents through the power of difference 
and not one that is logically pre-determined (ibid. 59). 
If the assemblage is conceived as an open and complex system, then it 
is not possible to identify any obvious start or end point as in a linear 
succession. Instead, we should expect a system whose continuity lies in its 
starting over from different and unpredictable points. I have sought to reflect this 
principle in my writing here. And it will also become clearer what I mean by 
'experience' since, following Deleuze and Guattari (1972 / 2009), I am not 
implying a phenomenological version of lived experience that presupposes the 
body as a bounded and already-existent object of that experience, and a 
subject-object opposition. In this first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, a 
theory is outlined as to how we come to experience ourselves as embodied (or 
othenA/ise), and this involves the interruption of flows and the body-without-
organs. The latter is implicated in all individuating processes where it operates 
as a limit, or the unattainable point at which all the flows which constitute the 
world would flow freely. The following quotation where Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980 / 2004: 4) are describing the book as an assemblage brings together the 
concepts mentioned so far and suggests how this thesis might be construed as 
a body-without-organs: 
'there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but 
also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification. 
Comparative rates of flow on these lines produce phenomena of relative 
slowness and viscosity, or, on the contrary, of acceleration and rupture. 
All this, lines and measurable speeds constitutes an assemblage. A 
book is an assemblage of this kind, and as such is unattributable. It is a 
multiplicity—but we don't know yet what the multiple entails when it is no 
longer attributed, that is, after it has been elevated to the status of the 
substantive. One side of a machinic assemblage faces the strata, which 
doubtless make it a kind of organism, or signifying totality, or 
determination attributable to a subject; it also has a side facing a body 
without organs, which is continually dismantling the organism, causing 
asignifying particles or pure intensities to circulate, and attributing to itself 
subjects that it leaves with nothing more than a name as the trace of an 
intensity' 
Like many other Deleuzean and Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts, the body-
without-organs is deployed differently across texts. In presenting my thesis in 
these terms, it is the version above which functions as an ethical and life-
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affirmative political imperative to experiment that I particularly value from a 
pedagogic and personal perspective. What Deleuze and Guattari are doing here 
is dismantling the concept of the body as a unified entity - an organism, and 
rejecting the notion of a hierarchical organisation of organs or parts. The body, 
accordingly, is viewed as an intensive physical reality that is continually affected 
by other bodies in a fluid relational space that is also impersonal; affect moves 
across and between bodies in affective relations that defy any characterisation 
of subjectivity as exclusively about consciousness or the mind of a self-
contained Cartesian subject. The body-without-organs can be thought of as a 
non-stratified or non-organised process directed towards endless becoming and 
a defiance of ossified concepts and organising frames that define, judge and 
therefore limit, productive desire and thinking. 
The body-without-organs also reveals the paradoxical nature of freedom 
or autonomy in that complete escape from organising principles or stratifying 
fields such as subjectification and signification is simply not possible. There 
must always be some reference to systems of stratification or we risk either 
obliteration or an imposed reterritorialisation; hence the ever persistent tension 
between smooth and striated space. My writing here should therefore be 
construed as a surface of inscription where the flows that were freed within a 
specific supervisory assemblage, and often inhibited by my own sedimented 
assumptions about academic writing, are laid bare and negotiated. I show or 
perform these tensions in an experimental writing practice that eschews a 
strictly linear style of argumentation and unadulterated theoretical exposition. 
There is an element of linear succession for readers who desire one as the 
plateaus were written in the order in which they appear here, but there is 
equally a layering process that allows them to be read out of sequence. The 
conclusions were produced retrospectively as they would be in any traditional 
logical exposition; but so too was this introduction and the italicised paragraphs 
that open each plateau. I initially resisted supervisory requests for their 
inclusion. However inappropriate this reaction at the time, I had immersed 
myself in a sustained intensive temporal flow of reading, learning and writing; 
and through that process, the thesis had acquired a sacrosanct status. It was 
witness to my efforts and felt inviolable. I am particularly grateful in retrospect 
that my introduction did not win supervisory approval immediately. Its 
production, and subsequent refinement, meant that I had to acknowledge a 
hitherto lack of attention to strategic dissemination. Just as I had dreamed of a 
proliferation of citational support for script-defying (MacLure 2006) postgraduate 
writing - a writing that spoke of free experimentation and thinking differently, my 
supervisors had imagined a day when I would contribute to such support by 
lending readers who were unfamiliar with my sources a helping hand. I can now 
readily articulate those features of a post-identitarian doctoral pedagogy that 
were so enabling and affirmative for me. This was not always the case. I am 
therefore even more grateful that my need to write first and ask questions later 
- much later, was understood and supported. I did not quite know where I was 
going until I had been supported in getting there. Such deviations from 
conventional research and supervisory practice inevitably demand an 
inventiveness that a more logical linear organisation of the doctoral process can 
preclude. 
I follow Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004) here in using the term 
plateau rather than chapter in order to indicate the affective dimension of the 
writing process, and how each piece of writing operates as a site of 
intensification within this particular supervisory assemblage where supervisory 
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questioning and discussion inevitably generated a body-without-organs that I 
would scurry across and invest a considerable amount of desire in, as I sought 
to grasp and refine my understanding of Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari. As the 
latter suggest, the body-without-organs cannot be taken for granted but must be 
created. To do so requires a doctoral pedagogy that is a delicate balancing act 
of meeting institutional imperatives and related systems of stratification whilst 
simultaneously ensuring a body-without-organs that sustains a dynamic 
relational and affective learning process. I write to learn, and learning - like any 
life-experimentation, is both a biological and political process. It is the affective 
that matters. Experimentation is investigative, and here in this thesis - through 
my writing, I am attempting to learn more about how the supervisory 
assemblage functions, and indeed how I function as a component within it. I 
strive to know more about its structures, flows and connections - 'what it does 
and what is done with it' (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 180). 
I revisit an earlier doctoral experience in the mid-1990s, from which I 
withdrew. Hence references to my recent doctoral experience are to the 
doctoral programme in a faculty of Education that I began in 2008, and to my 
current supervisory team, or more accurately, to the team by which I have been 
supervised since 2009 following the withdrawal of one member and inclusion of 
another. The latter substitution inevitably altered the nature of the supervisory 
assemblage and it is consideration of the differences between these three 
experiences that affirms one proposition implicitly defended here - that 
supervisory assemblages vary in their capacity to generate and support 
experimentation and therefore learning. This most recent doctoral experience is 
evocative of Deleuze's description of his teaching practice as participation in a 
'research laboratory' (1990 /1995: 139). The freedom to experiment - to 
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unpack impasses in my thinking in novel ways, has enriched this most recent 
doctoral experience. It has enabled a level and breadth of theoretical 
engagement that would not have been possible had my latest supervisory team 
prioritised overt and rigid conformity to pre-scripted linear research narratives 
over the creative negotiation of institutional guidelines. It has been an 
extraordinary (ad)venture that has moved my learning on - taking that learning 
in unpredictable, yet highly productive, directions. Where I initially feared that 
free experimentation might delay completion - however fierce my determination 
to exercise my nomadic tendencies, I know now that my completion was 
hastened by this freedom. Angst induced by epistocentrism (Deleuze ibid. 53) 
was displaced, and replaced with joy and excitement when I no longer felt 
obliged to position myself as a knower, but instead, as someone who - in 
Deleuzean terms, was supported in their not quite knowing and their powerful 
desire to understand. The papers which were penned shortly before and 
following submission are testimony to the truth of Richardson's (2005) 
observation - that fostering experimental writing can serve to enrich a student's 
thinking, enhance their subsequent academic writing and develop their capacity 
for informed criticality. All of this speaks to a distinction between productive and 
mimetic pedagogies (MacLure 2006); and to Bourdieu's (1990: 54) insistence 
that the habitus should not be construed as mere rule following. It is far easier 
to write of contradictory imperatives than to embrace them as lived bodily 
realities and articulate the tensions that the doctoral experience might invoke -
between seemingly contradictory 'partial identities' (Haraway 1991: 154). I 
imagine that the Deleuzean figure of the supervisory assemblage as research 
laboratory may assist other part-time postgraduate students who, like me, are 
mature enough to sometimes feel that they have too many backgrounds that vie 
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for attention, and a hard-won professional or personal persona that resists 
admissions of not knowing. 
The pedagogic import of key figures found in Deleuze and his 
collaborative writing with Felix Guattari (1930 - 1992) is outlined by Gale (2007). 
The term figure indicates that conceptualisation is conceived by Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994) as a dynamic and creative process which is situated within a 
logic of sense, event and multiplicity (Deleuze 2004), and which therefore differs 
markedly from the predicative relations of a formal logic that strives to 
determine falsity or truth (ibid.). Gale refers to the 'contingency and ambiguity' 
that characterises learning and pedagogic practice, and it is argued that figures 
derived from Deleuze, and Deleuze-Guattari, can support both inquiry into 
'incommensurate areas of thought' and an approach to practice that is 'tentative 
and curious' (ibid. 473). Contra Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that concepts 
are not 'waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies' (1994: 5), this 
insistence on the tentative or exploratory nature of learning, and by implication 
of doctoral research practice, was precisely what I had been searching for and 
waiting to find during the earlier phase of my most recent doctoral experience. 
The promise of a philosophy that might be mobilised in support of a thesis that 
actually performed this representation of learning was affirmative and 
energising. And the prospect of reconciling incommensurate areas of thought 
through such a philosophy spoke to a longstanding intellectual dilemma that I 
had not resolved prior to enrolment as a doctoral student, and which was 
consequently discussed at length during initial supervision meetings. I once 
welcomed Bruner's (1986) identification of two apparently incommensurable 
modes of knowing - logico-scientific and narrative, given the diversity of my 
academic background. But I had become increasingly dissatisfied with the 
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consequent uneasy co-existence of my varied academic interests which include 
sociology, animal behaviour and theories relating to trauma; hence the 
epistemological conundrum to which I refer throughout this thesis. So began my 
theoretical engagement with Deleuze, Deleuze-Guattari, and related others 
(e.g. Gale and Wyatt 2006, 2009; Braidotti 1994, 2005 / 2006; St. Pierre 1997a, 
1997b, 2004; Colebrook 2002, Protevi 2001, 2009). And so ended a challenging 
period of prevarication (2008 - 2009) during which I replaced one research 
method with another and failed to commit wholeheartedly to any specific 
theoretical perspective. 
Braidotti (2005 / 2006) is correct to suggest that there is a difference 
between theoretical and methodological anarchy, and the radically immanent 
nomadism proposed by Deleuze and Guattari. And Deleuze (2004) insists that 
even the nomadic must sometimes remain in the same place if they are to 
defend their position. Paradoxically however, my desire to heed this advice from 
Deleuze (ibid.), and to show the exploratory process of inquiry and learning 
advocated by Gale (ibid.), has taken my reading and thinking to places that I 
had not envisaged going. So although this thesis lays bare my engagement with 
Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari, that very engagement leads me to consider 
Nietzsche, Foucault, Butler, Cixous and others. Each can be located within a 
radical tendency in contemporary political thought that has profound 
implications for doctoral research practice. Deleuze (ibid. 253) credits Nietzsche 
with marking the 'dawn of a counterculture' that is concerned with biopolitics 
and which initiates the 'political orientalism' evidenced in Foucault's genealogy 
of technologies of self and Barthes' political minimalism (Luisetti, undated). The 
nomadology and new politics outlined in the politicised philosophy of Deleuze 
and Guattari (1972 / 2009, 1980 / 2004) are derived from the second essay of 
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Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals (1887 / 1966) where a contraposition 
is posited between territorial States and nomads, i.e. between the bureaucratic 
machine and the nomadic war-machine. 
Deleuze (ibid. 259) maintains that Nietzsche has created a counter-
philosophy - a different type of discourse that is 'first and foremost nomadic' 
and whose utterances would not be produced by a rational administrative 
machine but by a nomadic war-machine. Philosophies which support the former 
are dubbed the 'bureaucrats of pure reason' (ibid.). Nietzsche depicts 
Chhstianity as a life-negating force that promotes 'ascetic ideals' and that 
privileges reason and truth whilst concomitantly denigrating 'physiological 
conditions'; individuals are consequently deprived of ethical self-responsibility 
(ibid.). The Nietzschean oriental d/spos/f/f (Deleuze 1992) of Foucault is 
evidenced in the preface to Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009) 
and elsewhere (e.g. 1990a: 57 - 58) when Foucault opposes the intensification 
of pleasure in an oriental ars erotica to a Western scientia sexualis that makes 
truth claims about sex. And there are echoes of Nietzsche's 'art of life' (1968: 
58) when Cixous writes of the 'art of keeping alive' (2007: 15), and in the 
polemical, performative and nomadic tendencies manifested in her writing. 
Nietzsche's affirmative counter-philosophy is articulated through conceptual 
characters that offer an alternative language of life-forces, a parodic deployment 
of the history of religion, and a counter-memory designed to dissociate the 
reader from reified Western frames (Luisetti ibid.). This device prefigures the 
performative tendency evidenced in Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004) and 
also their concept of conceptual personae (1994). The latter refers to the 
divergent modes of knowing and associated conceptualisations of subjectivity 
that have been posited throughout the history of philosophy. Divergent 
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epistemologies raise distinctive ethical issues and in Gale (ibid. 474 - 475) 
ethical practice is linked to the evaluative, and therefore to the fostering of 
awareness of the 'inherent value orientation of language'. Reflexivlty becomes 
one dimension of ethical research that is sensitive to representational practices 
(ibid. 475). 
Gale mobilises the figure of the fold (Deleuze 1988) to challenge the rigid 
dualisms of subject-object in postpositivist research practice, and cites St. 
Pierre (1997a) who drew on the same figure in describing how the boundaries 
between herself as researcher and her research subjects were infinitely more 
blurred than methodological orthodoxy suggests. The fold is evocative of many 
of the key concepts developed by Deleuze-Guattari and captures a key aspect 
of their ontology of becoming. This ontology opposes the presupposed unity 
and stability of the liberal humanist subject. Relationship is not conceived in 
terms of a phenomenological binary of self and other, but rather, as involving an 
inevitable becoming-other through participation in a limitless number of 
assemblages. Folding relates to processes of individuation in Deleuze (ibid.) 
and implies synthesis and emergence of new qualities where 'folding in' 
produces multiple layering and intensification (Gale ibid.). The title of this thesis 
is intended to convey a similar process which can be summarised thus: 
singularity through relationality. And my current supervisory assemblage is 
conceived as a fluid constellation of forces - a polymorphous formation implying 
symbiotic relations. It is the site of my becoming a doctoral student and 
individuation as an academic subject in a process that is unique, yet 
unpredictable and changeable. I emphasise the singularity of the doctoral 
experience because one cannot know in advance quite what may emerge from 
a supervisory assemblage where, as I have already suggested, all parties must 
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negotiate processes of stratification (e.g. pressures to conform to institutional 
imperatives and to sedimented assumptions as to what a doctorate is) and 
processes of destratification (lines of creative production that defy such 
imperatives and assumptions). 
Before describing another key figure introduced by Gale (ibid. 477) - the 
rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004), I should expand on what Braidotti 
(ibid.) means by a 'radically immanent nomadism'. Deleuze (1968 / 2004) 
rejects the Kantian argument that reason should be contained within its own 
principle, i.e. be limited to what it can do in terms of good or common sense 
(Colebrook 2005: 180). Sound distribution for Kant means that reason, art or 
feeling and morality each have a proper domain, whereas for Deleuze, 
nomadism permits the maximum extension of principles and powers, and there 
is no law outside of thinking that limits what can be thought (ibid. 37). Nomadic 
distribution contains its principle within itself - there are no external or 
transcendent criteria; hence we should judge immanently, for example, valuing 
a text for what it does and the novel territory that it creates rather than its 
conformity to pre-existent forms or usefulness to other territories. Deleuze's 
univocity, whereby everything emanates from one substance, means that there 
cannot be a hierarchy of beings within which mind over matter or actuality over 
potentiality are privileged. Such subordination of selected differences to others 
is, as Colebrook (ibid. 181) points out, consistently related in Deleuze to the 
agrarian question - the political orientalism referred to earlier: the territorial State 
divides, distributes and hierarchises space according to some law, logic or voice 
{logos) that is outside or above what is disthbuted. In contrast to this sedentary 
and striated space which is what it is and then distributed, nomadic space is 
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produced through its distribution and it is smooth in that it lacks intrinsic 
properties that then determine relations (ibid. 182). It is nomos. 
Smooth space is produced through movement and involves the creation 
of concepts and styles of thought that open up new differences and paths for 
thinking (ibid.). It would be difficult to overstate just how powerfully this 
approach to thinking resonated with my own trans-disciplinary tendencies, and 
the relief that I experienced at the prospect of finding some resolution to my 
epistemological conundrum through this concept of univocity. Nomadic thought 
precludes reductionism or determinism of any sort and develops a third space in 
which pervasive binaries are dismantled and the connections between their 
poles theorised. I was intrigued that so many of the philosophical concepts and 
figures mobilised by Deleuze and Guattari derive from biological and 
mathematical sources, and by the apparently divergent readings of their work. 
And I appreciated the fact that such readings are positively encouraged. 
Nomadic inquiry (Richardson and St. Pierre 2005, Gale and Wyatt 2009) 
promises a freedom that arborescent thought (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 
2004) by definition simply cannot. It is the freedom to make rhizomatic 
connections and pursue avenues of inquiry as they arise in the flow of thought. 
The rhizome is a pivotal figure in Deleuze and Guattari's ontology of becoming 
and explains their irreverence towards epistemology. Rhizomatic thinking 
functions as an open-ended and decentred productive configuration - a moving 
matrix, where affective connections generate intensities that in turn create 
bodies; and this is how the world operates too (Colman 2005). The body of my 
thesis is a case in point; connections are made throughout the writing process 
that create networked patterns of association which permit the identification of 
themes such as freedom, madness, narcissism, asceticism, corporeality. These 
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themes are approached in rather different ways within each plateau as my 
grasp of Deleuzean and Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophical concepts, figures and 
images increases. I endeavour to show the tentative and exploratory nature of 
my own engagement with their philosophy by laying bare the rhizomatic 
connections that were made between autobiographical events and theoretical 
issues during that process. As Colman (ibid. 233) suggests, rhizomatic writing 
lacks a stabilising function as there is no attempt to manufacture a whole from 
dispersed parts; rhizomatic writing should instead reveal the multiple ways in 
which any thought, activity, or concept can be approached - the multiple and 
varied ways of 'entering a body, of assembling thought and action through the 
world'. 
The figure of the rhizome is equally applicable to thinking about the 
supervisory assemblage. When functioning rhizomatically, such an assemblage 
- by virtue of the contact of its components, will generate new affects, new 
thoughts and ways of thinking, and new bodies (ibid. 232); it becomes a site or 
milieu of transformation that entails a very different way of valuing academic 
production and theoretical praxis. It feels important to clarify here that, although 
Deleuze (2004: 78) refers to the 'private thinker', he is not implying a flow of 
thought that is reminiscent of the pre-given Cartesian cogito and that occurs in 
isolation from others or outside of the affective connections within an 
assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 62). My own most recent doctoral 
experience is one of multiple and relational movements within a supervisory 
assemblage that has been highly productive of rhizomatic connections. I also 
write here in a rhizomatic manner about my aforementioned doctoral experience 
at a different institution in the 1990s that was far less supportive of thought that 
deviated from an arborescent model. The latter follows pre-determined routes 
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and assumes an originary base from which all else follows. Like Deleuze and 
Guattari (1972 / 2009), I take Freudianism as an exemplar of the reductionism 
that arborescent thought necessarily engenders. Social Darwinism is also 
raised in this context and contrasted with the Darwin that I know from my study 
of animal behaviour, and on which both Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari 
draw. Anyone familiar with concepts like genetic mutation will understand the 
distinction that is being posited here. The popular Darwinism critiqued by 
Nietzsche assumes a reified version of an orderly and teleological descent, and 
therefore, laws that function as external criteria and that deny contingency. Just 
as Nietzsche demanded an effective history that acknowledged such 
contingency, Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004:12) insist that the rhizome is 
an 'antigenealogy'. Nevertheless, Nietzsche writes of a 'synthesis' of difference 
through the repetition of elements (Deleuze 1962 /1983: 46) and Deleuze and 
Guattari (1972 / 2009: 38 - 40, 326 - 328) describe synthesis as an assemblage 
of variable relations produced by the movement, surfaces and relations of 
rhizomes that form bodies through the composition of chains of previously 
unattached links (Colman ibid. 233). Because the rhizome constitutes a non-
homogeneous sequence, it can comprise causal, random and contingent links 
(ibid.). And as Deleuze suggests in his engagement with Hume (1953 / 1991), 
an association of ideas is produced and used where a body encounters socially, 
politically, or culturally determined forces. 
In the nomadic inquiry presented in this thesis, I revisit papers that were 
of interest to me in the earlier phase of my second doctoral programme (2008 -
2009). But, as my writing progresses and I become immersed in the texts of 
Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, I begin to respond differently. As I show in 
my opening plateaus, these same papers were once used polemically to 
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express my antipathy towards postpositivistic research at a time when I 
believed that doctorates which foregrounded theoretical engagement were no 
longer permitted within the neoliberal managerialist higher education regime. 
Such was the strength of this conviction that it had not occurred to me that I 
should check out this presupposition when enrolling on the programme in 2008. 
So contra Gale (ibid.), my own questioning of the methodology with which I 
began my doctoral experience did indeed prompt a polemical and 'devoutly anti-
positivistic' stance initially. I explore my ambivalence about postpositivism in a 
plateau that draws on feminist poststructural theory and writing. But I welcome 
Deleuze and Guattari's (1980 / 2004) insistence that we go beyond such rigid 
counter-positioning and binary logics, and Deleuze and Guattari's constructivist 
take on contemporary science (1994). Nietzsche also explicitly distinguishes 
between modern experimental science and positivism. 
The figure of the rhizome can also be taken to describe the mapping of 
my most recent doctoral experience in the writing here, and of the theoretical, 
epistemological, autobiographical, and pedagogic issues that arose for me -
that were my doctoral experience. It is the networked and relational thought 
which was produced within this latest supervisory assemblage that I am 
mapping. This leads me to suggest that the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage 
is a particularly useful way of thinking about this specific supervision and 
doctoral experience. The concept of heterogenesis (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
20) is pertinent here. It refers to encounters that are productive of novelty: 
something new is created in between two terms which retain their 
heterogeneity. In this instance, there were four terms or persons involved -
three of whom had comprised the original supervision assemblage (2008 -
2009) including myself. The divergent academic specialisms - excluding my 
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own, which were represented (biological science, educational philosophy, adult 
and offender education) formed a milieu in which the epistemological 
conundrum to which I have already referred could not be ignored. What ensued 
can be described as an encounter between the radical specificity of this 
supervisory milieu and the plane of immanence of thought (ibid. 93). 
My writing should consequently be construed as an experimental 
actualisation of what it means to cross a threshold when thinking is no longer 
viewed as the natural activity of a self-contained individual thinker (Stengers 
2005: 152). As the latter, who is a former student of Deleuze, implies: such an 
encounter is better conceived as one between lines rather than between 
persons who exchanged ideas and accumulated knowledge in order to achieve 
consensus. That is, it was precisely the epistemological and theoretical 
divergences within my current supervisory team, combined with a non-directive 
supervisory strategy of questioning and discussion as opposed to telling, that 
created an exploratory space in which I was free to make connections and 
engage with Deleuze's 'neorealism' (Semetsky 2009: 443). The plateaus 
presented in this thesis might also be viewed as events, 'junctures' or resting 
places (Morss 2000: 192) in a learning and conceptualisation process that is 
always provisional, 'still in the making' (Peters 1999a 7.4), and inextricably 
linked to the 'physicality of affects' (Semetsky ibid.). Coming to understand this 
neorealist orientation, in which the objects of real experience can be either 
actual or virtual, has enabled me to retain my interest in writing as inquiry 
without reproducing the privileging of language - and concomitant denigration 
of science, evidenced in structuralism (Peters ibid. 1.4). I have been influenced 
by the blurring of genres in academic writing proposed by Laurel Richardson 
(1997, 2005), and inspired by her references to stories that demand to be told 
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even when we do not know how (Bochner and Ellis 2002: 167). Yet I find 
phrases like 'we "word the world" into existence' (Richardson 2001: 35) 
extremely problematic in their apparent support for a linguistic constructivism 
that is contradicted by the psycho-physiological realities of traumatic abuse 
(animal and human). Hence the recurring figure of the soothing breeze as a 
force that emanates from the natural world in all of its materiality - a site of 
respite from the generalised laws of structural linguistics and also the now 
pervasive poststructuralist orthodoxy that assumes the discursive construction 
of events. I allude, and explicitly refer, to familial abuse in this thesis. Such 
references serve many purposes within my thinking and writing and function as 
a rhizo-structural thread between plateaus. They are productive of thinking 
rather than emotionally cathartic and designed to encourage multiple readings 
of the text. The poetic functions in a similar way throughout the thesis - as a 
retreat from reductionism of any sort, as an emblem of the creativity and 
experimentalism involved in thinking against received 'truths' in all disciplines 
(scientific and otherwise), and as a site of epistemological ambiguity given the 
very physical sense of rhythm that often drove my writing and seemingly 
endowed it with a life of its own. I went with the flow(s). I pursued connections. 
And I relied upon my supervisors to assist me in operationalising what Deleuze 
and Guattari (1980 / 2004: 177) dub the 'art of dosages'. If supervision within 
the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage is not for the feint-hearted, it is because 
there are no set rules, no models, no master copies to consult in the rhizomatic 
production of novelty or the production of the new for the individuals concerned. 
As Deleuze and Guattari (ibid.) insist however, the objective of expehmentation 
is not annihilation of all that is stratifying or constraining, but rather a working 
through the milieu (i.e. context) that demands some degree of caution and 
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strategic consolidation of the boundaries that have been pushed: consolidation 
as creation (Stengers ibid.). 
This suggests that another type of evaluation is perpetually at play within 
the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage: a marginalist evaluation that seeks to 
determine limits or dictate pauses where supervisor(s) and student must each 
consider whether a specific deviation from accepted frames is a deviation too 
far that might jeopardise the entire project by inviting an imposition of 
stratification by external forces. Creative practices are not without risk for all 
concerned (Gale 2010: 307) but, when writing as a student, my sense of risk 
was two-fold: I expehenced trepidation at the thought that my writing would be 
read as excessively transgressive of institutional norms. But equally, I worried 
that I was not being transgressive enough when I imagined a wider readership. 
From a feminist poststructuralist perspective it might be asked why there is only 
one textual irruption / dismption, in the final plateau, of what is othenwise a 
rather traditional academic exposition of the philosophical concepts proffered by 
Dead White Males? And those seeking an explicit detailed articulation of the 
import of Deleuze's philosophising for educational practice - particularly 
postgraduate supervision, might ask how such a personalised account of the 
doctoral experience is relevant to the supervision practice of others? 
My response to the second question would be: I feel that my own 
teaching and supervisory practice has benefitted from attention to what actually 
happened when, as a mature doctoral student, I was required to perform 
apparently straightforward tasks ('survey the literature', 'state your research 
question', 'select a research method', 'identify a theoretical perspective for 
analysis purposes', 'display criticality', etc.). And my response to the first 
question would be: I have actioned a feminist poststructuralist principle in laying 
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bare how I responded during the earlier stages of a doctoral research process 
that is presented to students as linear or logically progressive. A qualitative pilot 
study which I undertook in 2008 resulted in writing for my supervisory team that 
expressed my dissatisfaction with the hypostasis of data, and therefore 
subjectivity, and my selected phenomenological postpositivist qualitative 
methodology. I subsequently experimented with transgressive modes of 
dissemination but was unable to situate this work within a theoretical field that I 
felt wholly committed to. I then revisited literature on doctoral pedagogy and 
student experience that focuses upon power differentials between supervisor 
and student. And I wrote of theoretical impasses. Wellington (2010: 137) 
discusses the difficulty that postgraduate students can encounter in 'getting 
started' when writing. My own difficulties however did not concern writing 
specifically but instead derived from unfinished business of an epistemological, 
theoretical, political and personal nature which needed to be addressed. Jensen 
(2007: 489) has asked how the knowledge-seeking practices of professionals -
as desire for 'engagement and engrossment' in and 'enchantment' with a 
continual learning process, might be sustained. The psychoanalytic conception 
of desire as lack found in Lacan (1974) is questioned, and Deleuze and 
Guattari's (1972 / 2009) demand for a version of desire based on a more 'life 
affirmative ideal' (cited in Jensen ibid. 493) is endorsed. Jensen (ibid.) cites 
Knorr Cetina (2003) in suggesting that: 'the motivation to learn does not refer to 
an increased search for unified truth and unambiguous solutions, but rather to 
the unfolding of multiple references presented through epistemic cultures 
creating and warranting knowledge'. The epistemic culture provided by 
Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, provided me with a mode of inquiry that is 
an expression of 'desiring-production' where multiplicity ensures 'an affirmation 
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that is irreducible to any sort of unity' (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 42). I 
was free to let my writing become 'experimentation in contact with the Real' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 13) and unpack the impasses. And I was 
able to cite my own experience in a subsequent troubling of the hegemonic 
linear research model and assert that more flexibility, given the needs of 
individual students, is generally required - particulariy in institutions that have a 
widening participation or inclusive agenda. Despite my enchantment with, and 
engrossment in, works by Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari, I was frequently 
frustrated by the proliferation of neologisms in their writing and an allusive style 
that demands extensive knowledge of the history of philosophy which I did not 
possess. Coming to understand their philosophising, and teasing out its 
pedagogic implications, became a self-sustaining affective and affimnative 
exercise which resonated with Gale's (2007: 476) insistence on the tentative 
and provisional nature of knowledge. And this experience has confirmed my 
suspicion that many of the purported difficulties with writing may be 
symptomatic of other issues. The plateaus of this thesis reflect such a learning 
process. And although I was constantly aware of the supervisory reception of 
my writing, I have also written for imaginary readers, including: the student who 
is intimidated by theory or who rejects its relevance in the perpetuation of a 
theory-practice binary, the student who allegedly fails to meet the needs of the 
knowledge economy in their choice of discipline or academic specialism, and 
the student who judges their skill set against governmentally-driven criteria and 
finds themselves lacking. If some sections of this thesis require effort on the 
part of the reader, it is because I am making an important point about my own 
learning that, I believe, has a wider import. To select a theoretical perspective 
for analysis purposes is to trigger a potentially demanding and time-consuming 
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process of problematisation (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 99, 249; 1969 / 2004: 67) -
where a problem is a complicated series of relations between questions 
crossing over with one another yet resisting organisation into rank or order of 
importance. The questions included in such problems are two-fold expressions 
of affect, or bodily and emotional transformation, and intellect, or consistency-
seeking yet also creative thought (Williams 2005). Furthermore, this dual aspect 
means that a problem is determined not only by its questions but also by 
underlying tensions between ideas, affects and desires (ibid.). Williams (ibid.) 
highlights the tensions arising when our quizzing is inconclusive or when we 
struggle to articulate the problem as the coming together of related questions. I 
was reminded by this description of my quantitative research in animal 
behaviour (2003 - 2006) where formulating a testable hypothesis was a 
similarly affective process of problematisation accompanied by anxiety about 
the denial of multiplicity that clarity demands. I am showing here what 
unpacking these tensions, through a nomadic writing inquiry, entailed for me. 
And I intend the reading of this thesis to be as difficult at times as I initially found 
the intense style of Deleuze. The adopted strategy of allowing ambiguity, 
allusion and ambivalence to proliferate within the text was, in part, designed to 
facilitate multiple readings and generate productive affects. This will always 
happen however regardless of authorial intent. So I also did so because 
guidance manuals directed at doctoral students reduce such problematisation to 
a discrete stage in a linear process and neglect the sort of difficulty that may be 
encountered. It is for this reason that I decided to include the first three 
plateaus. I highlight affective responses to evocative autoethnography and 
poststructuralist self-writing in the first, rather than provide a theoretical 
exposition of differences and continuities between them. The latter precludes 
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appeal to shared experience or empathetic identification and emphasises the 
radical specificity of individual experience. I introduce the concept of duality 
however and a logic of and not or, and the suggestion of a continuum that we 
necessarily move within. I get side-tracked by mentions of sexual violence in 
preparatory reading for this plateau but then realise that, far from diverting me 
from resolution of my epistemological conundrum, this apparent digression is a 
connection that will assist my own process of problematisation. Consideration of 
physiological conditions, and related theoretico-political and ethical issues, 
becomes a rhizo-structural thread through which I articulate and explore how 
the materialism-idealism dichotomy complicates my thinking. The therapeutic 
value of either form of self-writing, or otherwise, arises in this same reading and 
becomes the unfinished business that is pursued in the ensuing plateau. 
Bleakley (2000: 13) has criticised 'introspective personalism' and a language of 
therapeutic empowerment in educational settings, so it seemed important that I 
broached such issues and began to do so through Nietzsche's claim about the 
therapeutic value of philosophical thinking, the Spinozan relational ethics of 
Deleuze, and by critiquing a paper on Foucauldian ethopoiesis that uses a 
Freudian paradigm to discredit Foucault and invalidate his work. The same 
concept of duality is implicitly demonstrated here as my writing clearly evokes a 
phenomenological understanding of learning as the pursuit of missing pieces in 
an assumed whole (Jensen ibid. 492) - a search for those pieces, even as I 
explore and enact alternative conceptualisations of that learning. I avoid tracing 
continuities and discontinuities between Foucault and Deleuze in any depth as 
my doctoral focus is engagement with the latter. But the notion that ethopoiesis 
encourages narcissism is taken up subsequently in my refutation of charges of 
self-indulgence in the event of deviation from the evidence-based culture of 
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educational neoliberal managerialism. Academic freedom, as support for 
informed experimentation, emerges as another powerful rhizo-stnjctural thread. 
I endorse the rejection of thinking by consensual evidence but concur with 
Stengers (ibid. 152) that this does not require mobilisation against a 'common 
enemy' or subscription to alternative orthodoxies. 
In future research, I am likely to pursue Stengers' (ibid.) interpretation of 
the presentation of philosophy, science and art into separate domains in 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) as a call to resistance of such rigid distinctions. 
Stengers (2009) asks whether the baby is being thrown out with the bath water 
when an ethico-aesthetic paradigm is pitted against a scientific paradigm, and 
argues that objectivism hinders every domain: 
'The sciences are not a model. They are a very particular example of an 
original production of subjectivity occurring when a situation makes a 
fold, in other words, forces those it rallies to think, imagine, create. The 
question of experimentation is situated at the level of the meso' 
Stengers' (ibid.) concept of mesopolitics will be pertinent to any future 
consideration of the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage because it specifically 
concerns practice. The meso shifts the focus away from the macro and micro 
levels of Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004). And it is Stengers' (ibid.) familiarity 
with the m///et/-specific folding of 'biological macro-molecules' that leads her to 
question these authors' distinctions of molar-molecular, and macro-micro: 
'It's a molecule-milieu history which obliges us to think through the 
"middle", through the milieu {parte milieu), as Deleuze would say. I like 
to bring up the biological macromolecule because I am afraid that if we 
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content ourselves with the opposition between the molecular and the 
molar we are almost inexorably led to maniacal modes of differentiation 
where the issue is always designating paths of salvation or perdition. The 
question of how to go from the mode of description demanded by water 
molecules to the molar mode of description, where it's a question of 
water that we can drink or swim in, is extremely complicated. It's an open 
problem, not an opposition'. 
In writing about former academic experiences, including withdrawal from 
a doctoral programme in the 1990s, and changes to my present supervisory 
team in 2009, I continue to pursue two rhizo-structural threads - that of my 
relationship to feminist theory and politics, and that of the rise of neoliberal 
managerialism. I follow Deleuze and Guattari (ibid.) in insisting on a macro-level 
collective assemblage of enunciation (feminism) whilst hanging on to molecular-
level dissolution of gender identities. Stengers (ibid.) is correct however to 
suggest that oppositional generalities do not readily translate into pedagogic 
strategies for practice settings; hence, the mesopolitical is 'everything that the 
macro does not allow to be said, and everything that the micro does not permit 
to be deduced'. The rhizomatic supervisory assemblage is mesopolitical in 
Stengers' terms because 'the questions that must be asked are utteriy specific': 
What is this student's potential? What is happening for this student? What 
happens when we ask this? Will this or that work? How do we define success or 
failure? Stengers (ibid.) argues for an 'ethoecology, where the ethos of the 
molecule, that which it is capable of, cannot be dissociated from its oikos, from 
the milieu requiring this ethos'. In the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage, all 
parties to that assemblage experiment since the meso 'must create itself, 
create its own problems, create its own ethos, and engage in 'meso invention' 
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(ibid.). It is political to the extent that those who participate in it experiment with, 
and experience, its fabrication - fine tuning it and feeling its affects and effects 
(ibid.). Contra Bleakley (ibid.), I would argue that this meso level creativity is 
indeed empowering precisely because such invention is student and milieu-
specific (where the latter includes diverse supervisory specialisms); it is not 
about conformity to pre-existing guidelines but rather a working through that 
milieu. It is about the radical specificity of supervisory assemblages and their 
capacity for practical experimentation, for supporting experimentation, and for 
creating and sustaining a students' desire to seek and produce knowledge. The 
writing which is produced through this process of supported experimentation in 
the final plateau is indicative of the plane of immanence or proliferation as 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 41) define it. It is a plane in which thought reveals 
itself as an affective process, but also one that, following Stengers, is 
manifested in the experience that every conceptual solution is a creation that 
generates new unknowns in a moving landscape. The proposition that I defend, 
by enactment throughout this thesis, can be expressed thus: a rhizomatic 
supervisory assemblage operates heterogenetically to support knowledge-
seeking as an ongoing creative relational process. A moving landscape 
achieved through a moving matrix. 
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Writing autoethnograptiically on autoetfinography... 
The suggested abandonment of the writing-up period as a discrete final stage of 
postgraduate research (e.g. Wellington 2010) neglects one source of anxiety 
about getting started: do I know enough to write with confidence or authority? 
The writing below arose from supervisory discussion about theories of 
subjectivity given my reservations about the phenomenological frame I had 
adopted in 2008 and discarded in 2009. At this point in my engagement with 
Deleuze, I knew enough to know that I did not know enough to construct 'a' 
Deleuzean perspective on subjectivity (several conceptualisations are identified 
across Deleuzean texts in secondary sources). I needed a different entry point. 
So I started writing about writing about the distinction between evocative 
autoethnography and radically desubjectifying theories. I used this exercise as 
an opportunity to clarify my understanding of key Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts 
and wrote without a pre-planned structure or pre-specified conclusion. I wanted 
to experience lines of creative becoming not merely write about them. I concur 
that students should start writing at an early stage of their research; insufficient 
attention is given however to the implications for both student and supervisor. 
January 2010 
My intended strategy here was to cite varied autoethnographic texts in 
illustration of the divergent tendencies within this heterogeneous literature, and 
to construct a continuum: initially critiquing those closer to one pole - liberal 
humanist / unitary / arborescent model of subjectivity, before celebrating those 
closer to the other - posthumanist / rhizomatic / non-unified subjectivity. This 
would contextualise my subsequent introduction of a more modernist style 
designed to demonstrate those flows of experience, and that multiplication of 
connections, that indicate a radically different nomadic subjectivity. Contra 
Butler, I would not declare 'there is a person here' amidst my theoretical 
decentering (1990: xvii) and dilute the personal significance of rhizomatic 
thinking. I felt relieved, not alienated, when I encountered the decentred subject 
of an anti-essentialist Althusserian Marxism in 1978 (1969/ 1977: 13, 231). It 
promised the possibility of reconciling Marxism and feminism at a theoretical 
level. Both humanist Marxism that seeks to liberate a repressed human 
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essence, and the unitary self-transparent rational autonomous humanist subject 
exemplified by the timeless universal Cartesian cogito (that thinks and therefore 
is), imply a radical divorce between the social and the individual. Posthumanist 
theories challenged this disconnection but then stood accused of replacing 
essentialism with a determinism or relativism that effectively eliminated the 
subject as an agent of social change. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1972 / 2009) sought to integrate political and 
libidinal economy through the concept of 'desiring-production' and a subjectivity 
defined only by its connection with the 'outside'; hence: 'there is no subject, only 
collective assemblages of enunciation' within historically specific social 
formations where language is always 'a political affair' (1980 / 2004: 144, 154). 
The unconscious ceases to be an 'interior' space within which the Oedipal 
drama is enacted, becoming instead, an active variable inextricably embedded 
production - embedded that is, in both the social and natural world, not hitherto 
unspeakable fantasies about 'Mommy and Daddy' (1972 /1977: 7). The 
popularisation of psychoanalysis suggests one form of politically controlling 
arborescent thinking: we look to early familial, or powerful interpersonal, 
experiences as 'root' causes in our personal accounting rather than 'uprooting' 
this reductive image of a fixed and 'deeply rooted' identity. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980 / 2004: 13) advise us to 'forget trees and think grass' since the latter's 
root system implies a rhizomatic subjectivity and mode of thinking that is not 
anchored at a single centralised point and hierarchically organised, but that 
multiplies connections in a horizontally organised open-ended network: it is the 
'logic of the AND' that 'nullifies beginnings, endings, and foundational 
assumptions' (ibid. 20, 28). Rhizomatic connections are random and 
probabilistic, as in neural activity, so rather than 'dig deep' into our unconscious 
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through the prescribed entry point of familial relations, it is recommended that 
we think like 'rats' who fail to acknowledge the piped piper of Freudianism and 
enter or exit their burrow system at any of one of many available sites (ibid. 7, 
17,21). 
Already my writing is permeated with dualisms - voluntarism v. 
determinism, social v. natural, conscious v. unconscious, rational v. emotional, 
despite my commitment to move beyond dualistic thinking and rigid social 
binaries - to desire differently (Hooks 1990), escape the forest of arborescent 
thought, and engage in nomadic transgression of social and academic 
expectation. This is the 'problem of writing' (ibid. 22-3)- that we can seemingly 
only challenge one dualism by invoking another. It is 'the furniture we are 
forever rearranging' in search of that elusive 'magic formula we all seek -
PLURALISM = MONISM' (ibid. 23). Acknowledging this paradox does not mean 
however that presenting autoethnography as a continuum would be useful in 
the form of two static poles defined in opposition or presented as mutually 
exclusive. The arborescent and rhizomatic do not represent 'two opposed 
models' but instead, a constant movement between models perpetually 'in 
construction or collapsing'; and the dichotomous arranging of the furniture 
should not obscure the fact that rhizomes can contain 'knots of arborescence' 
and roots can possess 'rhizomatic offshoots' (ibid. 22). Deleuze and Guattari 
(ibid.) 'employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that 
challenges all models'. 
I suspect that my intended strategy stemmed from a failure to develop an 
autoethnographic way of writing that I could call my own; hence the resort to a 
convenient 'tried and trusted' formula for academic writing based on a Weberian 
ideal-type methodology dating back to my pre-university studies in sociology 
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(1976 - 1978). I was well-trained in the 'static writing model' (Richardson 1997: 
87) and consequently find it hard to write without striving to demonstrate my 
capacity for critical and analytical thinking, for organising and structuring 
material, for performing a hegemonic version of the academic subject. I am also 
very conscious that the diversity of autoethnographic styles has expanded 
existing possibilities and provided invaluable citational support (ibid. 2002: 376). 
I want to experiment with different styles and it is precisely this awareness that 
others have already risked institutional opposition to achieve this multiplication 
of methodological possibilities that deters me from dismissing any specific 
autoethnographic approach. Autoethnography was my second selected 
methodology (2009) and the very fact that I portrayed my own experiences of 
doctoral study as data in a second project approval procedure is testimony to 
the pressure, real or perceived, to conform to a single hegemonic 
postpositivistic research model (St. Pierre 2004: 286). 
Thinking back to my initial reactions - powerful gut reactions, to various 
autoethnographic texts, they had little to do with the construction of some 
typology organised around notions of subjectivity and associated 
epistemological presuppositions. I reacted strongly to descriptive details that 
resonated with, or offended, sacrosanct personal memories. I felt energised by 
some texts and deflated by others. I jarred at the apparently prescriptive 
character of some more methodologically orientated texts. And when reading 
published transcripts from a conference discussion (Bochner and Ellis 2002), I 
felt inexplicably angry. In 2008, I attended a master class given by one of the 
discussion participants. An excerpt from a seminal autoethnographic text (Ellis 
and Bochner 1996) was circulated (Ellis 1996: 140-143)- an account of an 
adult daughter caring for her elderly, fragile and dying mother. I was moved by 
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the tenderness and compassion with which each detail of a bathing ritual was 
related but repeatedly returned to the first paragraph. Did I need to know about 
the shit under her mother's fingernails? Why was this mentioned? And why did 
this graphic image prompt such quiet outrage? I had been vividly reminded of 
an elderly relative - a woman whom I revered as I grew up, and a woman who 
fought to maintain a sense of personal dignity as she died of a similar cancer. I 
articulated my concern that the elderly and dying should be permitted some 
dignity - whether they are alive or aware enough to register its violation in print 
or not. I accepted the author's explanation. A year later however, I still find this 
excerpt disquieting - it depresses and irritates me. 
I do not suggest here that the author was unethical or morally 
reprehensible, as if there is, or could be, some universal transcendent value 
dictating what we should, or should not, include in our writing about others. 
Instead, I treat texts as encounters that are good or bad for me as a unique 
existent, as a middle-aged woman, as a reader, and as a researcher who is 
tired of jumping through institutionalised neoliberal hoops in pursuit of a 
sameness that masquerades as knowledge production. I follow Deleuze's 
engagement with Spinoza's philosophy in doing this: 'The good is when a body 
directly compounds its relation with ours, and, with all or part of its power, 
increases ours', and 'goodness is a matter of dynamism, power, and the 
composition of powers'; I am thinking here of 'relational composition' or 
'relational decomposition' - whether the power to act is enhanced or diminished 
by a particular encounter (1970 / 1988: 22, 23). Is this encounter energising? 
Will it facilitate experimentation and transformative becoming? (Gale and Wyatt 
2009: 36). Does it offer an 'intensification of life'? (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 
74). 
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When first encountering Richardson's writing about a friend with cancer 
(Bochner and Ellis 2002: 372-376), I was confused by the Self-Other binary that 
appeared to inform it given her endorsement elsewhere of feminist 
poststructuralism (1997: 48-9, 165). But is that what I really care about? Or is it 
her determination to enter a 'zone of proximity' and produce a 'minor literature' 
(Deleuze 1997: 226, 228) in politicising her friend's story and speaking with, not 
for, those whose health status precludes collective agency - her ability to evoke 
the sense of a time that is yet to come (ibid.)? Would I prefer that she talked of 
an ethical 'mode of existence' (Deleuze 1962 / 1983: 75-77), and not a 
'remoralization' (ibid. 375) where the latter implies a socio-political constellation 
of constraining rules that, historically, has not served the interests of the 
'isolated' and 'disempowered' (ibid. 376) particularly well? And if I answer in the 
affirmative, am I not promoting another orthodoxy and contradicting my desire 
for a radical academic pluralism and for a similar heterogeneity within 
autoethnographic writing? Deleuze defines a 'minor literature' as writing that 
invents 'a people that is missing' and creates 'a possibility of life' (ibid. 229). It is 
writing with the oppressed or those whose voice is excluded from the public 
arena. To institute a 'zone of proximity' demands a self-effacement or 
imperceptibility where becoming is always 'between' or 'among' (ibid. 226); it 
speaks of an ethical de-individualisation (cf. Foucault's preface in Deleuze and 
Guattari 1972/2009: xiv). 
At the same master class, triangulation as a means of verification of 
autoethnographic accounts was recommended where possible - a technique for 
validation critiqued by Richardson and St. Pierre (2005: 963) given its 
assumption of a 'fixed point' or 'object' that can be triangulated. This recourse to 
a postpositivistic research model and concomitant suggestion, that a more 
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objective truth awaits us if only we triangulate hard enough, also dampened my 
enthusiasm. I was there to explore alternative models and avoid becoming an 
evidence-based lapdog of governmental intrusion into the academy (Lather 
2004: 15). I was disappointed. Why then, only months later, did I feel compelled 
to present my prospective research in such postpositivistic terms - my own 
experience as data? Deleuze states: 'We always have the beliefs, feelings, and 
thoughts that we deserve given our way of being'; hence our actions and 
utterances must be evaluated, following Nietzsche, as symptomatic of our 
'mode of existence' (1962 /1983: 1). A 'noble' life means 'denouncing all that 
separates us from life' and maximising those encounters that energise us 
through 'joyful passions' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 74; Deleuze, 1970 / 1988: 
26, 28). Even at proposal stage, I had adopted a strategy that I construe now as 
'looking both ways', i.e. outlining a traditional postpositivistic qualitative study 
but electing for a multi-genre and therefore less restrictive dissemination 
vehicle. Davies is correct to suggest that fear is the currency of neoliberal 
managerialist higher education systems (2005: 3, 7, 11). In my case: fear that I 
would be refused entry into a doctoral programme, then fear of disbarment from 
the next phase. Richardson identifies postgraduate entry as one site where non-
positivistic research and writing is increasingly viewed as deadwood that can be 
discreetly pruned from the tree of academic life (1997: 209). 
On Deleuze's account of Spinoza, the implied mode of my existence 
would undoubtedly be considered 'bad' and my actions evidence of a self-
inflicted 'enslavement' to neoliberal methodological hegemonies (Deleuze 1970 
/1988 : 20, 23). I was guilty of the Spinozan illusions of 'final causes' and 'free 
decrees' which translate here as: the system gave me no choice, therefore I 
chose to do this (ibid.). I had diminished my own power of acting. In the 
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immanent ethics of Deleuze and Guattari, 'what must I do?" questions are 
rejected as belonging to a moral order which relies on external reference points 
and fixed identities, and replaced with 'what can I do, what am I capable of 
doing?' questions that are ethical and derive from Nietzsche and Spinoza 
(Smith 2007: 67). My writing here is about finding out what I can do outside of 
the grid-lock of institutionalised postpositivism, and a neoliberalism that prefers 
'breakdowns to breakthroughs' (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 1977: xvii) or 
'affirmative tokenism' (Winefield et al. 2002: 9; Sklar 1980: 45 cited in Davies, 
Gottsche and Bansel, 2006: 311) to real heterogeneity. I was gently nudged -
and sometimes pushed, towards asking that 'what can I do?' question by some 
autoethnographic texts I had encountered long before I understood and 
embraced the affective and ethical potential of Deleuze. Shortly after resisting 
the undertaking of a conventional analysis of transcripts, acquired during the 
earliest phase of my current doctorate, I read papers where Elizabeth St. Pierre 
(1997a, 2004) documented a similar reluctance and found the citational support 
that Richardson insists is so important when normative boundaries are 
transgressed (Flemons and Green in Bochner and Ellis 2002: 376). This 
strengthened my resistance as intensities and affects were multiplied to 
produce further possibilities for my experience. This is what Deleuze means by 
relational composition: these texts energised me, fed me, made me stronger 
(1970 / 1988: 22). I felt passionately that my decision to abandon the study and 
elect instead for an autoethnographic method was the ethically correct one. 
Shortly aftenA^ards, I discovered Tami Spry who performs autoethnography and 
challenges the 'apartheid of knowledges' that is played out in rigid distinctions 
between 'thinking and doing, interpreting and making, conceptualising and 
creating' in academia (Conquergood 2002:153). For Spry (1995, 1997, 2001, 
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2006) the self is located as a reflexive physical presence in both text and 
performance. Conquergood's notion of 'co-presence' with the self as other is 
mobilised, and I found the sense of futurity and embodied agentic power within 
her writing to be thoroughly energising. The passionate refusal of victimhood 
and survivor status in narratives of sexual violence (1995) is strongly 
reminiscent of the defiant rejection of normative constraint which enlivened the 
feminist activity of my teenage years. And when I read Spry's powerful accounts 
of losing a child (2006: 339-46) and losing a mother to cancer (1997: 351-7), 
academic considerations of co-presence as a restatement of the Self-Other 
binary dissipated as my own body remembered the psychotic quality of 
profound grief and yearned to go there. Spry has consistently challenged the 
'force of exclusion and abjection, [ ] the abjected outside, which is, after all, 
"inside" the subject as its own founding of repudiation' (Butler 1990:3), and 
responded to the postpositivistic 'politics of evidence' by positing the body as a 
'body as evidence' and performative autoethnography as an 'epistemic / 
aesthetic praxis' (2009: 603). The body functions as a privileged site for a 
critical reflexivity that can disrupt 'social strategies of abjection' and highlight the 
social contingency of purportedly universal ahistorical laws of subject-formation 
(Butler 1990: 190). It is not entirely clear to me whether Spry is following Butler 
in assuming that the body is materialised through language - that the materiality 
of the body is an 'effect' of discourse as a reiterative and citational practice, or 
whether the speaking and performing of the previously unspeakable is 
indicative of a natural bodily reality outside of its discursive production. This 
hardly matters. My encounter with Spry's writing leaves me with a sense that 
foreclosure - as the exclusion and marginalisation of particular narratives and 
identities, is infinitely more fluid than the term implies. I feel the affective 
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potential of her writing - on my skin and through my body, and the passions 
induced are joyful. They empower me. I read Spry intensively. As Deleuze 
(1990/ 1995: 7 - 9 ) explains: 
'There's nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret. 
It's like plugging in to an electric circuit [ ] in contact with what's outside 
the book, as a flow meeting with other flows [ ] as a series of experiments 
for each reader in the midst of events that have nothing to do with books' 
Performance as a 'way of knowing' (Pelias 1999: ix; Spry 2009: 603) - as a site 
of critical reflexivity and political agency, resonates with Deleuze and Guattari's 
theory of the Real (1972 / 2009) and their dismissal of an unknowable Real or 
one that is perpetuated by Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
Spry's insistence that autoethnography must be more than the 
production of personal emotional narrative (ibid.) echoes Deleuze's comments 
about an 'infantile conception of literature' as the writing of 'ones memories and 
voyages, one's loves and griefs' (1997: 227). But here Deleuze is objecting to 
the role of psychoanalysis in privatising and Oedipalising experience under 
capitalism, and the concomitant diminution of our sense of the 'continual praxis 
of identity' (Spry 2003: 171). Deleuze suggests: 'One does not write with one's 
neuroses. Neuroses or psychoses are not passages of life but states into which 
we fall when the process is interrupted, blocked or plugged up' (1997: 228). The 
'logic of sensation' outlined by Deleuze (1981 / 2003), and the 'clinical aesthetic' 
that he proposes - which 'has the advantage of not being a psychoanalysis' 
(1981 / 2003: 31), allows us to rethink experiences of psychosis, depression, 
and hysteria as the embodied realities of any life however singular its becoming. 
I recoiled when reading that Ellis (Flemons and Green in Bochner and Ellis 
2002: 116) advises her students to become 'their own therapists'. Elsewhere in 
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this four part dialogue, Bochner (ibid. 169) talks of 'destigmatizing therapy'. I 
imagined how I would feel if I was encouraged to supply details of a trauma in 
my life (ibid. 163) and subsequently advised to become my own 'therapist'. 
Anger would be my first response; swiftly followed by the feeling that I was 
being manipulated and that talk of 'destigmatization' was disingenuous. The 
flipside of the immanent evaluative, affirmative and transformative ethic 
proposed by Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 74) is that we endeavour not to act 
thoughtlessly or enhance our own power to act at the expense of others: we 
inquire, we experiment, we bring into existence rather than judge (Marks 2005: 
86). 
Deleuze and Guattari summarise feminist responses to Lacan's take on 
desire as lack in the late 1960s and 1970s as: 'We are not castrated. So you get 
fucked' (1972 / 2009: 68). My spontaneous reaction to a definition of 
autoethnography as 'exposing a vulnerable self (Ellis 1999: 673) took the not 
dissimilar form of: I am not vulnerable. So you fuck off. In the feminist 
consciousness-raising groups I attended at seventeen years of age the 
unspoken ethos was: explore every nook and cranny of your vulnerability within 
the privacy of the group, but beyond it, avoid providing political capital to those 
who would stereotype you as passively feminine by concealing that vulnerability 
and going for angry defiance, self-assertion, and collective agency instead. 
There were heated debates about psychoanalysis and sessions where we 
experimented with co-counselling, feminist dream-interpretation and 
transactional analysis as exercises in empowerment through politicisation of the 
personal. We were moving on, becoming, not licking wounds. I imagine that 
Spry would approve: the self-exposure was 'essential to the argument, not a 
decorative flourish, not exposure for its own sake' (Behar 1997: 13-14 cited in 
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Spry 2001: 713). The sharing of details of distressing life events was liberating 
not stigmatising: we were dismantling an artificial interior-exterior divide 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 28), foregrounding the 'back story' 
(Goffman 1959 / 1 9 7 1 : 66), and finding a politics in all of our experiences. What 
am I saying here? I think that 'vulnerable' is one of those words that has 
acquired a taken-for-granted uncontested quality and I am drawn to 
autoethnographic texts that 'trouble' it (Lather 2007: 27) explicitly or otherwise. 
My recent reading of Spry (1995) worked to disrupt any sense of a shared post-
feminist present. It was 'untimely' in its evocation of one era and its creation of 
another - here, now, for me (Colebrook 2002: 62 -3). So I worry about the 
prescriptive import of the definition supplied by Ellis (1999: 673). How 
vulnerable is vulnerable and who decides? Whose interests are served by 
individualising vulnerability? 
Vulnerability remains a political issue in neoliberal higher education 
regimes where image management, competitive individualism (Davis 2005: 9) 
and institutionalised relational decomposition prevail (Sparkes 2007: 521-50). 
The issue of who decides arose in another context. In my original research 
proposal (submitted in 2007), I cited existing research into doctoral study 
amongst academics where memory-work had elicited accounts of 'traumatic' 
experiences; the authors had concluded that such experiences are a condition 
of production of the independent scholar (Lee and Williams 1999:23). This 
prompted one supervisor, who left my supervisory team in 2009, to presuppose 
the vulnerability of my research participants. Ironically, given my expressed 
epistemological and theoretical interests at the time, I responded by citing 
quantitative psychological research that assessed the risk of re-traumatisation 
of previously traumatised research participants in a lengthy appendix to a 
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mandatory two page ethics protocol. I outlined the shortcomings of hegemonic 
Kantian and utilitarian ethical principles, and proposed a pragmatic orientation 
involving empathetic identification. The Kantian categorical ethical imperative 
dictates that participants are viewed as ends in themselves not purely 
instrumentally but fails to generate practical guidelines. Utilitarian cost-benefit 
ratio calculation lacks an equivalence of terms for assessing cost and benefit, 
and the level of ethical analysis is ambiguous since the stated benefits of 
research to society in general, not individual participants, permits research 
where the individual costs are unacceptably high from a Kantian perspective. 
Despite my Director of Studies intervening and assisting me in securing 
approval, and support from my third supervisor, I subsequently wrote angrily of 
the infantilisation of both researcher and researched in ethical approval 
procedures and suggested that they are primarily concerned with policing 
methodological hegemonies and protecting institutional interests. I had also 
rejected the ethical philosophy of Levinas as it is difficult to see how a moral 
obligation to the Other is demanded simply by virtue of its presence (Moran 
2000: 351). I find the implied rigid binary of Self-Other problematic, and for 
Deleuze, the concept of the Other is the paradigmatic concept of transcendence 
that works to separate someone from their capacity to act; it is 'the concept of 
impotence raised to infinity' (Smith 2007: 68). The affective potential of 
performance autoethnography lies not in a performer, conceived as a unitary 
Self, representing their experience to an audience, conceived as Other, but in 
the generation of impersonal affects that cannot be located in any one agent or 
subject: 'Life is a dynamic swarm of affects, of interactions, encounters or purely 
machinic connections and productions. It is from affects that distinct beings are 
formed' (Colebrook 2002: 61). 
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My declared intention to interview mature students and experienced 
supervisors was interpreted as highly risky from an ethical perspective by the 
aforementioned former supervisor, so I produced an interview consent form 
stating that I was gathering data not offering therapy even though this seemed 
insulting to my prospective participants. In that document, I emphasised that my 
interviewing style would be dialogical (Oakley 1981: 30 - 61). I was taken aback 
however when during one interview I was asked whether I had considered 
autoethnography. I immediately understood the implication: that my sense of 
'enslavement' to a positivistic research model was concealing a cowardly 
refusal to make myself vulnerable, and far from producing a 'collective story' 
(Richardson 2002: 375), or contributing to a 'minor literature' (Deleuze 1997: 
228), I must be desirous of my own repression given the protection from the 
vulnerability of self-exposure that it afforded. She was right. It had been easy 
until this point to locate theoretical rationales for my methodological 
ambivalence - my ignoble mode of existence: I was living the fragmentation of 
the subject across numerous language games that is our postmodern condition 
(Lyotard 1979 /1984) or expressing the contradictory impulses of gendered 
socialisation - the simultaneous but conflicting desires to be 'one's own person' 
and'the right kind of person' (Davies and Gannon 2006: 158, 160, 181). 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 259) talk of a 'vast confusion of 
contradictory drives'. The subject is posited as a multiplicity of unconscious 
drives which are never purely individual and constantly change. Following 
Nietzsche, the idea that our reason or intellect determines which drive 
predominates in any given situation is rejected (ibid. 1994: 387); their relative 
strength varies as time elapses and depends on the encounters through which 
we are constituted, and the mode of existence we pursue. Desire is necessarily 
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invested in the social formation (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 29). But we 
can strive to maximise those encounters that are our singular becoming, and 
that promise creative transformation or 'lines of flight' which are formulated as 
ruptures, new beginnings, or novel paths to pursue (1980 / 2004: 4, 9-10). I 
became increasingly interested in poetic performances of autoethnographic 
material that combined vulnerable self with angry self, politicised self, 
impassioned self and self as becoming. At one master class event, where active 
participation was encouraged, I borrowed from a performance artist who has 
talked openly about his childhood abuse and self-injurious behaviour (Athey 10'^ 
November 2006). I felt empowered through this joyful relational composition and 
elected for autoethnography as my latest research method of choice. My 
attendance at such events was not a self-initiated self-help strategy. I am not 
my 'own therapist', but instead, recognise positive encounters and connection 
with others as assisting the process of troubling my reticence about public 
expressions of vulnerability. I was 'aided, inspired, multiplied' (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980 / 2004: 4) by others. 'True freedom lies in affirming the chance of 
events' and 'taking thinking, constantly, beyond itself (Colebrook 2002: 38). 
I discovered the practical ethics of Deleuze and Guattari when seeking 
citational support for dissemination vehicles with performative potential, i.e. 
texts that disrupt expectations and facilitate thinking outside of familiar frames. 
At proposal stage in 2007, I proposed a 'messy text' (Marcus 1994: 563 - 74; 
Denzin 1995: 177- 184, 1997: 17) where deployment of different genres would 
underline competing constructions of social realities (de Freitas 2007: 337; 
MacLure 2003: 80-81) despite nagging concerns about the ethics of such 
representationalist thinking. The use of 'messy text' techniques in 
autoethnographic accounts of abusive experiences (e.g. Ronai 1995) highlights 
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such concerns: does construction of the same event in multiple versions merely 
serve to strengthen charges of subjectivism or perspectivism, and thereby 
reproduce the invalidation that perpetrators invariably resort to in their public 
and psychological denial? Similar issues are evoked in a question that Wyatt 
poses to Gale about writing as the performance of a story: 'does that mean that 
it didn't happen? In the sense that there are myriad versions, not just one story' 
(2009: 68). Gale responds: 'of course, it happened!' and then explains that the 
telling and re-telling of stories can reveal '(rhizomatic) complexities' that change 
the teller not the status of the event (ibid. 74). This echoes Richardson: 'If the 
person truly is writing an "is" story, an "isness" story, the person will be changed 
by the process of the writing' (2002: 120). 
It struck me that the adopted genre in Wyatt's autoethnographic account 
of a physically punitive religious ritual is unequivocally realist (ibid. 2009: 227-9). 
I welcomed this narrative realism but was unnerved by my gratitude. The 
language of linguistic mediation has become my everyday tongue just as 
humanism is 'the air we breathe' (St. Pierre 2000: 478). I vehemently oppose 
postpositivism as a methodological monopoly and its preoccupation with 
veracity, validity, detachment, and objectivity, yet my thinking remains 
thoroughly realist where, and when, a personal truth matters. I find these 
divisions in my philosophical, theoretical and personal loyalties difficult to 
manage. I want to be consistent and it worries me when I am not. Like 
Richardson, I have enthusiastically embraced many poststructuralist writers 
during my academic history, but inevitably a deeply-seated sociological 
sensibility - or cynical feminism, makes me ask why particular theories or 
philosophies are taken up when they are: 'it is really interesting and important to 
point out that that the author died exactly when women and minorities came to 
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voice' (ibid. 120). And, I would add, that a//our bodies became docile, 
disciplined and punished, just as those who had expehenced physical, 
psychological, and sexual abuse were seeking to end conspiracies of social 
silence. During my first doctoral experience of the 1990s, I was advised that 
sociological research into child abuse would be credible only if I explored how 
abuse is discursively, and variably, constructed. I felt then that the 'it', the 
'isness', of any testimony could, under such circumstances, become the abject 
that might be conveniently ignored in this rejection of realism - that the 
'collective story' (Richardson 2002: 375-6) would be eradicated. 
I read Deleuze as 'ultimately a realism' (Shaviro 2009: 47) and as 
radically materialist (Braidotti 2005 / 2006) because I need to. I am tired of 
epistemological conundrums that go nowhere just as Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980 / 2004: 17) are 'tired of trees'. Deleuze allows a 'me' that is the possibility 
of change, of movement, of relationship, of a radically decentred subjectivity 
(Mansfield 2000: 136). I follow Braidotti (1994: 5) and Gale and Wyatt (2006: 
1118) in feeling the creative and political energy that is engendered when the 
traditional dualisms of Self and Other, mind and matter, real and represented, 
thought and feeling are abandoned. Others, like St. Pierre (1997b), read 
Deleuze somewhat differently - as fitting seamlessly into a web of linguistic 
constructivism. Deleuze and Guattari would undoubtedly approve of these 
varied readings: 'It's not about re-examining sacred texts which have been more 
or less interpreted; it's about taking a good look at the actual situation as it now 
stands' (Deleuze 2006: 88). I need my 'cerebral pessimism' to become affective 
or bodily 'optimism' (Deleuze 1981 / 2005: 37). I want my doctoral writing to 
convey the process of my learning, to function as evidence of that learning in its 
physicality, in its intermingling of personal and relational history and academic 
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product. I am conscious now that I intended an emphasis on affective response 
to specific texts, and the ethical issues evolved for me, to enliven the academic 
prose that I habitually produce. Instead I have drifted, rhizomatically, into darker 
waters. I have allowed this to happen. 'We will speak of freedom only when we 
pose the question of an act capable or not of filling the amplitude of the soul at a 
given moment' (Deleuze 1987 cited in Smith 2007: 73). Letting it happen is my 
academic freedom - my soul speaking through the writing. And this is my 
doctoral experience - its 'isness'. 
Colebrook (2002: 95) explains: 
Transcendence is equivocal: positing a being that is - the outside world 
- and a being that knows or represents - mind or "man". Univocity posits 
one plane of becoming with no point being the ground or knower' 
I understand univocity to permit the use of 'realist tales'and 'experiential 
author(ity)' {\/an Maanen cited in Richardson 1997: 90) as more appropriate 
sometimes than 'experimental representation'. For these writers, 
poststructuralism facilitates a move away from 'science whting' to 'let us off the 
hook of science' (ibid. 88, 89, 91). Each is referring to postpositivistic research 
models and narratives - where I wholeheartedly support their position, while I 
am referring to writing of experiences where power and trust have been abused 
and issues of validity and invalidation are emotionally loaded. I am unsure about 
'crystallization' however - the image of the crystal as an alternative form of 
'validity' (ibid. 92). Deleuze promises, not another version of validity confining 
me to the same problematic or plane as postpositivism, but instead a way of 
having my 'it' and experimenting with it: finding intensities, reaching thresholds 
and being transformed, energised and politicised by them. Writing about 
49 
abusive episodes as realist accounts has affective potential; it is precisely the 
nnatter-of-fact style - given the events being described, that is shocking in Gale 
and Wyatt (ibid.) and that forces the reader to think. Crystalline validity is 
presented as a response to the 'crisis of representation' (Denzin and Lincoln 
2005: 18) - a means of 'troubling' (Lather 1996: 525) postpositivistic notions of 
objectivity and the quest for a shared truth. But I worry that it perpetuates: 'the 
tripartite division between a field of reality (the world) and a field of 
representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the author)' (Deleuze and 
Guattah 1980 / 2004: 25). Richardson is seeking transgressive 'methods' (ibid. 
166) that expose 'hidden assumptions' and 'life-denying repressions': 'Reseeing 
and retelling are inseparable' (ibid. 167). So 'crystallization' lays bare the 
'interweaving of processes in the research: discovery, seeing, telling, storying, 
re-presentation' (Guba and Lincoln 2005: 208). Richardson is asserting the 
transformative power of writing - its capacity to be creative of continually shifting 
researcher-writer identities. Interpreted in this way, it suggests one way of 
'bringing ethics and epistemology together [ ] via practices of engagement and 
self-reflexivity' (Lather 1993: 686) and of challenging prescribed identities in a 
'continual praxis of identity' (Spry 2003: 171). The growth of crystals affirms the 
power of difference; they do not remain the same only bigger; their growth is 
their becoming different. 
Affect in Deleuze is a form of pre-personal or impersonal perception that 
is intensive because it concerns the becoming of qualities. Intensities produced 
by writing will, as Colebrook implies, disrupt or confuse the faculties and allow 
both reader and writer to grasp: 'the powers of becoming from which our 
ordered and composed world emerges' (2002: 39). So returning to the question 
evoked for me by the potentially prescriptive description of autoethnography 
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provided by Ellis (1999: 673) (how vulnerable is vulnerable and who decides?) I 
insist that only the writer can decide, in their singular becoming, how much they 
say and how they say it. This is what I take from writing as nomadic inquiry 
(Gale and Wyatt 2009); that becoming is necessarily unpredictable, depending 
as it does on the chance of events - on the memories, texts, situations and 
others encountered during the process of writing. So my own self-writing may 
be realist at times, but also become experimentally hysterical, depressive, 
psychotic even: 'Reason is always a region carved out of the irrational - it is not 
sheltered from the irrational at all' (Deleuze 2004: 157). By hysterical, I mean an 
'excess of presence' where the writing releases presences beneath and beyond 
representation through its action on the nervous system and the production of a 
'nervous optimism' (ibid. 1981 / 2003: 36 - 37). By psychotic, I mean writing that 
reveals a 'body without organs' (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 173) - a 
'connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities' (ibid. 179) 
that recognises desire in all its positivity; a desiring machine that has been 
'plugged into other collective machines' because the body without organs is 
necessarily 'a Collectivity', and one where 'what remains of me, unalterable and 
changing in form, crossing thresholds' is about 'experimentation' (ibid.). By 
depressive, I mean writing which speaks of interpretation (reduction to pre-given 
frames) and judgment replacing experimentation and therefore learning - of the 
blocking of flows, connections and intensities within neoliberal grids (ibid.). 
Richardson talks of stories that change over the course of their telling, 
and the selves that change with them (Flemons and Green, 2002: 91); there are 
many stories here in this writing of mine: stories that start in the middle, that 
surface for breath and that distract my thinking. I had wanted my writing to 
exude affirmation - 'a desire that produces' (Deleuze 2004: 223) by not writing 
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'against' (ibid. 141). I tried to reorientate myself in a new geography of writing 
style, avoiding the ascents of a highly theoretical impersonal discourse, striving 
to be worthy of the powers of difference that flow through me (Deleuze 1969 / 
1990: 170); and leaving behind 'the linear mode of intellectual thinking, the 
teleologically ordained style of argumentation that most of us have been trained 
to respect and emulate' (Braidotti 1994: 29). I recognise however that: 'The 
BwO is a component of passage' (ibid. 175) and: 'Writing has nothing to do with 
signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping even, realms that are yet to 
come' (ibid. 5). 
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Foucault, Freud and flagellation ... 
Long before I finished the thesis, I became conscious of a rhythm establishing 
itself within and across plateaus. I had not appreciated just how powerful the 
sense of risk might be when transgressing my own sedimented assumptions 
about academic writing. Upon re-reading, it seemed that I had run for the cover 
of my habitual style of writing in the plateau below, contrary to my professed 
intentions and supervisory support for experimentation. This rhythm or 
movement was duly noted in supervisory feedback - that T had suddenly 
disappeared from the text and needed to consider why this had happened. I 
was aware when writing this plateau that Latour (2004: 230) has rejected the 
'critical barbarity' of social scientific critique. But I have to admit that I can derive 
considerable pleasure from exercising this writing skill when I feel that it is 
warranted. I respond here to a paper on the later Foucault that appeared to 
exemplify the sort of invalidating reductionism that psychoanalytic theory can 
engender 
February 2010 
The artist never confronts a blank canvas, or the writer a blank page. The latter 
must be 'emptied' or 'cleaned' of all 'givens' in a process of deciding what will 
hinder and what will help - which 'cliches' ('psychic' and otherwise) should be 
abandoned and which retained (Deleuze 1981 / 2005: 61). Confronting these 
cliches can be a difficult experience of 'confused sensations' (ibid. 62, 71) -
irrational and involuntary responses. But this is all part of that process of 
deciding, not 'who I am', but 'what I want to become' (Braidotti 2002: 2) as an 
academic subject. And it is this knowledge that I am not a blank page - an 
empty surface awaiting normative neoliberal inscription, which makes me resist 
institutional imperatives that assume that I will inevitably and unquestioningly 
recognise myself in such premises. As a mature student with professional 
research experience, 1 re-entered higher education in search of far more than 
accreditation. Memories of my undergraduate days in the late 1970s led me to 
perceive academia as the site where novel or controversial ideas could be 
enthusiastically debated - where ideas mattered, where identities were forged, 
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and where a plurality of perspectives was assumed. I am disheartened by the 
contemporary emphasis on training not education, on accreditation not 
authenticity, and politico-economic imperatives not personal learning agendas. 
Is the 'research training' that governmental intrusion into the academy has 
prescribed (Lather 2004: 15-34; 2006: 35) appropriate for mature students who 
enter with experience in the execution of postpositivistic research or whose 
profession will never require them to demonstrate proficiency in this area? 
The confused sensations I experienced in the initial phase of my doctoral 
studies (2008 - 2009) involved negotiating identity conflicts. I wanted to recover 
an undergraduate self that thrived on engagement in topical theoretical debates 
and grasped their social relevance, yet also felt an enormous pressure to be the 
professional woman who could rapidly read a situation and just get on with 
whatever was required of me - a syndrome Davies and Gannon (2006: 158, 
160) attribute to gendered socialisation and relations of power. As former 
theoretical loyalties and issues were evoked through my reading, I found this 
desire to 'be the right kind of woman' (ibid.) increasingly unsustainable. 
Although like Foucault, I reject the repression hypothesis - the notion that an 
essential or 'true' self awaits its liberation from oppressive social systems and 
their repressive ideologies (1985: 113; 1990b: 102), my current determination to 
explore theories and research practices that challenge the hegemonic 
postpositivistic orientation within higher education (Gale 2007: 472) does feel 
like a recovery of a former academic self. I am excited by my reading of 
Deleuze and the sense of discovery it affords. Lather advises that we 'practice 
in our empirical endeavours what we preach in our theoretical formulations' and 
reflect on how our value commitments 'insert themselves into our empirical 
work' (1991: 80). Such coherence assumes however that those values or 
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political principles are non-contradictory and readily articulated, whereas I had 
spent many years outside of higher education. It was only when beginning a 
traditional postpositivistic analysis of qualitative interview transcripts that I 
recognised a contradiction between my research strategy and my teaching 
practice which is intuitively collaborative, affirmatory, and empathetic. I could 
characterise this recognition as a form of ethopoietic self-constitution (Foucault 
1997: 209; Pelias 1999) - a process, as Braidotti (ibid.) suggests, of deciding 
what I wanted to become, and involving intensive reading as I sought support 
for this desire to develop an alternative research practice ethos that resonated 
with my teaching style. I abandoned postpositivism but became an 'empiricist' in 
Foucault's sense of the term - of trying not to 'advance things without first 
checking whether they are applicable', of attending to the 'finer detail'; and I 
identified with him when I read how, in his youth, knowledge had been 'a means 
of surviving by understanding' - the 'protection of an existence', and how he 
came to regard the 'transformation of oneself by one's own knowledge [as] 
something rather close to the aesthetic experience' (1990b: 106, 39, 14, 7). 
A cliche of the hegemonic linear postpositivistic research model 
increasingly imposed upon academics and students in neoliberal higher 
education regimes (Lather ibid.; Davies 2005: 7; St. Pierre 2004: 285) is that the 
research question is generated through exhaustive review of the existing 
literature. Deviation from this product-orientated self-evidently logical sequence 
is discouraged through concomitant training in generic professional 
competencies like project management (Green 1995: 13). Logico-scientific 
disciplines do, of course, demand production of scientific narratives (Bruner 
1986, 1996) that demonstrate adherence to shared and replicable procedures. 
Beyond such disciplines however, this model functions as a normative force -
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as evidence of a pervasive 'secular theology of enhanced competitiveness and 
ineluctable market forces' (Haraway 1997: 90) and a 'neoliberal orthodoxy' 
(Touraine 2001: 1). Resistance feels 'risky' in a climate of uncertainty about 
individual, institutional, and national economic survival (Davies 2005: 11). 
References to 'heresy' (Atkinson 2004: 111) and 'heretic agency' (Spry 2006: 
344) indicate the perceived power of this dominant research model to suppress 
alternatives ways of thinking. As a doctoral student, in the 1990s and more 
recently, I have resisted producing the type of literature review dictated by this 
model. For me, confining reading to a time-framed stage of a linear research 
process is not at all suggestive of 'a passion for a life of the intellect' or 
'impassioned scholarship' (Davies ibid. 7, 8). Instead, it evokes the 'vampiric 
consumption of de-terntorialized differences' that characterises advanced 
neoliberal capitalism (Braidotti 2005: 2-3). This cliched consumerist treatment of 
texts persists despite recognition that the contemporary proliferation of available 
material pertaining to any one selected topic means that 'no single-authored 
synoptical overview is possible' (ibid. 11). 
Reducing reading to a gap-finding exercise contradicts my 
longstanding expectation of doctoral study that it will afford 'thinking spaces' 
(Davies February 2010) - opportunities to pursue themes, digest ideas, make 
connections, and learn more about the theoretical, philosophical and pedagogic 
traditions that interest me. If asked now why I find the texts of Deleuze so 
engaging, I might glibly respond that they address troublesome binaries like 
'nature-culture' and 'essentialism-constructivism' (Braidotti 2005: 12) and situate 
my work within a recognisable academic tradition; but it has taken many months 
of close reading to find a space that I feel confident writing from. Foucault's 
description of a state known as stultitia in Greco-Roman culture, in the context 
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of the hupomnemata, suggests how the imperative to survey a sizable literature 
in a very limited time may work against thinking and personally transformative 
scholarship: spreading ourselves across numerous texts has a 'scattering' effect 
such that the mind forgets itself and fails to find a point from which to write 'in 
the possession of an acquired truth' (1997: 212). Stultitia is a state of distraction 
implying superficiality and inconsistency (Ure 2007: 51). The hupomnemata is 
one of three sets of pre-Christian practices identified in Foucault's study of the 
'arts' of the self that comprise an 'aesthetics of existence' (ibid. 261). These 
practices differed from subsequent Christian confessional purificatory self-
narratives premised on a belief that self-government, necessitated by an ascetic 
righteous mode of existence, could be fostered through writing about one's 
thoughts and actions, since the very act of writing allegedly enabled the writer to 
anticipate reactions in others and thereby instilled fear of disapproval and 
shame (ibid. 209 - 211). 
Contra Christian purification and self-policing rituals, Foucault argues 
that Greco-Roman writing concerned the exercise of thought and reasoning: the 
hupomnemata were recorded collections of quotes, book extracts, and 
overheard reflections that functioned as 'guides for conduct' and facilitated a 
'silencing of the passions' and self-reliance in the event of adverse 
circumstances (1988: 22). The objective was not to simply memorise and cite 
this disparate material; the power of reasoning was purportedly enhanced 
through an ethical project of self-constitution that demanded its digestion and 
unification - making its truth one's own and forming an identity through which a 
'whole spiritual genealogy' could be read (ibid. 1997: 214). A related but 
distinctive practice of correspondence served the dual purpose of providing 
valued others with advice whilst concurrently preparing the self for similar life 
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events. This embrace of reciprocity and friendship was the 'souls labor upon 
itself and Foucault argues that such reciprocity far exceeded 'counsel and aid'; 
correspondence was equally a reciprocity of the gaze that constitutes the self in 
its presentation for the scrutiny of another - the 'objectification' of the soul is 
simultaneously a 'subjectivation of true discourse' as such writing is construed 
as a 'personal' asset (ibid. 214, 216, 221). The third Greco-Roman form of 
writing and self-training is deschbed, following Plutarch, as ethopoietic; it 
possesses an ethopoietic function by transforming truth into an ethos or 
principle of rational action (ibid. 213). But it is in correspondence where the 
historical development of writing about the self's relation to the self is first 
evidenced; Foucault cites letters from Seneca demonstrating growing concern 
with subjective and bodily states, impressions not actions, and 'interferences of 
soul and body' (1988: 29). These letters show a movement between subjective 
impression - as bodily sensation, and the exercise of thought brought about 
through 'remedies of the soul' which include 'meditative walks' and support from 
others: 'it is a question of recalling the effects of the body on the soul, the 
healing of the former resulting from the care given to the latter' (ibid.). 
Ever since reading that Richardson ascribes a 'healing' power to self-
narrative (Flemons and Green, 2002: 166), I have been intrigued by the use of 
such terminology. It feels risky. It contradicts the image-management I 
associate with neoliberalism and defies the fear of stigmatisation accompanying 
the shift Foucault charts, i.e. the historical migration of maladies from the body-
soul to the head as symptoms of individualised mental illness. My reaction to 
statements about 'healing' is always ambivalent. I applaud the courage of those 
making them but worry that proponents of the postpositivistic research model 
will use and abuse them by perceiving any admission of human vulnerability as 
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indicative of a potential for causing harm and therefore grounds for manipulating 
research agendas. Why else would Davies and Gannon (2006: 6) insist that 
their collective biographical method is not therapy, and why did I once feel 
compelled to advise adult interviewees that therapy was not being offered? 
In my early teens, any suggestion that aesthetic self-stylisation is ethical 
would have been anathema to me; testimony perhaps to the enduring social 
legacy of early Christian polemics within which Greco-Roman ethical practices 
were deemed pagan cults of 'self-love' and the 'sin' of self-deification (Ure 2007: 
23, 31). Hostility today assumes an ostensibly different form: reactions to 
personalised 'confessional' narrative include charges of solipsism - as the 
unhealthy withdrawal into a private sphere, narcissism - as an infantile 
behaviour indicative of retarded emotional development, or self-indulgence - as 
an inappropriately excessive individualism (e.g. Patai 1994: 52). I dislike the 
word 'confessional' intensely and attribute this involuntary, and arguably 
irrational, response to its religious connotations and their function as a 
mechanism of social control. The volunteering of relatively innocuous 
autobiographical detail can trigger self-recrimination despite my intellectual 
interest in the heuristic value of personal narrative. Sometimes though, I will 
perversely head off in the other direction and defiantly put it out there to see 
what comes back. In a reworking of the Christian taboo on self-love and 
valorisation of selflessness, I tell myself that I am old and strong enough to do 
so, and that such self-exposure may make it easier for others to tell their story 
and weather accusations of self-indulgence. 
Wittgenstein viewed confession as a 'kind of surgery, an operation to 
remove cowardice' according to Monk (1990: 372) and Peters (1999b) 
maintains that Wittgenstein's philosophy is interpretable as a positive response 
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to the cultural nihilism of fin-de-siecle Vienna which rendered suicide obligatory 
for many of his peers. Wittgenstein described philosophy as 'more like working 
on oneself (1980: 16e). Peters constructs a third space where '(auto)biography 
and philosophy [ ] commingle' (ibid.); Wittgenstein, Nietzsche and Heidegger 
are located within a philosophical tradition concerned with self-constitution that 
culminates in later Foucault's technologies of the self. Some important 
differences should be noted however: Foucault, I believe, abstained from the 
type of quasi-religious confessional practice undertaken by Wittgenstein in the 
mid-1930s which included oral exposition of his sins to selected live audiences 
and directly apologising to a female pupil whom he had struck but publicly 
denied striking. Moreover, it is precisely the absence of confession as a ritual of 
purification and absolution in Greco-Roman practices of the self that Foucault 
emphasises. And while Wittgenstein remains committed to challenging the self-
transparent Cartesian subject, Foucault's later work is read by Dews as marking 
the 'return' of a subject (1989: 37), or perhaps more accurately, a return to 
Nietzsche, in order to recover a positive model of the exercise of subjectivity 
having conceded that subjectivity is more than an effect of power - however 
embodied and embedded (Ansell-Pearson 1995:13-30; Patton 1994). 
I sense a greater affinity between Foucault's writing on the constitution of 
subjectivity in the 1970s and reductive interpretations of Wittgenstein's 
language philosophy that invite the subject to be viewed as merely an 'effect' of 
'language games' (Wittgenstein 1967 / 1972: 219, 238). Although Wittgenstein 
states that: 'The truth can be spoken only by someone who is already at home 
in it' (1980: 26e), the criteria by which the truth of self-narrative is to be 
established are exclusively those of the language games deemed to comprise 
his post-Cartesian autobiographical project: 'confessing, bragging, accusing, 
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blaming, apologizing, expressing, and so on' (Szabados 1992:6 cited in Peters 
1999). Szabados (ibid. 7) is therefore able to claim that Wittgenstein 
demonstrates the futility of attempts at coherent self-accounting since, on the 
latter's account, such narratives can only be forms of 'myopia or self-deception' 
where any objective of coherence 'fuels omissions, rationalizations, invention: 
suppressions of salient, raw, stubborn memories which confound the imperial 
attitude of pretended wholeness'. Contra Szabados, Davies (2005: 13) argues 
that students should be encouraged to produce coherent or 'stable narratives of 
identity' in order to 'understand the way that neoliberal discourses and practices 
will work against that stability' - to foster conscience and a critical literacy. 
Davies (ibid.) links the ineffable to desire and irrationality, and Wittgenstein is 
equally concerned with what cannot be expressed - he writes of being 
'seduced' by logic and 'mislead' by grammar. Peters (ibid.) however attributes 
Wittgenstein's sense of the ineffable to his Judeo-Christian Calvinist religious 
outlook which dictated asceticism and a striving for purity; desire here would be 
a torment demanding forgiveness from a 'higher' authority and not a source of 
creativity or transformative becoming-other. 
From a pedagogical and personal perspective, I prefer the less 
prescriptive approach to student 'self-writing' implied by Davies (ibid.) and 
others (e.g. Gale and Wyatt 2009). Peters glosses over differences between 
early and late Foucault in his determination to privilege confessional narrative 
as a pedagogical practice: 'we might profitably investigate the notion of "writing 
the sel f as a pedagogical practice that encourages a confessional mode 
compelling us to tell the truth about ourselves and, thus, creating the conditions 
for ethico-poetical self-constitution'. Foucault does not however mention 
confession in the context of ethopoiesis, nor is there any sense of students 
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being 'compelled' in the relationships of apprenticeship within which the 
Hellenistic and Stoic practices of the self were evolved. Reading and writing 
were spiritual exercises linked to meditation (Hadot 1995: 81). Foucault 
identifies two series: a linear one going from meditation to writing to trial in a 
real situation - 'a labor of thought, a labor through writing, a labor in reality', and 
a circular one where meditation precedes writing which can later be reread to 
instantiate meditation (1988: 37). Peters suggests that for Wittgenstein, 
truthfulness lies in the uniqueness of 'voice' and personal style (ibid.), but I think 
it is equally important to recognise that writers - including students, are similarly 
unique in their attitudes towards to confessional narrative, which are infinitely 
variable. Hence for Pelias (Bochner and Ellis 2002: 35) there is 'no catharsis, no 
purging of emotions [ ] no act of purification' in autoethnographic writing. 
Richardson writes of 'healing activity' but acknowledges that some stories must 
remain untold if the teller is not ready for their telling (ibid. 166-167). 
It may be inaccurate to suggest that Wittgenstein's political awareness 
did not develop beyond guilty self-flagellation at his privileged upbringing, but 
this is my impression: that philosophy and confession were taken as 'therapy' 
for an individual tormented soul. So although Wittgenstein (1972) intends that 
his texts will 'act little by little on our spirit, like a cure, like a medical treatment', 
the inclination to look beyond the individual to the socio-political context in 
Deleuze and Guattari (1972 / 2009; 1980 / 2004) is far more inspiring, precisely 
because it allows the possibility of an ethics that facilitates collective agency, 
and a pedagogy based on relationship and collaboration rather than competitive 
individualism. When Deleuze writes of 'health as literature', and the writer as the 
'physician of himself and of the world' (1997: 228), he is not resurrecting a 
Judeo-Christian tradition of repentance and absolution, of charity and salvation, 
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but referring to writing that 'escapes the dominant system' and that speaks to a 
'people that is missing'. In the same paper, the fragile health of Spinoza is 
mentioned as 'bearing witness until the end to a new vision whose passage it 
remains open to'; there is no conformity to language games here: 'Every writer 
is obliged to create his or her language' and writing is 'passage' - a possibility 
of life (ibid. 228, 229). 
A new vision is conveyed in Deleuze (1981 / 2005), and Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980 / 2004). Traditional narrative structure is abandoned as chapters 
can be read in any order since, as Conley states: 'their conclusions are 
enveloped everywhere in the "machinic" manner of the text' (Deleuze 1988 / 
1993 / 2006: xxi). Machines are simply connections, parts that function together 
in the absence of invisible unifying or organising principles (1980 / 2004: 4-5) 
and to read is to connect with a text in a unique way that has as much to do with 
the affects generated in the reading process (Deleuze 1970 / 1988: 129) as the 
ideas contained within it - which are already, and always, subject to multiple 
readings. In Deleuze (1969 /1990), the body is shown to be organized into an 
organic unity through a hierarchical structuring that produces its subordination 
to the rational ego; this process of subordination is a condition of possibility of 
that ego, but obscures the forces acting upon the body and the multitude of 
assemblages into which a body enters with other bodies (Johnson 1999: 33). 
My reading of Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004) is reminiscent of the 
meditative process associated with the hupomnemata, as Foucault describes it, 
in that I have returned to this text on numerous occasions in order to 
(re)consider specific ideas and make them my own truth. Yet, contra Foucault, 
each reading generates entirely different affects and lines of flight in my thinking 
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and I am changed by it. But I would not describe that change as enhancement 
of my power of reasoning or capacity for rational thought. 
Ure (2007: 19-52) criticises Foucault for a misleading emphasis on 
thought and rationality in his interpretation of Greco-Roman practices of the self, 
and is clearly repulsed by suggestions of an aesthetics of existence. Like 
Peters, Ure identifies a philosophical tradition, dating back to Socrates and 
including Nietzsche, within which to locate Foucault, and conceives this tradition 
as a 'therapeutic' one - a therapeia of the soul, not an aesthetic one. Ure 
endorses claims that Foucault exaggerated the extent to which beauty was the 
telos or objective of Greco-Roman self-training techniques, and that a 
nineteenth century cult of beauty was inappropriately transposed onto a 
classical tradition where the meaning of aesthetics was much narrower (ibid. 22; 
O'Leary 2002: 14-15). Hadot (1995: 207) also criticises Foucault's reading of 
Greco-Roman ethics as an 'ethics of the pleasure one takes in oneself. Ure 
proposes an alternative psychoanalytic interpretation, derived from Freud, of the 
Nietzschean middle works upon which Foucault drew; practices of the self here 
are reduced to 'a treatment' addressing the 'psychological traumas of loss and 
transience' and therefore the 'loss of narcissistic plenitude and its pathological 
manifestations' (ibid. 22 - 23). Against Hadot's advice that the psychological 
state of an author should not be inferred from their philosophic writing 
(Davidson 1995: 18 in Hadot 1995), Ure clearly implies that Foucault is guilty of 
narcissistic self-absorption and that the proposed care of the self only serves to 
heighten this tendency: 'Foucault's recasting of the work of the self in terms of 
Baudelairean Dandyism or the freedom of undefined, unrestricted self-invention, 
elides something fundamental to this ethics'; consequently: 'Foucault's 
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Baudelairean aesthetic self-fashioning is merely a synnptom of narcissism' (ibid. 
24. 25; Foucault 1986: 362). 
Ure is less judgmental about Foucault's observation regarding the 
distortion of modern ethical discourse by a zero-sum Chhstian concept of love, 
presumably as it is supported by a psychoanalytic source - namely Fromm, 
who identified a resonance between Freudianism and Christian theology in a 
shared emphasis on self-renunciation. Fromm (1939: 173 - 197) rejected the 
mechanical relation between self and object love in Freud, whereby an increase 
in one produces a proportionate diminution in the other. Foucault maintains that 
secularisation has neither eradicated the perception of morality as obedience to 
external law, nor the Christian tradition of rendering self-renunciation as a 
condition of salvation - self-love continues to be synonymous with selfishness 
or the sin of self-deification (1988: 22). Hence the contemporary relevance of 
Greco-Roman practices of self in Foucault's project of making care of the self 
'the basis of a morality' and developing a personal ethics as the 'stylization of 
conduct' and exercise of 'individual liberty' (1986: 32, 253; 1985: 115). In The 
Use of Pleasure (1985) it is the relationship of the self to external norms as a 
process of adjustment, not the self-constitution through relationality implied in 
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (1997), which concerns Foucault and where a 
distinction is drawn between the Hellenistic and Roman Stoic traditions: 'beauty' 
and 'brilliance' derive from the manner of adjustment in classical Greek culture, 
whilst the Stoics emphasise rationality as a means of achieving self-mastery 
and introduce the notion of 'enjoyment of oneself without desire or disturbance' 
(1986: 68; 1985: 63, 70). Ure avoids any further exploration of the role of 
psychoanalytic theory and practice in reproducing and perpetuating the 
Christian view of morality as respect for external, and patriarchal, law and seeks 
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instead to demonstrate that Foucault has conflated the classical and Stoic 
traditions and recast them as 'too purely aesthetic' thereby neglecting the 
therapeutic dimension of Nietzsche's 'art of living' (ibid. 34, 47). 
A quotation from Nietzsche provided by Ure (ibid. 35 - 36) - one also 
used by Foucault in both Care of the Self (1986: 44) and Technologies of the 
Self (1988: 20), is evocative of Davies (2005) and the concept of the 'untimely' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 112-113). Nietzsche writes passionately about the 
'lust for power of idealists' who 'hammer into children that what matters is ... the 
salvation of the soul, the service of the state, the advancement of science, or 
the accumulation of reputation and possessions, all as a means of doing service 
to mankind as a whole' (Nietzsche 1880 / 1986: 6). I substitute higher education 
students for 'children' and late capitalism (Braidotti 2005) for 'mankind' and 
wonder what has changed. Maybe Foucault thought so too in insisting that an 
aesthetics of existence was necessitated by the contemporary demise of 
morality as external law (1989: 311). 
However objectionable Ure's central premise and psychoanalytic 
interpretative frame, I have found his provision of historical examples of medical 
metaphors and analogies helpful. Now that I am aware of the extent of their 
usage by Stoics like Seneca, and Nietzsche's adoption of them as his own, I will 
be less antipathetic or ambivalent in future when encountering reference to 
healing and therapy in autoethnographic texts. I am able to situate them, make 
connections, I am generating questions of my own, I am reading with love 
(Deleuze 1990 / 1995: 7-9) and I want to read more. This is not stultitia. This is 
learning. For me, reading is a form of correspondence, collaboration, 
relationality, that says 'do with me' and not 'Do as I do' - which is education for 
Deleuze: 'Our only teachers are those who tell us to "do with me", and are able 
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to emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures for 
us to reproduce' (1968 / 2004: 26). So when I read texts depicting the doctoral 
supervision relationship in neoliberal managerialist or contractual terms (e.g. 
Yeatman 1995: 9-11; Wisker et al. 2003: 91 -105; Mullins and Kiley 1998: 1 -13), 
it is precisely this sense of heterogeneity that is missing; they read like flat-pack 
self-assembly instructions and recipes for institutional 'melancholia' (Nietzsche 
1982: 382). 'Out of loveless words directed at us, conclusions grow up like 
fungus: one morning they are there, we know not how, and they gaze at us, 
morose and grey' (ibid.). The Cynics, Epicureans and Stoics shared the belief 
that 'erroneous beliefs and value judgments' can induce disorders of the soul -
a spiritual sickness, and Nietzsche adopts this position when describing his own 
philosophising as a 'self-treatment' (Ure 2007: 38). 
In a sleight of writing hand, Ure (ibid.) suggests that Nietzsche 
'obsessively returns' to the notion of philosophy as 'a therapeutic art that heals 
the sufferings and diseases of the soul'; an 'aesthetics' of therapy, linked by 
connotation to medicine, is acceptable to Ure whereas Foucault's 'aesthetics' of 
existence is not. And although practices of the self were initially introduced by 
Ure as curative of the 'psychological traumas of loss and transience', additional 
disorders are later identified in a passage from Nietzsche that have a 
distinctively psychoanalytic flavour - traumatic memory and mania, culminating 
in Nietzsche being credited with the positing of an 'alternative medico-
philosophic therapy' (ibid. 40). The Stoic practice of praemeditatio is raised in 
this context; this form of 'self-testing' refers to loss-related emotions such as 
anger, desire for vengeance and envy that demand continuing askesis as self-
mastery through the 'assimilation of truth' not self-renunciation (Foucault 1988: 
35). Ure approvingly describes Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence as a 
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key post-metaphysical diagnostic and curative spiritual exercise and form of 
'self-testing'; it is what Magnus (1978: 156, 194) describes as an antidote to 
Platonism, Christianity, and romantic pessimism, in that these arrest 'becoming' 
and temporality. Ure's approbation of Magnus's argument is confusing since it is 
Foucault's concern with such 'becoming' that is so heavily criticised. The 
purpose of Ure's sleight of hand is manifested when, at the end of his paper, he 
refers to 'Stoic therapy' (ibid. 50). We are longer in the realm of metaphor and 
analogy. 
Foucault writes against a 'Cartesian moment' in philosophy after which it 
is understood as a predominantly cognitive enterprise not one linked to 
spirituality, truth, and subjectivity (2005: 14-16) or 'transformation of the 
subject's being' (Hadot 1995: 265). Nietzsche also objects to a shift in 
philosophy from study of wisdom towards philology (the study of mere words) -
a change he attributes to much eariier sophistic teaching (Ure ibid. 45). 
Foucault asks: 'what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it 
resulted in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not [ ] in the knower's 
straying afield of himself?'(1986: 8). Ure attaches enormous significance to this 
mention of 'straying' from oneself interpreting it as 'continuous estrangement of 
the self from itself, 'limitless, perpetual self-transformation', and 'release from 
all pre-given limits' occurring independently of all external norms (ibid. 47- 48; 
Jay 1989: 73; Dews 1989; 40). Foucault is not only accused of conflating the 
historical contingency of subjectivity with 'self-fashioning as analogous to the 
indifferent, indeterminate material of artistic poiesis'; Ure refers to Foucault's 
'theoretical and personal resistance to psychoanalytic theories' and to Patton's 
argument that Foucault must presuppose a 'feeling of poweriessness' in order 
to promote a continual self-transformation to enhance one's feeling of power 
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(Whitebook 1999: 29-66; Patton 1994: 71 cited in Ure ibid. 49). Foucault's care 
of the self is then read as evidence of precisely that pathology that the 
therapeutic orientation of Roman Stoicism, and the middle works of Nietzsche, 
sought to cure: 'the transgressive desire to flee from oneself or tear oneself 
from oneself that results from a primal 'narcissistic wounding'; Foucault 
purportedly presents such transgression as a 'virtue' because he was unable to 
embrace - at either a theoretical or personal level, the ethical, psychological and 
normative implications of the Stoical project; consequently, according to Ure, he 
seemingly grasps the practical-therapeutic conception of philosophy but 
simultaneously severs it from the central 'normative ideal of self-sufficiency' and 
'analysis and critique of the emotional agitations or pathologies on which this 
ideal is premised' (ibid. 51). 
I have cited Ure's paper at such length for several reasons. Firstly, I 
wanted to show how psychoanalytic theories encourage reductive critiques that 
degenerate into an ad hominem (against the person) mode of argument. 
Whereas Foucault discusses stultitia in the context of the hupomnemata, and 
the importance of rereading and processing their contents, Ure presents stultitia 
as exemplifying the inhibited psycho-emotional development from which 
Foucault must be suffering in order propose an 'aesthetics of existence' that 
valorises self-transformation (ibid. 51). We are effectively invited to dismiss 
Foucault's concept of ethics without an adequate exposition of its content. I am 
suggesting here that it is not just self-writing that implies ethical principles -
particularly since students increasingly rely on secondary sources. Citing Patton 
to bolster the image of Foucault which Ure wishes to convey is misleading. 
What Patton (1994: 60-71) offers is a defence of Foucault against arguments 
that he fails to provide normative criteria against which varying regimes of truth, 
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and forms of individual agency, can be compared. Secondly, I hoped to 
highlight the downside to the consumerist approach to reading dictated by a 
linear research model. Had I pursued my original doctoral research proposal 
(2007), reviewing the existing literature instrumentally - to rapidly identify the 
'gap' with which to justify a postpositivistic study, I could not have pursued these 
sources in any depth or meditated on questions arising during that brief survey. 
I endorse Braidotti's depiction of global capitalism as 'schizophrenic' in its 
multiplication of difference for the sake of profit and national competitive 
advantage. The latter imperative provides the rationale for governmental control 
of the higher education system. For (Braidotti 2005 / 2006): 
'Advanced capitalism looks like a system that promotes feminism without 
women, racism without races, natural laws without nature, reproduction 
without sex, sexuality without genders, multiculturalism without ending 
racism, economic growth without development, and cash flow without 
money' 
If my experience of doctoral study is not to become one of education without 
learning, then I need to pursue issues that arise through my reading. 
I find, for example, that Patton (ibid.) does not endorse Ure's suggestion 
that a 'feeling of powerlessness' underlies Foucault's desire to convert stultitia -
conceived as an infantile disorder, into an ethical mode of existence. On the 
contrary, Patton addresses criticisms of Foucault that he considers misplaced 
and that relate to Foucault's alleged failure to provide normative criteria and his 
conception of subjectivity. Ure's traditional psychoanalytic orientation dictates 
an exclusive focus on individual adaptation to an existing social formation 
through attention to seemingly universal timeless contingencies of life 
(separation, loss, mortality); hence the selective emphasis on 'self-doctoring' 
within Nietzsche's philosophy and neglect of key Nietzschean concepts like will 
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to power. The latter, as a historically contingent feature of human life, involves 
reflexivity and therefore the possibility of political agency or resistance to an 
existing social and moral order. Foucault cannot offer universal moral norms or 
criteria of evaluation without undermining the basis of his analysis of power, 
agency, and morality - all are recognized as historically contingent and 
therefore variable. As Patton states: 'values are internal to types of individual 
and social being, not independent of them', hence it is exactly the non-
universalizable character of Foucault's ethics that permits the possibility of an 
enhanced sense of personal agency and resistance, where oppressive social 
forms seemingly preclude both (ibid.). 
The 'practice of freedom' (Foucault 1987: 113) is not the infantile desire 
for omnipotence or narcissistic plenitude Ure implies, but the possibility of 
personal and social transformation based on a human capacity for reflection, 
critical reflexivity, and modification of power relations as intrinsic to human 
existence. Patton argues that once Foucault's conception of power as an 
interplay of forces and inducement of affective states in other bodies is 
understood, it makes little sense to ask how resistance is possible. Foucault 
follows Nietzsche, firstly, in regarding human freedom and autonomy as a 
given: thinking is part of the capacity to act stemming from 'the kinds of internal 
division within the self which Nietzsche saw as resulting from the human will to 
power turned back against its subject' (ibid. ). And secondly, in recognising that 
the socially situated character of individual existence means that self-
interpretation is influenced by the 'moral' judgments of others; there is a 
'feedback loop' such that affective states induced by those judgments may 
enhance or diminish our 'will to power', and the perceived success or failure of 
our attempt to act will in turn also effect that capacity for agency: 'the peculiarity 
71 
of human action is that it is not only conscious but self-conscious: we are happy 
or sad according to whether our actions produce a feeling that our power is 
enhanced or a feeling that it is diminished' (ibid.). This demonstrates that 
Foucault presupposes a 'fuller conception of human subjectivity' than that 
suggested by either his critics or his focus on power relations, and that this 
conception is required to explain both the feeling of power and the lack of a 
sense of agency that is so often recorded as indicative of oppression (ibid.). It is 
also needed to account for the experience of the limits of freedom as the basis 
for social change, and it is in this context that Patton states: 'In order to account 
for the experience of these systems of power as forms of domination, as limits 
to individual's capacities for action, Foucault must presuppose the existence of 
particular forms of self-interpretation and the existence of something like the 
feeling of power/essness' (my italics) (ibid. 71). 
Ure's (psycho)analysis of Foucault's proposed care of the self 
exemplifies 'interpretosis' (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 127) - 'a 
Western disease that traces all becomings back to some origin' (Colebrook 
2002: 134). Ure implies that had Foucault overcome his resistance to 
psychoanalysis, the Oedipal or childhood trauma underlying his 
recommendation of self-transformation as an aestheticised ethics would have 
been uncovered. 'Interpretosis' is a defining feature of representational thinking 
whereby all experienced affects are read as signifiers of some original scene; it 
is typified by the Freudian concept of overdetermination that reads all affects as 
symptomatic or symbolic of some original parental fantasy, and ultimately, of a 
desire to 'heal' the narcissistic wound of maternal absence (ibid.). Instead of 
referring images back to an event conceived as an external cause, and 
searching for the concealed 'real' meaning, Deleuze and Guattari (2006: 81-83) 
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propose an internal intensity of affect. Dreamed or fantasised images do not 
represent or symbolise anything other than potential actions: 'a desire to 
expand or become-other through what is more than oneself (Colebrook 2002: 
135). A version of 'interpretosis' is evidenced in the educational literature 
(Balatti and Whitehouse 2001: 43; Holligan 2005: 276; Cryer 2000: 87) where 
apprenticeship is recast as a developmental process akin to psychological 
individuation. Hence we speak of 'mature' and 'independent' scholarship 
regardless of the age of the students, and trauma is presented as a condition of 
the production of individualised and 'independent' scholarship (e.g. Lee and 
Williams 1999: 23). 
Deleuze (1986 / 2006: 73) notes the 'stupidity' found in many 
commentaries on Nietzsche and Foucault relating to notions of subjectivity: 
'Emergence, change and mutation affect composing forces, not 
composed forms. Why is this idea, apparently so simple, difficult to 
understand to the point where the "death of man" has caused so much 
misinterpretation? [ ] The question concerns the forces that make up 
man: with what other forces do they combine, and what is the compound 
that emerges' (ibid.) 
I laugh in self-recognition, as I sit glued to a PC monitor with aching wrists, 
when reading the ensuing illustration offered by Deleuze: a combining of the 
forces of man and of information technology will create something other than 
man - 'indivisible "man-machine" systems?' (ibid. 74); there is no universal 
eternal subject here, and the concept of 'Man' is a historically situated one 
which operates as a contrived set of boundaries, or a limit on experience, that 
neglects becomings with the non-human. The affinity Deleuze (1970 / 1988: 22, 
26) identifies between Nietzsche, Spinoza, Foucault's 'death of man' and 
presentation of power as a relation of forces is clearer when Spinoza's definition 
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of a body is understood. The latter involves two propositions: firstly, that a body 
comprises an infinite number of particles: 'it is the relations of motion and rest, 
of speeds and slowness between particles, that define a body, the individuality 
of a body'; secondly, 'a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; 
it is this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its 
individuality'; these propositions are described as kinetic and dynamic 
respectively (ibid. 123). 
For Deleuze, the apparent simplicity of these propositions is deceptive. In 
a passage that captures my own experience of encountering Deleuze's 
philosophy, he writes: 'if one truly installs oneself in the midst of these 
propositions, if one lives them [ ] one finds that one is a Spinozist before having 
understood why' (ibid.). It should be noted that bodies are defined by these 
relations not by form or function - the development of form is dependent upon 
them: 'The important thing is to understand life, each living individuality, not as 
form, or a development of form, but as a complex relation between differential 
velocities [ ] A composition of speeds and slownesses on a plane of 
immanence' (ibid. 122-123). The 'plane' functions as a conceptual-affective 
continuum and Deleuze illustrates this using music and sound particles: 'It is not 
just a matter of music but of how we live: it is by speed and slowness that one 
slips in among things, that one connects with something else' (ibid. 123). 
Deleuze takes up the second Spinozist proposition and underlines its 
implication that bodies (or minds) are not substances or subjects but modes 
defined as relations: 'concretely, a mode is a complex relation of speed and 
slowness, in the body but also in thought, and it is a capacity for affecting or 
being affected, pertaining to the body or to thought' (ibid. 124). Deleuze's 
'indivisible "man-machine" systems' now make more sense since every being is 
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defined by the 'arrangements of motions and affects into which it enters, 
whether these arrangements are artificial or natural' (ibid.); this follows from the 
propositions relating to bodies and to Spinoza's first principle that all bodies -
minds, individuals, machines, whatever, are part of Nature: 'one substance for 
all attributes' (ibid. 122). 
Perhaps this is why Deleuze (1969 / 1990: 149) describes his philosophy 
as an ethics of amor fati or love of what is - an affirmation of existing life not a 
quest for 'external' foundational assumptions and transcendent givens like God, 
Being or Truth (Colebrook 2002: 71). And why Deleuze proposes a 
'transcendental' empiricism that is claimed to be ethical as it concerns the 
concrete conditions of possibility of the real and does not take an ahistorical 
universal Cartesian cogito as a given (Deleuze 1953 / 1991). Deleuze seeks to 
demonstrate the 'productive, positive, and liberating' nature of thought and go 
beyond critique (Colebrook ibid.). On Patton's reading of Foucault, ethopoietic 
self-constitution can be interpreted as a similar affirmation of life, thought, and 
relationality of bodies. And the negation of life in Ure's (psycho)analysis of 
Foucault is clear. Foucault, like Deleuze, sought to liberate his thinking from a 
'subjection to transcendence' and an 'ethics of knowledge' that dictates fact-
finding in an 'exterior' worid as the basis for action (ibid. 71; Foucault 1972: 
203). The 'subject' is simply another form of transcendence or, following Hume, 
the habit of saying ' I ' (Deleuze 2006: 364; 1969 / 1990: 17). Foucault is 
challenging the idea that thinking is an innate interior faculty: 'Thinking does not 
depend on a beautiful inferiority' (Deleuze 1986 / 2006: 72), just as Wittgenstein 
challenged the notion of a 'private' interior language. 
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Painting waves ... 
'One never commences: one never has a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters in the 
middle: one takes up or lays down rhythms' (Deleuze 1970/1988: 123). In the 
preceding plateau, I alluded to concerns about linguistic constructivism but 
defended Foucault against unethical forms of critique (ad hominem 
argumentation and psychoanalytic reductionismj.l was moved to find affinities 
between Deleuze and Foucault not highlight their differences, e.g. Foucault's 
(1990: 32) rejection of productive desire as an originary source and less radical 
conception of power (Morss 2000: 198). I draw on the doctoral pedagogy 
literature below, particularly two papers that adopt Foucauldian concepts and 
purportedly relate theory to supervisory practice. Neither accord with my 
Deleuzean vision of the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage as a site of practical 
experimentation, and both evoke Stengers' (2008) demand for a mesopolitical 
orientation. I continue to support macro-level critiques of neoliberal 
managerialism, even as I struggle to articulate the specificity of my current 
supervisory assemblage and account for its novelty and productivity. I explain 
the apparently paradoxical proposition - singularity through relationality by 
outlining selected Deleuzian concepts. I draw on Smith (2007) who maintains 
that the medical analogies pervading Nietzsche's writing convey the complexity 
of assessing what is singular, and what ordinary, in any given multiplicity (2007: 
12 - 13); hence Nietzsche's likening of the philosopher to a physician reading 
symptoms to ascertain the interrelation of forces prevailing within whichever 
multiplicity is being considered. Despite the metaphorical resonance, this is not 
the language of diagnosis evidenced in institutional supervision policy guides or 
student-directed manuals, where an essence of good or effective supervision is 
invariably posited and remedial or prophylactic actions specified. The first paper 
(Grant 2005) suggests one manifestation of the 'language of therapeutic 
empowerment' in educational settings that Bleakley (2000) rejects, and confirms 
my concerns about psychoanalytic reductionism. The second (Holligan 2005) 
links traditional discourses of scholarly autonomy to the preservation of 
epistemological pluralism in higher education. 
March 2010 
When Francis Bacon met Deleuze following the publication of The Logic of 
Sensation (Deleuze 1981), the artist said that he dreamed of painting a wave 
but dared not believe in the success of such a venture {Translators Introduction, 
2003 edition). Deleuze found this reticence very 'Cezannian' (ibid.) and quotes 
from D. H. Lawrence (1972: 578 - 9) who noted that Cezanne fought with 
cliched representations of the apple for some forty years and that Cezanne's 
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appleyness could not be imitated: 'Every man must create it new and different 
out of himself: new and different'. A similar principle informs the rhizomatic 
supervisory assemblage where supervisors do not ask what 'Proper 
supervision' (Grant 2005: 337 - 338) is or seek to replicate cliched 
representations or models, but instead engage in practical experimentation that 
is student-specific. 
Grant (ibid.) adopts a Foucauldian perspective in presenting doctoral 
pedagogy as a 'rich discursive context' of competing discourses, and this 
context purportedly promises a 'slipperiness' that permits the limits of what may 
be 'sensibly' thought, spoken, and enacted, to slide and shift (2005: 337-338). 
Such discourses are held to function as 'fantasies, fairytales, fictions and 
fallacies' and display an 'unruliness' as they 'play out in lived experience' (ibid. 
338 - 339). Of six competing discourses identified, the four deemed most 
influential are the traditional-academic, techno-scientific, neoliberal and 
psychological, and Grant explores how 'Proper supervision' is constituted in 
each. The traditional-academic is designated an elitist pedagogy of indifference 
(Johnson, Lee and Greene 2000: 135) that requires a subjectivity infused with 
'masculine norms' of academic life (Grant ibid. 341; Frow 1988; Green and Lee 
1995). The image painted here is one of nineteenth century Oxbridge tweed-
clad dons who rarely condescend to communicate with students and eageriy 
perform the rituals of social-academic Darwinism allocated to them; and it is 
argued that this discourse persists in a relationship of tension with more recent 
discourses (ibid. 341). The techno-scientific is deemed a similarly anachronistic 
by-product of late nineteenth century positivism and subsequent postpositivism, 
and supervision is presented as a rational logically ordered process where the 
probability of successful outcomes is maximised through skill training, close 
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surveillance and control (ibid. 342; O'Rourke 1997: 32; Acker etal. 1994: 484). 
A neoliberal discourse, connected with the recent commercialisation of higher 
education, has purportedly reconfigured education as a commodity, students as 
consumers, and supervision as a managed contractual relationship ensuring 
mutual accountability and therefore 'consumer satisfaction' (ibid. 343; Yeatman 
1995: 9 -11). A rampant instrumentalism is allegedly shared by both techno-
scientific and neoliberal discourses, but the former is claimed to be dominant 
given its role in national policy and institutional agendas (Grant, ibid. 343). For 
Grant, both discourses create pressure on students 'to limit their ambitions (the 
scope of their work)' (ibid.). 
The remaining two discourses that Grant identifies, and classifies as 
marginal, are the radical and the psychoanalytic (ibid. 340). The former 
comprises feminist and critical perspectives that emphasise power differentials 
and social positioning (ibid. 344). The latter is characterised as 'Psycho-
Supervision'; it is held to be 'analogous' to therapy and therefore conditional 
upon 'intensive training' if it is to be 'effective' (ibid. 346). A 'psychological' 
discourse, and 'Psy-Supervision' practice, is clearly favoured by Grant. 
Supervision relationships here are constituted as primarily interpersonal and 
personal support is to be provided by a 'caring, expert professional' (Salmon 
1992: 20) who is also charged with guiding the student 'along a developmental 
trajectory to maturity as an independent researcher' (Grant ibid. 341). The 
student is required to 'confess his / her struggles and failings' (ibid.) in this 
teleological normative process. Despite the 'unruliness' and 'slipperiness' of the 
discursive context posited by Grant, 'Psy-Supervision' is predicted to become 
the most powerful discourse and supervision practice (ibid. 350) since, contra 
an elitist 'Trad-Supervision', it is expertise in supervision and not a studenf s 
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doctoral area of interest that is needed. Grant consequently endorses 'Psy-
Supervision' on the grounds that widening participation is facilitated. The 'happy 
endings' that Grant once believed 'Psy-Supen/ision' afforded are now less likely 
however given what are described as institutional limitations; conditions cannot 
apparently become too slippery within a contemporary context of heightened 
accountability for outcomes (ibid. 350 -351). Indeed, Grant goes on to paint a 
scenario that is characterised as the 'fraughtness of contemporary supervision': 
'an individual supervisor, lacking extensive knowledge of the topic, supervises a 
student of unknown ability, within a context of heightened accountability for 
outcomes' (ibid. 348). 
'Psycho-Supervision' and 'Psy-Supervision' are distinguished throughout 
Grant's paper as distinct discourses with the former being recognised as 
inappropriate in the absence of training and in settings other than those of 
relevant therapeutic disciplines, and the latter as universally applicable. 
Nevertheless, Grant inadvertently describes 'Psy-Supervision' as requiring 
intensive therapeutic training at one point and not 'Psycho-Supervision' as 
context would demand (ibid. 346). This slippage or interchangeability is 
alarming given that the ascendency of 'Psy-Supervision' is predicted and 
purportedly requires only skills in supervision, a caring disposition, and 
awareness of the ethical implications of the coexistence of multiple discourses -
the danger that supervisor and student may 'talk past each other' (ibid. 351). 
The potential for abuse of supervisory power, and inappropriate expectations in 
students, is manifest in the event of slippage between 'Psycho-Supervision' and 
'Psy-Supervision'. And I find Grant's paper problematic on several other counts; 
it fails to consider how an emphasis on pastoral care can resolve the very 
scenario that Grant portrays as fraught or, more accurately, the predicted 
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ascendency of 'Psy-Supervision' is premised on the assumption that an 
absence of expertise in a student's area of interest is necessarily a bad thing. 
Grant appears to presume a one-to-one supervisory relationship modelled on 
the psychoanalytic / therapeutic model and is apparently oblivious to the 
possibility of supervisory teams. Neither are extra-supervisory factors 
considered; Trigwell and Dunbar-Goddet (2005), for example, suggest that the 
departmental environment can condition student perceptions of their 
supervision - presumably access to academics that do possess knowledge 
relevant to the student's interests may be a factor here. My own experience of 
the pastoral dimension of supervision is that I have not consistently required it, 
but at times it has been invaluable. And I struggle to conceive this support as 
the discursive construction of a specific subjectivity or evidence of a learnt 
vocabulary that must compete for traction; this implies a Deleuzean bend in my 
thinking - a liberal humanist value asserting itself when I decide that empathy 
and compassion are not skills that are learnt because a job description specifies 
them. There are gender issues here that Grant elects to ignore. And 
slipperiness is suggestive of a sense of fluidity that I find lacking in the image of 
discrete discourses vying for the attention of a subjectivity that is reduced to a 
site where they 'play out'. The presentation of parties to the supervision 
relationship as the coexistence of anachronistic and contemporary subjectivities 
(Grant ibid. 338; Usher and Edwards 1995: 20) perhaps answers Bleakley's 
(2000) question as to why the concept of empowerment is so seductive to some 
within educational settings. I lose any sense of the meso inventiveness that 
Stengers (2008) argues is evidenced at the meso level that concerns practice. 
When I meet my supervisory team, we are four bodies, four people - not simply 
representatives of competing discourses and vehicles of passive inscription. 
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And we are no longer the same people that nnet several months previously. Our 
lives have moved on in a myriad of unspoken ways. It is a 'potent cocktail' but 
not, as Grant (2005: 346) suggests, because I am grappling with conflicting sub-
conscious desires to be taken care of and to be autonomous. To return to 
Grant's portrayal of supervisory pastoral care as a response to the expertise 
deficit that Is the corollary of higher education expansion, I would challenge this 
assumption and reframe it: such divergences of interest within my own 
supervisory assemblage engender Its rhizomatic character. I am beginning to 
explore connections between Stengers' philosophy of science, and the poetic 
feminist poststructuralist writing of Cixous, without the sense of rigid 
compartmentalisatlon between disciplines that I once felt. I feel empowered. 
In Holligan (2005: 267-278), Grant's 'rich discursive context' is instead a conflict 
zone where the sun/ival of traditional discourses of scholastic autonomy (Halsey 
1992) Is threatened by a commercialised audit culture (Ball 1990, 1994; Power 
1997). Holligan Is particularly critical of the 'technicist, formulaic model' which 
promotes the belief that supervision involves the application of a 'generic "tool 
kit" to facilitate progression'. And a parallel is drawn between postpositivistic 
research narratives which tidy up the field and post hoc 'technicist diagnosis 
and remediation' exercises which fall to acknowledge diverse constructions of 
the doctorate on the part of students, or to recognise that facilitation of 
intellectual originality is often highly context and student specific (Ibid. 270). I 
much prefer the phrase intellectual creativity to 'originality' since the concept of 
heterogenesis, in the context of a rhizomatic supen/isory assemblage, defies 
this suggestion of individual origin and ownership of Ideas. And, as with Grant, 
Holligan's macro-critique operates at a level of generality that invites precisely 
the charge of tidying up the field as in not admitting exceptions to the 
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generalisation to be scrutinised. Holligan maintains tliat the same 'generic tool 
kit' precludes discussion of the 'contested character of the process of scientific 
discovery as a socially and politically embedded practice' (ibid. 274). Yet this 
subject has driven discussion within my own supervisory assemblage since its 
inception given the diversity of the epistemological interests represented. 
Holligan argues that the capacity for critical and creative thought is more easily 
fostered when students are already inclined to 'irreverence' - refusing 
deferential conformity to hegemonic discourses, ideas, and practices (ibid.). I 
would suggest however that divergent epistemological loyalties within a 
supervisory assemblage render such irreverence inevitable; there is no uniting 
around a common foe or an entrenched position, rather, a process of 
exploratory engagement. I concur wholeheartedly with Holligan's view that 
'epistemological impoverishment of university culture' must be avoided - that 
students should have a right to choose. But when he argues that attempts to 
instil a critical capacity may be read as inappropriately over-directive by 
students who are insufficiently irreverent, the possibility that they are in fact 
over-directive should be entertained. The promotion of a culture of donnish 
dominion (ibid. 277; Halsey 1992) rests uneasily with my feminist sensibilities 
when criticality is conflated with the selection of 'a' position, and its gladiatorial 
defence, and an exploratory approach to learning is read as a sign of 
intellectual weakness. It is not surprising perhaps that Holligan interprets 'voice' 
(Richardson 1997: 122 cited in Done, Knowler, Murphy, Rea and Gale 2011) as 
the readiness to critically appraise available perspectives and methodologies 
(ibid. 274). Or that the tension induced in Holligan by conflicting discursive 
imperatives are described as 'cognitive dissonance' (ibid.). I am reminded of 
Foucault's comment that care of the self means evolving an ethics that affords 
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'protection of an individual existence' (1990b: 16) when Holligan (ibid.) states: 
'My own sense of identity made me resist enslavement by corrosive "new" 
discourses of governmentality'. I suspect that Holligan's sense of identity and 
experience of dissonance are not confined to his head. A rhizomatic supervisory 
assemblage creates opportunities for students to engage in a continual praxis of 
identity through a supportive and non-directive pedagogic strategy that fosters 
experimentation. I will explain shortly how the 'logic of sensation' (Deleuze 1981 
/ 2005) redresses the presupposed separation of thinking and affect. 
Holligan criticises the 'how to' literature directed at postgraduate students (e.g. 
Phillips and Pugh 2002; Cryer 2000) but adopts the 'weaning' metaphor found 
in Cryer (ibid. 87) which I find infantilising and potentially controlling. The 
processes through which the doctoral student is produced in a rhizomatic 
assemblage are non-linear and non-teleological, and imply complexity, 
contingency, uniqueness, changeability and unpredictability. References to 
cognitive dissonance, like Grant's interpretation of pastoral support as a 
psychological exercise, suggest that we are now so used to 'psychologising' in 
narratives about ourselves and others (Rose 1996) that we overlook the future 
and our capacity to change it in often unpredictable ways. A key motivation in 
abandoning the analysis of my participant-derived transcripts in 2009 was the 
realisation that I too was engaging in the very psychologising that I despise, and 
which invariably implies some unattainable normative ideal. And I found 
Deleuze's comments on Nietzsche's eternal return useful when discussing my 
feelings about this matter with supervisors. Contra Grant, I did not construe the 
mutual exploration of this epistemological / methodological break as the 
'confessing' of my 'struggles' and 'failings'. And I sometimes wonder whether 
the casting of such dialogue as 'confessionalism' - with its connotations of guilt 
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and voluntary subjection to power, or as the 'introspective personalism' of liberal 
humanism (Bleakley ibid.), or as evidence of a disempowering teleological 
normative developmental process (Cryer ibid.) makes it harder to speak of 
emotional or affective reactions. Deleuze emphasises the active affirmative 
ethical import of the eternal return: would we be happy to live the same life over 
again? (2004: 125). I would have felt distinctly unhappy re-living my academic 
life had I spent it picking over the psychological bones of women whose 
company I had valued. I had already abandoned a doctoral postpositivist study 
in the 1990s but reminded myself that the past can never be repeated - it is 
always in production just as the present is, so to look to the past is to grasp the 
force of past questions, problems and directions, and to permit them to 
transform the present into a future; hence Deleuze describing his philosophy as 
untimely (Colebrook 2002: 64). It is not the site of hidden truths about 
ourselves. 
Defining changeability, novelty, or the new is not easy and I am indebted 
to Smith (2007: 1-21) for a succinct account of Deleuze's metaphysics of 
difference which I will summarise with reference to the concept of model 
implicitly contained in the two papers reviewed here. It was Bergson who 
transformed philosophy by posing the question of how the production of 
something new is possible, and by shifting attention from the eternal and 
universal to the new and singular (Deleuze 1986: 3). Deleuze is similarly 
concerned with the conditions under which something new is produced 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1977 / 2002: vii). The new can only be thought through a 
principle of difference: if identity (A is A) was the primary principle, i.e. if 
identities were pre-given, there would be no production of the new or no new 
differences (Smith ibid. 1). Smith restates familiar arguments (that everything is 
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new if we are referring to something that did not exist before, and conversely, 
that the new often appears in predictable patterns); he then contrasts the new 
from the related but distinguishable problems of: change and transformation, 
causality and determinism, and the possibility of emergence or emergent 
qualities. 
Transformation is often conceived as combinatorial (existing elements 
being rearranged or combined) or hylomorphic (matter being treated as inert or 
passively receptive of forms which vary); both reduce novelty to the 
rearrangement of matter. Linear causality raises the problem of effects pre-
existing their causes such that only quantitative not qualitative change can 
occur, whereas determination implies that an effect can have multiple causes 
and that a cause can have multiple or very different effects; determination can 
therefore take several forms - causal, probabilistic, structural, teleologlcal and 
dialectical (ibid. 2-3). Smith maintains that each can be derived from Deleuze's 
principle of difference: 'Difference is the state in which one can speak of 
determination as such' (Ibid.; Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 36). Emergence derives 
from a 'physicalist' ontology and refers to the production of new qualities at ever 
higher levels of complexity in systems; but physicalism cannot take supra-
physical, or emergent, properties (e.g. new individuals or institutions) that their 
physical components lack into account (Ibid. 3). Emergence therefore differs 
from the concept of the new in Deleuze, Bergson and Whitehead, where: 
'novelty becomes a fundamental concept at the most basic ontological level' 
(Being = Difference = the New) (Ibid.). 
Since Deleuze is concerned with the conditions of the new, I should also 
address the conditions of thought and briefly outline the alternative conditions 
previously specified. In assessing logical possibility for example, the impossible 
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or unthinkable is determined using the principles of identity (A is A), non-
contradiction (A is not non-A or not what it is not) and the excluded middle 
(between A and not-A there is no middle term - something cannot be what it is 
and what it is not); this is all about essences or essentialism, and a formal logic 
that restricts us to the realm of the possible or logically thinkable (ibid. 4). 
Contra to this logic, Kant introduced a transcendental logic and categories that 
delimit a realm of possible experience. Causality is deemed a category by Kant 
since objects of possible experience are conceived as caused by something 
else; empirical concepts are said to be immanent io experience, and 
consequently testable, whereas transcendent concepts (God, Soul, World) go 
beyond possible experience and are unknowable but thinkable (Kant follows 
Plato in referring to such concepts as Ideas) (ibid.). So Kant posits a posteriori 
and a priori knowledge: the latter are facts of reason and morality, and the 
conditions of possibility of such facts are attributed to the transcendental - they 
are presupposed rather than explained. Smith contrasts this Kantian concern 
with the conditions of possible experience to Deleuze's search for genetic and 
differential conditions of real experience and real thought (ibid. 5). 
The term genesis derives from Salomon Maimon and his critique of Kant. 
Maimon argued that a genetic method was required if the production of 
knowledge, morality, and reason itself was to be accounted for (ibid.). And it 
was Maimon who first recognised difference as constituting the genetic and 
productive principle of real thought. Maimon's influence on Deleuze is evident in 
his text on Nietzsche (Deleuze 1962 /1983) where genealogy is described as 
Nietzsche's genetic method, with which Kantian morality and truth was 
critiqued. Will-to-power is deemed to be Nietzsche's principle of difference 
(Smith and Protevi 2008). The concepts of virtuality anti multiplicity are 
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introduced in a later text on Bergson (Deleuze 1966 /1983); this is Deleuze's 
solution to Maimon's insistence that Kantian conditions of possibility of 
representational knowledge must be replaced with the condition of genesis of 
the real. The virtual is that genetic condition (Smith and Protevi 2008); it 
replaces 'extrinsic conditioning' with 'intrinsic genesis' (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 
154) and this Is why the future becomes the fundamental dimension of time not 
the past. Instead of thinking of the real as the possible with existence added to 
it, genesis involves the actualisation of the virtual where the latter is held to be 
fully real and not merely awaiting realisation. The virtual must be actualised, 
rather than realised, because of Its differential nature; Deleuze rejects the 
Kantian 'tracing' operation whereby the transcendental is viewed In the same 
way as the empirical: 'the task of a philosophy that does not wish to fall into the 
traps of consciousness and the cogito is to purge the transcendental field of all 
resemblance' (Deleuze 1969 /1990: 123). 
The above quotation conveys a fundamental Deleuzean principle - that 
the ground cannot be the same as that which it grounds. Kantian empirical 
experience Is purportedly personal and identitarian as implied in the 
Transcendental Unity of Apperception - the possibility of adding 'I think' to our 
judgments. Deleuze wants to hang on to experience but, as Smith and Protevi 
(ibid.) state: 'since the condition cannot resemble the conditioned, and since the 
empirical is personal and Individuated, the transcendental must be impersonal 
and pre-individual'. So the virtual lacks identity but Is the condition of real 
experience. This means that Identities of subject and object result from 
processes that actualise (resolve or integrate) a differential field: the virtual is 
the condition of genesis of real experience and not the condition of possibility of 
rational experience (ibid.). Smith (ibid. 6) explains that when the virtual Is 
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actualised, it differs from itself, so every process of actualisation is necessarily a 
production of the new - the production of a new difference. The absence of 
Kantian categories in Deleuze's philosophy means that conditions must be 
determined along with what they condition; they must change as the 
conditioned changes and therefore be 'plastic and mobile' (ibid.) or 'no less 
capable of dissolving and destroying individuals than of constituting them 
temporarily' (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 47). 
The concepts of ground, foundation and ungrounded are key to 
Deleuze's arguments concerning sufficient reason; the Cartesian cogito is a 
foundational assumption but Deleuze argues, following Leibniz and Spinoza, 
that constructing such a foundation is meaningless if the ground on which it 
rests is fragile: 'we must have something unconditioned' that is able to 
determine both the condition and the conditioned and ensure real genesis' 
(ibid.; Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 68; 1969 / 1990: 22). Deleuze identifies a 'bend' in 
sufficient reason or the ground, suggesting that: 'it leans towards what it 
grounds, towards the forms of representation; on the other hand, it turns and 
plunges into groundlessness beyond the ground which resists all forms and 
cannot be represented' (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 274 - 275). In Deleuze's theory of 
repetition, the present plays the role of foundation, the pure past is the ground, 
and the future is the ungrounded or unconditioned - the condition of the new 
(Smith ibid. 7). 
To present the supervision relationship as a compilation of discourses is 
to attribute a mediating role to language - to imply the existence of fixed forms 
that can be variously 'labelled', as in Grant's 'Psy-Supervision', 'Trad-
Supervision', and so on (ibid.). This representational model of language 
suggests that, behind or beyond appearances, the 'tmth' may be uncovered (or 
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recovered). Deleuze, like Nietzsche, rejects this view and asserts the truth of 
relativity. The world here comprises 'pre-personal singularities' (Deleuze 1969 / 
1990: 102); these are not general forms that language organises but chaotic 
free-roaming fluxes (Colebrook 2002: 18). Deleuze follows Nietzsche in arguing 
that philosophical concepts are ac//Ve and creative not representational. 
Thinking and the production of concepts is how the flux of reality is made 
manageable. In contrast, opinion involves reductive generalization where 
everything is reduced to already known forms and concepts are reactive (as 
labels of an already ordered world) (Colebrook 2002: 16-17). This is not to imply 
that opinion is a representational distortion of a true world 'out there' since we 
necessarily perceive the world in a partial or interested way in order to function 
within it. The subject here is not a transcendent pre-given rational 
consciousness, but rather, is constituted through affective forces, habit, and 
language (ibid.). 
It would be misleading to imply that Deleuze's philosophy marks a 
complete break with Kantianism since, like Whitehead (1925: 90, 190), Deleuze 
reworks Kant's transcendental aesthetic in order to posit a 'transcendental 
empiricism' (1968 / 2004: 180). Artistic creation is one of the non-philosophical 
sources that Deleuze draws on along with molecular biology and calculus. From 
the latter Deleuze derives concepts like the virtual, multiplicities, singularities, 
the problematic and the differential relation through which the conditions of the 
real are defined (Smith ibid. 8). Texts implying an 'essence' of good supervision 
and providing prescriptive or normative models suggest a very different 
mathematically-inspired philosophical position; the Platonic Idea (as a defined 
form or essence) is based on Euclidean geometry where forms are static, 
unchanging, and self-identical (ibid.). The differential equation invented by 
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Leibniz produces an alternative 'differential equation paradigm' (Stewart 1989: 
32 - 33 cited in Smith ibid. 9) with which to think nature in science and the 
nature of the real in philosophy, i.e. the conditions of the real and the new. An 
account of the differential relation is found in Leibniz (1966: 545) or Smith (ibid. 
10 -11) . It will suffice here to note that the differential relation continues to exist 
even when its terms disappear and this fact provides Deleuze with an example 
of the concept - difference-in-itself. 
'Deleuze takes the notion of the differential relation to a properly 
transcendental level. The differential relation is not only external to its 
terms (Bertrand Russell's empiricist dictum), but it also determines its 
terms. Difference here becomes constitutive of identity [ ] it becomes 
productive and genetic, thus fulfilling Maimon's demand: a genetic 
philosophy finding its ground in a principle of difference' (ibid. 11). 
Deleuze's use of singularity differs from that of logic (where the singular is 
related to the universal); the singular points of a square, for example, are the 
corners and an infinite number of ordinary points compose each of its sides. 
Deleuze describes a multiplicity as a combination or assemblage of such points 
- hence determination of any individual is precisely this combining of the 
singular and ordinary points, or the remarkable and the regular: the singularities 
are those points where something happens in the multiplicity (an event), or in 
relation to another multiplicity, causing a change in its nature and the production 
of novelty (ibid. 12). One of several examples supplied by Smith (ibid.) includes 
'boiling over in anger' as the singular point of a psychic multiplicity that is in 
perpetual flux. 
If we relate this Deleuzean abandonment of ideas of essence, 
substance, and therefore identity to what might happen over the course of any 
one supervision meeting, or supervision relationship, it should be clear why I 
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prefer to avoid preconceived static notions of what either supervision, good 
supervision, or bad supervision is, and to take each meeting as 'if comes, 
recognising that the relationship is created anew on every occasion. Questions 
like 'what /s?' belong to Socratic and Platonic traditions that aim to determine 
essences, whereas Deleuze will ask: How? Where? When? How Many? And, of 
course, I am trying to write a thesis, not seeking to paint the supervisory wave. 
What does taking it as it comes actually mean? Deleuze might explain that my 
existence is objectively problematic and, for that reason, the exact directions 
that I take cannot be specified in advance; I am, at all times, surrounded by 
virtualities - not logical possibilities but physical realities of which only one will 
be actualised, at a particular moment, as the production of a novelty or the 
differentiation of the virtual. The ensuing moment will be both similariy 
problematic and modified by the preceding one; hence every event is new and, 
as Deleuze insists following Maimon, the conditions and conditioned are 
determined at the same time (ibid. 17). This returns us to calculus since 
although we know now that most differential equations are non-linear, and 
Involve infinite divergent series, determinism or deterministic thinking was 
encouraged by the historical tendency to attend to linear equations with 
convergent series that were more easily solved without computers (Strogatz 
2003: 181 cited in Smith ibid. 15 -16) . The concepts of the problematic and the 
virtual evoke Kant in that, for Deleuze, they are conditions of the real that can 
be tfiougtit but not l<nown in any direct empirical sense. Kant distinguished 
between true and false problems, suggesting that Ideas such as God, Soul, 
Worid, are objectively problematic structures since they are taken as objects 
rather than as problems: we ask questions about objects whose existence we 
take for granted, and in doing so, the object of the Idea becomes separated 
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from its solutions or status as a problem - it is a problem incapable of solution 
(ibid. 1 4 - 1 5 ; Kant 1999: A327/B384). The scope of Deleuze's concept of the 
problematic is now clear: the movement from problem to solution is that of the 
virtual-actual complementarity and it is not confined to thought: the growth of a 
crystal, a tree, a relationship is a solution to a problem with uncertain outcomes. 
If I refer to perception in the context of novelty, contingency and unpredictability 
within supervision meetings and the supervision relationship, it is the fuller 
conception of perception in Deleuze that I have in mind. Deleuze follows Leibniz 
in viewing perception as the integration, or actualisation, of a multiplicity of 
'obscure' minute unconscious perceptions as a condition of real experience. A 
conscious perception occurs when minute or virtual perceptions - which we are 
unaware of, enter into a differential relation that determines a singularity which 
is actualised: 'Far from having perception presuppose an object capable of 
affecting us, and conditions under which we would be affectable, it is the 
reciprocal determination of differentials (dy/dx) that entails both the complete 
determination of the object as perception, and the determinability of space-time 
as a condition' (Deleuze 1988 / 2006: 101; Smith ibid. 13). Space and time are 
not pre-given or a priori conditions of perception but instead constituted along 
with perceptions (ibid.). 
If supervision meetings are 'potent cocktails' (Grant, 2005:346), it is not 
because those present are nursing potentially disruptive unconscious 
expectations fuelled by childhood fantasies about Mommy and Daddy (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 50), or powerful desires signifying an originary lack 
and castration. The latter Lacanian position is not a palatable alternative to the 
Freudian Oedipal drama; it also risks a reductive and controlling supervisory 
practice, and the derision of supervisors. I shudder when reading Hecq (2009: 
92 
40) who adopts a Lacanian perspective and writes of 'the possibilities that 
transference offers supervisors and candidates' and 'an ethical handling of the 
transference'. Simply replacing Freud with Lacan misses the point about the 
ethics of such pedagogic strategies. Contra Grant, the 'cocktail' that I propose 
involves an affirmatory (non-dialectical) unconscious in thought, multiplicities at 
play, the interrelation offerees referred to earlier, and a potential disharmony 
between the senses. I am seeking a way of thinking supervisory meetings as 
unpredictable events / encounters rather than as sites where neoliberal 
managerialist scripts are rehearsed and performed, boxes are ticked, and the 
gods of procedural accountability appeased; or of suggesting that neoliberal 
managerialist and technicist-rationalist imperatives are only part of a 
supervisory picture that comprises conscious perception, but also unspoken 
and unconscious thoughts (of a Deleuzean not Freudian nature), unpredictable 
affects, powerful sensations and forces. When talking with supervisors about 
starting this thesis, I feared that the task might prove to be bigger than my 
capabilities and my trepidation felt more like a tidal wave, as I imagined a thesis 
that might break and dribble across institutional sand, disappointing all 
expectation in the process. But I spoke confidently about my writing plans. 
According to the micropolitics of Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004), chaotic 
flows of desire were inevitably present but it is from such flows that the 
categories of supervisor and student-candidate - with their attendant interests, 
are produced in a coding of that desire; both are assemblages of socially coded 
affects (Colebrook 2002: 92 - 93). Desire is power - the power to become and 
produce images, and these images can work to enslave us when we invest in, 
and strive to conform to, the very stereotypical images that desire has 
produced. On this account, personal qualities begin impersonally and politically. 
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but contra theories of ideological production of subjectivity, there is no essential 
repressed self outside of power and the images that desire produces (ibid.). The 
multiplication of unpredictable affects and intensities can however alter 
possibilities for experience, and our power to act. I am thinking of intensity in 
two ways here: as difference which reaches a certain threshold and alters the 
dynamics of a situation to produce a qualitative change, and to refer to the 
'body without organs' as intensities-in-motion, as noise produced in the depths 
of the body, a physical and pre-linguistic force, or more dramatically - 'the 
terrifying nonsense of the primary order' (Smith and Protevi 2008). These 
authors describe Deleuze's text The Logic of Sense (1969) as an aberration - a 
response to the 'linguistic turn' before he came to 'embrace fully his materialist 
and naturalistic leanings' with Felix Guattari in Anti-Oedipus (1972 / 2009). 
According to Deleuze (1969 /1990: 181): 'What renders language possible is 
that which separates sounds from bodies and organizes them into propositions, 
freeing them for the expressive function', i.e. events of sense. Nonsense 
functions as a condition of sense, and although sense is virtual and incorporeal, 
it has the power to transform what bodies can do in its actualisations. If we 
apply this principle to neoliberal educational discourse, we would argue that it 
works reactively in presenting itself as descriptive of reality or a doubling of that 
consequently unquestioned reality. Hence, if sense is what allows neoliberal 
language to seem natural and meaningful (and discourses of academic freedom 
or autonomy distinctly unmeaningful and anachronistic), this suggests that the 
problem lending them sense has changed. For Davies (2005), the 
contemporary problem is that of planning to control uncertainty; and a related 
problem - implied by Holligan (ibid.) is facilitating accreditation for ever larger 
more diverse student populations. If the neoliberal managerialist depiction of 
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supervision practice makes little sense to me (and the supervision meetings it 
engendered in the 1990s often left me feeling alienated), perhaps it is because I 
am old enough to have lived through the very different post-war problem of 
ensuring meritocratic access to an elitist educational system where exploratory 
thought was expected not dismissed as an indulgence that the knowledge 
economy cannot afford. Colebrook provides an example from identity politics: 'It 
would be impossible to translate the word 'gay' into Ancient Greek or old 
English, not because they lacked an equivalent word, but because they did not 
approach the world through the problem or sense of "sexuality" (the problem of 
"my" inner sexual self above and beyond my bodily acts). Sense [ ] is the way 
we approach those bodies' (2002: 111). 
The Stoic distinction that Deleuze drew on between corporeal and 
incorporeal events is useful in understanding how this reactive neollberal 
transformation of bodies works. Supervision here is an incorporeal event or 
sense with no reality other than that expressed in a proposition. The activity of 
supervision (meetings and interpersonal communications) is a state of affairs -
an 'intermingling' of bodies and Supervision is a culturally conditioned effect of 
such intermingling. Hence, sense is 'exactly the boundary between propositions 
and things' Deleuze (1969 / 1990: 22) and that which subsists or insists - it 
does not exist outside the proposition which expresses but must not be 
confused with the proposition. On this count, language creates worlds of 
(common) sense, but also allows events and movements that defy neoliberal 
and techno-rationalist academic codes. 
In a much later collaboration, Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 161) explain 
that 'counter-effectuation of the event' is the abstraction of an event, or changed 
pattern, from bodies and states of affairs that lays bare the transformative 
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potentials inherent in things. The routes nof taken coexist with those taken as 
compossibles or inclusive disjunctions; differenciation is the tracking of the 
actualisation of the virtual and explanation of why a particular route was taken in 
a divergent series or exclusive disjunction (Smith and Protevi 2008). Concepts 
here 'speak the event' or map the multiplicities and connections that 
'deterritorialize' and 'reterritorialize' - that disrupt habitual ways of thinking and 
doing and develop new ways (Deleuze and Guattari ibid. 21). Right now though, 
I want to talk dirty about bodies. This is Grant's (1999: 6) description of writing 
that disrupts dominant discourses. And, of course, I love it when - despite his 
'clinical aesthetic' that draws on psychoanalytic theory, Deleuze (1981 / 2005: 
31) notes Bacon's irreverence in this area at inten/iew: 'Bacon seems to rebel 
against psychoanalytic suggestions, and when Sylvester, on another occasion, 
says to him that "the Pope is the Father", Bacon politely responds, "I am not 
quite sure I understand what you're saying"'(Sylvester 1987: 71 cited in Deleuze 
1981 /2005: 129). 
If I imagine an 'art' of supervision, it would be created 'new and different' 
(Deleuze ibid. 63) as student-specific, and be filled with affects that speak of 
encounters as events. When lecturing, Deleuze once explained what Whitehead 
(1920, 1941) meant by 'event' by unpacking what might happen if he 
announced: 'There's a concert tonight!' (1988 / 2006: 9 1 ; see also 
www.webdeleuze.com). I sense how joyful and stimulating these lectures must 
have been. It is the same excitement, or nervous energy, that the discussion of 
a novel idea or complex problem within the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage 
provokes - because I am free to explore them further. Excitement here is a 
collective affect rather than an individually-owned property. Affects are not 
emotions but charges on the surface of the skin (Massumi, 1995: 83 - 109) that 
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may, quite literally, be electrifying as they move across and between us. Art is a 
purely nominal term for Deleuze and Guattari as the heterogeneity of artistic 
activity implies a diversity of problems and solutions. The artist is held to think 
with percepts and affects, while the philosopher thinks in concepts (ibid. 163 -
199). The artist's role is to produce 'blocks of becoming' or aggregates of 
sensation - to 'record the fact' (Deleuze 1981 / 2005; 26). Such recording is not 
a reversion to a representational model where the artist strives to reproduce a 
world 'out there' or to (re)present an object through figuration; rather, it is the 
rendering visible of sensation, offerees that act upon the body, of intensities, 
through the 'figure' (ibid. 30) that acts directly on the nervous system and 
disrupts cliched thinking, feeling, and representation. Again, Deleuze invites us 
to ask of the artwork 'how does it function?' not 'what is it?' or 'what does it 
mean?', and to consider the components of the multiplicity of Bacon's art. This 
is the realm of the non-rational and non-cerebral (ibid.) where the intensive 
'body without organs' beneath the extensive body is laid bare. Deleuze is 
concerned with the genetic principles of the sensibility, or sense experience, 
that his empiricism privileges, but challenges the hylomorphic model of 
perception whereby the matter of raw sensory data is re-cognised in conformity 
to existing conceptual forms (Smith and Protevi 2008). So I do not ask what 
'Supervision' is, but how it functions, for me, in all my singularity. 
There is never only one, or even two logics (if we include both formal 
logic and the transcendental logic of Kant), at play when bodies intermingle in 
supervision meetings. There are three. The third is a powerful logic of sensation 
(Deleuze ibid.). I should point out here that, although I sometimes refer to 
embodiment to distance myself from the familiar hierarchically organised 
Cartesian mind-body binary, Deleuze is not dealing with the lived body of 
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phenomenology or with the phenomenological moment in Kant's transcendental 
aesthetic. The former is a 'paltry thing in comparison with a more profound and 
almost unlivable Power' (Deleuze ibid. 32). It Is the vital power of rhythm which 
constitutes sensation and saves us from the abyss - from 'chaos' (ibid. 72 - 73). 
When I wrote of feeling ovenA/helmed by the prospect of writing a thesis, given 
the enormity of the task, I was invoking the Kantian sublime. Kant's 
'phenomenological moment' occurs when he presupposes the situated or 
embedded quality of the human body, and assumes its role as a measure in 
conceptualising perception and aesthetic comprehension. The transcendental 
unity of apperception requires the unified cogito as a template - I think, and 
through thinking myself, I think the object in general (object x); I can then 
syntheslse sensory experience using this general form to make judgments 
about what I am seeing. Where the scale of the object defies any such 
synthesis that allows me to say: This is a it is because the limits of my 
Imagination have been exceeded (think of standing on the shoreline as a tidal 
wave of epic proportions approaches). I confront Chaos; I am unable to make 
the object conform to a familiar extensive spatio-temporal form by measuring it 
against my body as a reliable unit of measurement. This is the 'bend' in 
sufficient reason that Deleuze identifies In Kant (1968 / 2004: 210) - the 
foundation of the synthesis (aesthetic comprehension) rests on a ground that is 
somewhat fragile because there is always a risk that my imagination will 
encounter chaos. For Kant, this scenario is easily resolved since our faculty of 
Reason or Ideas kicks in. As we begin to feel overwhelmed, the imagination is 
tamed in a demonstration of our moral superiority over Nature. For Deleuze, 
there is no recourse to Reason. The experience of chaos Is the possibility of 
disrupting cliched representation. The unit of measurement is in constant 
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variation, and the artist develops a 'diagrammatic or abstract machine' (of 
asignifying lines and colours) that constructs 'a real that is yet to come' (ibid. 
50). The logic of sensation involves a relation between chaos and rhythm, and 
such 'diagrams' act creatively or genetically to constitute a 'possibility of fact' 
(Deleuze ibid. 77, 79). Each artist resolves the problem of how to paint 
sensation - the invisible forces which act upon nature and the body, in their own 
way. A rhizomatic supervisory assemblage also creates and resolves its own 
problems in its own way. 
The concept of the mesopolitical does not deny the existence of 
stratifying forces but demands that we work with, and through, them creatively -
reinventing them, in practice settings. It is an imaginative negotiation of smooth 
and striated space (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004) where the former offers 
the prospect of deregulated becomings, spontaneity, freedom and novelty and 
the latter implies organisation and control but also the continuity and security 
afforded by routine or habitual behaviours and academic codes. I am drawn to 
the politicised philosophy of Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009). 
The Marxist principle informing Anti-Oedipus, where the point is change, 
resonates with my feminist and politico-pedagogic interests. It is a deeply 
seated impulse. My memory of academia in the late 1970s and early 1980s is of 
no strict separation between my emancipatory politics and theoretical interests; 
together they compnsed a mode of life or an 'optimism that believes only in life' 
(Deleuze 1981 / 2005: 31). I felt connected. And I thrived in academic 
environments that supported this sense of connectedness, futurity and creative 
potentiality. I am aware that McMahon (1996: 7) rejects the concept of 
pedagogic empowerment where power is 'something in the student's future' 
and, I would add, something that is achieved by doing something to students. 
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So if I feel empowered within my current supervisory assemblage, it is because, 
as McMahon (Ibid.) advocates, the learning evidenced In my writing here is 
already an expression of my own power, energy and joy. And this learning 
implies the actualisation of unknown potentialities that are produced within a 
collective field of desire that is forever In flux. I want to avoid interpretations of 
desiring-production as an 'erotics of teaching' (Morss 2000: 197). From my 
exploratory reading so far, I would argue that it is precisely the sexualisation or 
eroticlsation of desire through psychoanalytic theory and practice that is being 
challenged in Anti-Oedipus and elsewhere. And I follow Deleuze, and Guattari, 
in the desire to avoid promoting yet more cliched and normative representations 
of supervision, doctoral experience and the thesis. Hence, Guattari (1995 cited 
In Morss ibid. 196) poses the question as to how paths to singularisatlon are 
fostered but resists proposing any specific solutions to this problem; and 
Deleuze (1995: 139) writes of students being permitted to take what they 
'needed or wanted, what they could use'. It seems distinctly un-Deleuzean to 
talk of texts within a corpus as aberrations, as If consistency - the failure to 
review and renew thinking, is the hallmark of academic achievement. I have no 
desire to nail Deleuze to an immovable theoretical cross. I am inspired by his 
irreverence - by his refusal to limit his own learning in this way. 
Bacon responded to the suggestion that his artwork evoked the 
psychoanalytic hypothesis of ambivalence (simultaneous affection and hostility): 
'That is too logical. I don't think that's the way things work. I think it goes to a 
deeper thing: how do I feel that I can make this image more immediately real to 
myself? That's all' (Deleuze 1981 / 2005: 28). Freedom to experiment makes 
my learning more real to me. 
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Dark precursors... 
I find it difficult to move beyond issues raised in the previous plateau but allow 
myself to be deeply affected by what I read and go where my writing takes me. 
Holligan's (2005: 276) claim that increased governmental control has resulted in 
'residual' academic discourses of intellectual freedom or autonomy being 
perceived as anachronistically 'self-indulgent', with a consequent 'knowledge 
revolution' occurring 'quietly' throughout higher education (2005: 277), leads me 
to research Deleuze's take on revolution and learning. Holligan's fear that 
invoking revolution may be 'over dramatic' (ibid.) reinforces my view that 
popularised Freudianism can function as a vocabulary of political self-
invalidation, and evokes writing about the neoliberal production of 'docile' 
subjects or fearful docility (Dawes 2005.- 9; Dawes et a/. 2006; 307; Gale 2007: 
473) and related gender issues. Deleuzean lines of flight, as creative escapes 
from received frames, are not necessarily poetic but they do demonstrate the 
non-linearity of thinking in the process of problematisation - a phenomenon 
ignored in the generic model of academic writing proposed by Wellington (ibid.). 
Thinking the meso-level without resort to introspective personalism and the 
implication of interiority is proving problematic; I hang on to a collectivised 
history but also now begin to live the contradiction between evocative 
autoethnography and a radically decentred Deleuzean subjectivity, and 
between the impersonality of my academic writing and a desire to demonstrate 
the singularity of my experience. I am unsure how to experiment however much 
I value being afforded the space in which to try. I am still looking backwards, 
even as I write about impersonal becomings and futurity. Foucault once wrote: 
'Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it 
thinks (the present) and be able finally to "think otherwise" (the future)' (1985: 
15 cited in Deleuze 1986 / 2006: 98). 
April 2010 
Some thirty years ago, accusations of self-indulgent stridency were deployed 
against feminist academics. In the mid-1990s, the Research Director of the 
university where I completed my first undergraduate degree, responded to an 
enquiry about returning to undertake postgraduate research into child abuse by 
informing me that the department had once included a 'feminist' and that it did 
not 'work out' as she was 'a very aggressive woman'. I still regret my response -
that I would be challenging feminist orthodoxy; it is reminiscent of Leonard's 
(2001) advice to female doctoral students to 'play the game'. I require a sense 
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of freedom from overt political control to be intellectually productive. I did not 
submit a proposal to the institution in question. 
Holligan fears that the newer discourses of technicist-rationalism and 
consumerism associated with government performance targets and skills 
training agendas may 'entirely' displace a traditional emphasis on scholarly self-
reliance and intellectual independence (ibid.). Induction programmes specific to 
mature students are nevertheless recommended, given his own experience as 
a returnee and concomitant sense of loss of status and self-determination that 
becoming an 'apprentice academic' produced (ibid. 272). Balatti and 
Whitehouse describe a similar trajectory: from self-perception as competent 
professionals at 'forty plus' to re-invention as low status students, novices and 
'apprentices'; their adopted survival strategy was one of 'becoming feral' and 
resisting a 'hidden curriculum' that any marketing professional could instantly 
recognize: 'the idea is to sell ideas' (2001: 43-53). As in Holligan, the 
'apprenticeship model' of doctoral study is attributed to Phillips and Pugh 
(2002). Balatti and Whitehouse also criticise the dubious analogy between 
marriage and supervision employed by these authors: failure to resolve 
irreconcilable differences is likened to divorce (ibid. 49). Such facile analogies 
distract attention from specifically educational issues and may foster unrealistic 
expectations in students regarding the level of contact and support supervision 
provides. 
Balatti and Whitehouse's concept of the 'composite supervisor' (ibid. 50) 
captures a familiar process. My own insecurities as a returnee pivoted around 
being out of touch with debates that had preoccupied me many years before. I 
read obsessively to re-orientate myself, charting the various turns within the 
social sciences, and related developments in educational theory and 
102 
philosophy. I did not expect any individual supervisor to assist this process. But 
I worried about potential misunderstandings where supervisors were not familiar 
with the critical traditions and 'conceptual personae' (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 61 - 62) that had enlivened my existence as a sociology undergraduate 
decades before - about talking past each other (Grant 2005) or communicating 
across 'parallel universes' (Holligan ibid. 277). Like Balatti and Whitehouse 
(ibid.), I sought out those whom could expand my repertoire of available 
theoretical perspectives or had similar interests. Some months later (in 2009), 
one of my three supervisors was replaced with someone who shared my 
Interest in Deleuze. I believed then that, far from avoiding the support of any 
one academic lest they should 'fall from grace' (Ibid. 48), having a supervisor on 
a similar theoretical wavelength was a condition of my own creativity and 
fulfilment. Intellectual isolation, not physical and emotional isolation (Frow 1988: 
319), felt like the bigger issue. Over time however, I have come to believe that it 
is the divergences in the epistemological and methodological loyalties within my 
supervisory team - as I perceive them, which is multiplying the rhizomatic 
connections that I am now making. 
Neither 'playing the game' (Leonard ibid.) nor spreading risk through 
non-alignment to any one academic as a matter of policy (Balatti and 
Whitehouse ibid.) strike me as sustainable strategies unless, of course, 
education is re-invented as the 'commercial professional training' that Deleuze 
and Guattari consider 'an absolute disaster for thought' (1994: 12). I recall a 
conference where the chairperson congratulated the presenter on the 
publication of a paper that accurately portrayed the pressures on academics in 
audit cultures and their Indirect effect on postgraduate students. The presenter 
coughed in embarrassment: 'I almost lost my job over that one' was his muffled 
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response. It is easy to see why, under such circumstances, Holligan (ibid.) fears 
the demise of scholarly independence. Was the writing of this paper evidence of 
'self-indulgence' (ibid.)? Or was the censure it invited from the author's home 
institution indicative of a 'new fascism' (Deleuze 2006: 138) and 'abject 
reterritorialization' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 109)? Balatti and Whitehouse 
write of developing 'a strong distrust of the system' (ibid. 48) and of resisting the 
'cauldron' image of postgraduate study: 'we did not wish to be melted down, 
stirred, new elements added, others skimmed off, and then poured into an 
unfamiliar mold [ ] We wanted a journey, not a crucible' (ibid.). 
I too need a journey. And a thesis that demonstrates the learning 
process - my singular encounter with Deleuze. I am entering a very different 
cauldron by doing so: 'If the writer is a sorcerer, it is because writing is a 
becoming' (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 265). Following Deleuze, it is not 
a question of being a scholar; but of becoming-scholar and engaging in 
scholaring (ibid. 264) and resisting production as a fixed and State-sanctioned 
academic identity. And if this means being condemned to 'haunt the fringes', 
then so be it; sorcerers have always held the anomalous position (ibid. 271). Do 
those who level charges of self-indulgence fear what they cannot control - fear 
contagion that might spread like an infectious disease or a 'nameless horror' 
(ibid. 270)? Deleuze and Guattari describe 'pack fascism' as one form of human 
behaviour induced by forces that privilege 'State intelligibilities' as a mode of 
sociability over pack effects; 'internal black holes' are thereby created (ibid. 
271). In the absence of such forces however, dynamic positions are at play and 
anomalous or peripheral positions occupied by some can suddenly become 
attractive to others; hence the phenomenon of bordering implies a perpetually 
shifting border. It is all about which 'half-space' we elect to enter (ibid.). This 
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image is drawn from the discipline of ethology (animal behaviour). I relate to it. 
The cocktail of epistemological divergence is becoming ever more potent. 
In 2007, long before meeting my current supervisors, I rejected the term 
apprenticeship in a higher education context, and I queried depictions of 
supervision as 'friendship' (Bartlett and Mercer 2001: 59) or a contractual 
relationship. What about power differentials and the recasting of political control 
as pedagogic guidance or training? I still cannot think of myself as a doctoral 
apprentice, though I can now recognise myself in 'becoming-apprentice' - these 
are not the same thing (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 113). If, following 
Nietzsche, I diagnose my own becomings in every passing present, then I must 
think what might have triggered this particular becoming (ibid.). It is a 'love of 
scholarship' (Becher and Trowler 2001: 51) - of learning something that I did 
not know before (Richardson 1997: 87) that has eclipsed concerns about power 
differentials. And my feelings about becoming-apprentice were changed by 
Deleuze's take on apprenticeship. 
I intuitively doubted that Phillips and Pugh (ibid.) and Bartlett and Mercer 
(ibid.) had invented the concepts of apprenticeship and professional academic 
friendship respectively and wanted to know more about their histories. A classic 
example of a 'conceptual personae' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2, 61) is 
Descartes' cogito or concept of self (I think therefore I am) where the relation 
between doubting, thinking and being lacks any logical determination but 
becomes one of 'inseparability' through the arranging of each in: 'zones of 
neighbourhood or indiscernability that produce passages from one to the other' 
(ibid. 24). Historically, the sage as possessor of wisdom was displaced by the 
Greek philosopher as someone who was a friend of wisdom but did not formally 
possess it; the sage had thought in 'Figures' while the philosopher thinks in 
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'Concepts' (ibid.). Deleuze and Guattari explore what 'friend' signifies in the 
context of Greek city formation, and argue that it is an important question since 
the shift at stake Is one from empirical circumstance or 'extrinsic persona' 
towards: 'a presence that is Intrinsic to thought, a condition of possibility of 
thought itself, a living category, a transcendental lived reality [such that] the 
Greeks violently force the friend into a relationship that is no longer a 
relationship with another but one with an Entity, an Objectality, an Essence -
Plato's friend, but even more the friend of wisdom, of truth, or the concept' (ibid. 
3). A conceptual persona is a condition of the exercise of thought and the 
philosopher becomes the judge or arbiter of concepts - of rival claims to validity 
(Ibid. 2-3). The Greek city, as a society of equals, demanded a means of 
distinguishing contested claims in the rivalry of free men - a 'generalized 
athleticism' Involving friendship, but also a conflict between claimants and 
competitive distrust of rivals (ibid. 4). Deleuze and Guattari criticise the 
tendency to regard existing concepts 'as a gift [or] a wonderful dowry from some 
sort of wonderland': the point is to make or create concepts not 'polish' pre-
existing ones (ibid. 5). They reject both universal concepts and contemporary 
reductions of thinking to marketing exercises whereby 'the concept has become 
the set of product displays' and critique is replaced with 'sales promotion' (ibid. 
10). There is no 'new Athens' where the validity of rival claimants can be 
authoritatively distinguished, as In the Platonic tradition, but rather concepts, 
following Nietzsche, that are created in: 'an intuition specific to them: a field, a 
plane, a ground that must not be confused with them but that shelters their 
seeds and the personae who cultivate them' (ibid. 7). 
The concept of supervision as an academic fhendship is problematic 
where it functions normatively or as a transcendental reality - a pre-given 
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representation of some supposed underlying empirical reality, and ignores the 
specificity or 'uniqueness' of specific supervision relationships (Acker, Hill, Black 
1994: 484). So too is the etymological backdrop of rivalry and 'conflict' (ibid.) 
that suggests precisely the competitive individualism decried by Balatti and 
Whitehouse (ibid.). I appreciate the issues raised by these authors, but I also 
find their portrayal of academic culture excessively bleak as relationships other 
than the purely instrumental, and those of rivalry, are seemingly precluded. 
Neither am I convinced that 'becoming-feral' - a phrase strongly evocative of 
'becoming-animal' in Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004: 265 - 266, 269, 302), 
is appropriate to the process they describe. The strategies outlined as devious 
but necessary responses to what is perceived as an infantilising disempowering 
academic culture for mature postgraduate research students include: the 
misuse of photocopier access codes and avoiding alliance with any one 
individual. Neither strategy strikes me as subversive resistance, but rather, as 
striving to become even better at playing the game than established players. 
This is not, of course, an ethical reading in Deleuzean terms; I am being 
judgmental and moralistic. How can such a position be justified when this 
requires a 'separate, stable and disengaged' perspective from which to judge? I 
have engaged in an active selection - affirming this, rejecting that, but 
presented it reactively- as predetermined through a common value system 
(Colebrook 2002: 130). I am assuming that 'Everyone recognizes that . . . ' , even 
though I know that: 'there is always an unrepresented singularity who does not 
recognize precisely because it is not everyone or the universal' (Deleuze 1968 / 
2004: 63). 
To perceive or interpret ethically is to grasp the ethos evidenced in 
Balatti and Whitehouse as emerging from the situation in which they find 
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themselves. They write of a sense of no longer knowing who they were, or what 
they were becoming (ibid. 44, 46), which is more reminiscent of 'becoming-
imperceptible' (Deleuze and Guattari ibid. 308 - 309). According to Colebrook, it 
is exactly this sense of not knowing who or what we are that permits us to 
remain open to the 'differences, intensities and singularities that traverse us' 
and not conform to fixed and molar images of what we should become (ibid. 
130, 131). 'Becoming-imperceptible' involves a dissolution of the border 
between perceiver and perceived and therefore freedom from judging and pre-
judging. It is an affirmation of our power to become (our joy), and of our power 
to refuse what is limiting (our sadness) (ibid. 131). I detect no joy in the account 
of doctoral study in Balatti and Whitehouse (ibid.); it implies a relational 
composition that is toxic in its diminution of their power to act. Nevertheless, I 
read their text as a 'minor literature' (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 116) in 
its highlighting of the experiences of some mature students within doctoral 
programmes designed for younger students: 
'There is an entire politics of becomings-animal, as well as a politics of 
sorcery, which is elaborated in assemblages that are neither those of the 
family nor of religion nor of the State. Instead, they express minoritarian 
groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on 
the fringe of recognized institutions' (ibid. 272). 
The objective here is not to represent that experience but to be productive of 
affects and intensities that encourage new ways of perceiving the academic 
world. In this event, as readers, we would not overcode (ibid. 72 - 73; 
Colebrook 2002: 133, 137) the text by interpreting it as an example of an 
enduring underlying reality - the human quest for meaning; we would fee/what 
becoming-feral is like in the environment that Balatti and Whitehouse (ibid.) 
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describe, be transformed by that feeling and relate to similar situations 
differently (Colebrook 2002: 137). 
Before turning to apprenticeship in Deleuze, I want to comment on the 
reference to Christian narrative in Balatti and Whitehouse (ibid. 48). At proposal 
stage, I referred to the heretical content of my literature review - particularly of 
those texts on doctoral pedagogy aimed at prospective students and those I 
found defensive (e.g. Lovitt 2005: 137-154). I especially disliked the latter's 
central, and tautological, argument that students who withdraw from doctoral 
programmes are those who should not have been admitted in the first place or 
those who are incapable of finishing. Richardson (1997: 211 - 212) provides a 
more politicised account of postgraduate withdrawal from a professorial 
perspective, as do Balatti and Whitehouse from the vantage point of the 
doctoral student (ibid. 49). Reading of experiences of enforced postpositivistic 
methods and political censure - however far afield, led me to assume ever more 
polemical - if not gladiatorial, positions. Nevertheless, I voluntarily elected for a 
postpositivist qualitative research project rather than risk sanction or the 
withholding of the papal seal that I had read about. Yet I was supported in 
abandoning this study as I am being supported in my nomadic writing here. I 
had re-entered academia as a Christian, then become a Greek, before 
discovering that only becoming-Deleuzean would provide the journey that I 
really sought. I concur with Deleuze and Guattari when they ask: 'And what 
would thinking be if it did not constantly confront chaos?' (1994: 208), but it was 
a fieartfelt commitment to one theoretico - philosophical perspective that I 
needed back then in order to progress - to pull my own disparate interests 
together. Holligan is correct to suggest that selection of a theoretical 
perspective is a neglected issue in the doctoral literature (2005: 273). 
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I am ambivalent about invoking Christian narrative to convey a point. I 
am unsure how apt implied analogies between church and educational regime 
actually are, however useful others find religious metaphors. Frow (1988: 307), 
for example, portrays supervision as disclpleship prompting a paper from a 
former student (Giblett 1992: 136) on the narcissistic need for disciples In 
supervisors. And Balatti and Whitehouse write of how a valued member of staff 
can 'fall from grace' (ibid. 48). The barren landscape of self-interest and 
instrumentality conveyed by these authors leaves me craving something 
sacred. When I write of being a Christian however, I am referring to self-
martyrdom in a structure I once perceived as concentrating the authority to 
pronounce what constitutes knowledge at, or towards, the apex of that 
structure. And when I write of being a Greek, I am referring to my readiness to 
defend my chosen method (autoethnography) against an earlier rival (my 
postpositivistic qualitative study). Of course, nothing is this simple (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 113) and undoubtedly, I must address the relationship between 
past, present, and future in relation to being and becoming. It will suffice here to 
state that becoming suggests the dissolution of empirical identity as a 
consistency whose being is determined in its relation to a definite field of 
representations. And that earlier, I was providing a representation of higher 
education where the content was determined by a prior representation -
Christian narrative (Baulch 2008: 12). For Deleuze however, such 
representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference: 
'Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding 
perspective, and in consequence a false depth. It mediates everything, 
but mobilizes and moves nothing' (1968 / 2004: 67). 
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Becoming is movement away from fixed and molar identities; it is always 
molecular and implies 'a plurality of centres, a superposition of perspectives, a 
tangle of points of view' (ibid.). Deleuze talks of an 'infinity of representations' 
that is ensured by the 'convergence of all points of view on the same object or 
the same world', or by making 'all moments the properties of the same Self 
(ibid.). It is the RE in representation that, as Deleuze argues, signifies a 
conceptual form of the identical: A = A or Self = Self, and which subordinates 
differences (ibid. 68). To become is to leave the domain of representation and 
enter that of immediate experience where: 'every object, every thing, must see 
its own identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a 
difference between differences' (ibid.). 
What then does RE signify in repetition, if repetition is opposed to 
representation? Deleuze explains this in relation to the Nietzschean eternal 
return which is present in every metamorphosis and opposed to the coherence 
implied in representation: 
'Repetition is the formless being of all differences, the formless power of 
the ground which carnes every object to that extreme "form" in which its 
representation comes undone' (ibid. 69). 
The world is to be understood as simultaneously complete and finished - in 
contrast to the implied infinity of representation, and yet unlimited and chaotic. 
What is then affirmed in the eternal return is the power of difference: 
'the circle of eternal return, difference and repetition (which undoes that 
the identical and the contradictory) is a tortuous circle in which 
Sameness is said only of that which differs' (ibid.). 
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The coherence of the subject that represents itself, and the object which it 
represents, is thereby excluded. I recall a conversation with my Director of 
Studies shortly after commencing doctoral study where I either suggested or 
conceded - I cannot remember the precise order of events, that a doctoral 
student's experience of supervision will be conditioned by prior experiences 
(educational and otherwise). This echoes Acker etal. (ibid.) where the 
uniqueness of each supervision relationship necessarily follows from the 
divergent past experiences of parties to the relationship. At that time, my 
understanding of myself - my self-narrative(s), included crass psychologisms 
encouraged by Freudianism; evolving any such narrative would inevitably entail 
varying degrees of self-interrogation as to whether I was perpetuating a pattern, 
or unwittingly reproducing the dynamics of former relationships - particularly 
familial ones that had compromised my capacity to trust. 
The problem here though is that whenever I reflect on, and represent my 
experiences (and I am thinking of specifically educational ones), they feel 
unique; any suggestion of an identifiable pattern, which I have somehow 
unconsciously brought about in a reproduction of the Same (where I = I across 
all situations), denies the very different circumstances in which I have engaged 
in becoming-student, and the very different others with whom I have entered 
into pedagogic relationship. We become with the world; we do not remake it in 
our own image. This is, of course, also the problem with an autoethnographic 
method that assumes a universally 'vulnerable Self (Ellis 1999: 673) as a unity 
of the faculties and principle of representation. It is the problem which Deleuze 
attributes to the Cartesian and Kantian cogito - that T as an object of thought 
depends upon an a priori thinking subject which functions 'as a beginning' 
(1968/2004: 169). 
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'I conceive, I judge, I imagine, I remennber and I perceive - as though 
these were the four branches of the Cogito. On precisely these branches, 
difference is cmcified. They fomri quadripartite fetters under which only 
that which is identical, similar, analogous or opposed can be considered 
different: difference becomes an object of representation always in 
relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined 
opposition or a perceived similitude' (ibid. 174). 
Falls from grace, excommunication, papal seals, now Deleuze and crucifixion; 
too much religion I feel, as I write here and hear a very dear Refrain (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 343 - 344) playing in my head - a source of calm 
outside the black hole. I had intended to write about apprenticeship and 
becoming using Deleuze's example of learning to swim (Deleuze ibid. 26, 205) 
and not religion or its psychoanalytic sibling. It seems however that I am hard-
wired to recall an appropriate Joni Mitchell lyric when body and soul demand it; 
on this occasion - 'wash and balance me' (1975). And I know it was reference to 
abusive dynamics that triggered this soothing intrusion. When teaching about 
trauma, I like to mention Pierre Janet before introducing Van der Kolk (van der 
Kolk and van der Hart, 1989: 1530 - 1540; van der Kolk, 1994: 253 - 265), and 
always as a prelude to criticising Freud. I have never raised Deleuze in this 
context. I should. To hell with disciplinary boundaries. Deleuze rejects notions of 
originary trauma through maternal separation and Freud's argument that we 
have no model for death (since all becoming implies it). But now, I want to think 
about seas and learning to swim. Seas are didactic - a Romantic idea perhaps, 
but within them, I am invariably reminded of my own insignificance in the scale 
of things; hence the purifying value of immersion however gentle or angry their 
waters may be. How can Christian narrative explain this power of sensation, of 
sensuality and of sensibility - the 'being of the sensible' (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 
69)? I am introducing Deleuze's discussion of learning to swim in the context of 
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apprenticeship because hegemonic representations of learning seem 
inadequate. 
'Learning takes place not in the relation between a representation and an 
action (reproduction of the Same) but in the relation between a sign and 
a response (encounter with the Other)' (ibid. 25) 
We do not learn to swim by imitating our instructor nor do our movements 
resemble those of a wave. Instead, our body combines some of its own 
distinctive points with those of a wave and 'espouses' the principle of a 
repetition which is: 
'no longer that of the Same, but involves the Other - involves difference, 
from one wave and one gesture to another, and carries that difference 
through the repetitive space thereby constituted' (ibid. 26). 
Learning here is the constitution of a space of encounter with signs, and 
according to Deleuze, signs testify to the spiritual and natural powers acting 
beneath representation - beneath the words, gestures, characters and objects 
that are represented (ibid.). As Colebrook (2002:136) puts it: 
'I will only learn to swim if I see what the instructor does not as a self-
contained action but as a creative response [ ] I have to feel what good 
swimming does, not what it is' 
It is about feeling the force of the problem. 
Deleuze states that learning is about entering into the 'universal of the 
relations which constitute the Idea, and into their corresponding singularities', 
and then refers to the 'idea' of the sea in Leibniz (1968 / 2004: 204). Clearly, 
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Ideas and ideas are not synonymous. An Idea is not a property of individual 
consciousness, nor is it bound to the representation of an object or concept 
(Baulch 2008: 3). 'The Idea is not yet the concept of an object which submits 
the world to the requirements of representation, but rather a brute presence 
which can be invoked in the world only in function of that which is not 
"representable" in things' (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 71). According to Deleuze, only 
the Idea or problem - or the problematic Idea, is universal (ibid. 202 - 203). This 
is why Colebrook (ibid.) refers to feeling the force of the problem of how to swim 
and of creative responses: 'Once we "forget" the problem, we have before us no 
more than an abstract general solution'. The consequences of such forgetting 
leads consciousness to attempt to reconstitute the problem: 
'but by way of the neutralized double of particular propositions 
(interrogations, doubts, likelihoods, hypotheses) and the empty form of 
general propositions (equations, theorems, theories ...) So begins the 
double confusion which assimilates problems to the series of 
hypotheticals and subordinates them to the series of categories' 
(Deleuze 1968/2004: 202) 
What this means is that the nature of the universal is lost (the force of the 
problem) but so too is the nature of the singular: 'for the problem or the Idea is a 
concrete singularity no less than a true universal' (ibid.). This returns us to 
Leibniz and singular and distinctive points since: 
'Corresponding to the relations which constitute the universality of the 
problem is the distribution of singular and ordinary points which 
determine the conditions of the problem' (ibid. 202) 
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It was Leibniz who recognised what separates problems and propositions: 'all 
kinds of events, "the how and the circumstances", from which propositions draw 
their sense' (ibid.). Ideas are multiplicities or complexes of relations and 
corresponding singularities. Deleuze offers the idea of the sea in Leibniz by way 
of illustration. It forms a system of differential relations between particulars and 
singularities corresponding to the degrees of variation among these relations -
'the totality of the system being incarnated in the real movement of the waves' 
(ibid. 204 - 205). So to learn to swim is to 'conjugate the distinctive points of our 
bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea in order to form a 
problematic field' (ibid. 205). In this conjugation, Deleuze suggests that a 
'threshold of consciousness' is reached, whereby micro-perceptions of the 
prevailing real relations cause our real acts to be adjusted; it is a subliminal 
process that attests to a 'profound complicity between nature and mind': 
learning occurs in and through the unconscious (ibid.). 
For Deleuze, there are two aspects to apprenticeship. I want to tease out 
their implications, and those of related ideas about learning, for my own 
experience of doctoral study and becoming-apprentice; I have already 
introduced the first aspect which is about the process of learning and relevance 
of signs in problem formation: it is signs which 'cause problems' (1968 / 2004: 
204). Deleuze then states: 
'the paradoxical functioning of the faculties - including, in the f irst, 
sensibility with respect to signs - thus refers to the Ideas which run 
throughout all the faculties and awaken each of them in turn' (ibid.). 
Here, I assume that the force of problem can be felt but not necessarily 
articulated. It is then the articulation, or conscious formulation of a scholarly 
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problem, that as Deleuze suggests, is its solution: 'A problem does not exist, 
apart from its solutions. Far from disappearing in this overlay, however, it insists 
and persists in these solutions' (ibid. 203). As a mature student who entered my 
faculty with conflicting epistemological loyalties (having studied animal 
behaviour most recently), the pressure created by the linear postpositivistic 
research model to select an appropriate methodology at proposal stage was 
stressful. I was dogged by a sense of dis-ease at my chosen methodology, but 
not at all well-positioned to articulate this feeling as a carefully defined set of 
problems. When I abandoned this method, opting instead for autoethnography, I 
envisaged the latter allowing me to formulate problems related to subjectivity 
and epistemology. Bruner's (1986) two types of knowing the world (logico-
scientific and narrative) did not relieve me of an acute sense of division at the 
core of my academic being. I felt undermined by my inability to adequately 
articulate and resolve this contradiction. 
I want to say now that learning and apprenticeship, by definition, take 
time. Thinking takes time, and for Deleuze 'thought is time' (ibid. 206). That 
learning is also so often an unconscious process implies that neoliberal 
managerialist, or technicist-rationalist, depictions of the doctorate - as an 
unproblematically conscious and linear process of learning, is inadequate. 
Rapid identification of an appropriate methodology and theoretical perspective 
suggests a privileging of final product (the thesis) over process (learning), and 
may not be applicable for all students. Instead, I have embraced complexity and 
non-linearity (Waller 2002), and rejected postpositivism in favour of a theoretico-
philosophical odyssey. I am following Gale and Wyatt (2009: 3 - 5, 7 - 8) in 
prioritising the process of learning; their work poignantly demonstrates that a 
traditional discourse of scholarly self-reliance and autonomy does not 
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necessarily preclude collaborative modes of learning (Gale, Speedy, and Wyatt 
2010: 21). Learning can and should facilitate experimentation - the production 
of rhizomatic connections (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 277), the 
circulation of intensities (ibid. 169) - a veritable 'tantricegg' (ibid. 170, 181 -
182), and defiance of the 'judgment of God' that insists we learn alone (ibid. 
176) and of those who police the plane of organisation and seek to 'plug' lines 
of flight (ibid. 297) as they steal the body of learning (ibid. 305). 
In another example of the relationship between problem formation and 
solution in apprenticeship, Deleuze describes an experiment in psychology 
where a monkey must learn to find food contained in boxes of a specific colour 
(1968 / 2004: 204). The point here is that: 'Learning is the appropriate name for 
the subjective acts carried out when one is confronted with the objecticity of a 
problem (Idea), whereas knowledge designates only the generality of concepts 
or the calm possession of a rule enabling solutions' (ibid.). If I allow myself a 
brief moment of becoming-monkey, I can feel the elations that accompany the 
initial phase of the experiment or apprenticeship as I start discovering tasty 
morsels in the yellow boxes. If I respond like the monkey in the cited 
experiment, my choice of boxes will reveal fewer errors over time, even though I 
cannot articulate the problem, and do not possess the knowledge that is its 
solution. This is the 'paradoxical' period which shows how 'truth and falsity are 
distributed according to what one understands of a problem'; and when I 
eventually get it 'right' every time, it will seem as if the 'final truth' has emerged 
- 'as though it were the limit of a problem completely determined and entirely 
understood' (ibid.). Imagine now, as that 'philosopher-monkey' (ibid.), who has 
grasped the truth, that I am invited to continue the experiment but this time with 
a different coloured box. Becoming-monkey again, how will I react to seizing the 
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'right' coloured box and finding it is empty? My first reaction would probably be 
to pick it up again to check that my eyes were not deceiving me; or I might 
refuse to continue to participate and withdraw to ponder my sanity; or decide 
that learning to juggle the boxes is much more fulfilling now that I am satiated; 
or duly comply and continue to pick up boxes despite my disappointment and 
confusion. As Deleuze states, there is no method to learning: 'We never know in 
advance how someone will learn: by means of what loves someone becomes 
good at Latin, what encounters make them a philosopher or in what dictionaries 
they learn to think' (ibid. 205). Why then should current definitions as to what 
constitutes a legitimate doctorate be so limited? Why is engagement with theory 
relegated to the pre-stage of bone fide research? Who presumes to know 'by 
which signs within sensibility, by which treasures of the memory, under torsions 
determined by the singularities of which Idea will thought be aroused?' (ibid.). 
One posited 'method' of learning, for Deleuze following Nietzsche, is 'the 
means of that knowledge which regulates the collaboration of all the faculties' 
and which is effected through 'violent training'; culture is ironically described as 
an 'involuntary adventure' that trains the mind in order to produce a 'nation of 
thinkers' (ibid.). Deleuze also considers the Platonic theory of apprenticeship 
where learning is the transcendental movement of the soul, and argues that an 
insistence on resemblance and identity recasts the apprenticeship in the 'image 
of thought itself, and therefore functions as a 'repentance, crushed by the 
emerging dogmatic image yet bringing forth a groundlessness that it remains 
incapable of exploring' (ibid. 206). This dogmatic image of thought forms the 
eighth 'postulate of knowledge' and embodies the seven other postulates 
outlined by Deleuze (ibid. 207). It is 'the postulate of the end, or result, the 
postulate of knowledge (the subordination of learning to knowledge, and of 
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culture to method' (ibid.). Deleuze suggests these postulates 'function all the 
more effectively in silence' (ibid.) thus evoking Gale's observation (2007: 479) -
of the tendency to convert findings from empirical research into subsequently 
unquestioned 'givens' that purportedly reflect the way the world is. It also 
invokes the contemporary construction of the doctorate as the execution of a 
postpositivist study which now functions as an unspoken 'given' - as to what the 
doctorate is, the map that precedes the territory (ibid.). Deleuze's third postulate 
is that of the model. This is where the distinction between the Platonic Idea and 
the Idea in Deleuze can be highlighted. Plato posits a dualist ontology where 
there are two worlds - the real and the apparent; the sensible world is allegedly 
derivative, i.e. it is modelled on (and therefore a copy of) the realm of Ideas, in a 
hierarchical organisation of the intelligible and the sensible (Ross in Parr 2005: 
208 - 209). 'Copies, that comprise the sensible world, mark a graded descent 
away from the realm of Ideas to the merely "apparent" world of the senses' 
(ibid.). Art is regarded as a copy of a copy and consequently fares badly in this 
hierarchical ranking exercise, while theatre is deemed positively dangerous to 
the proper order of the State because it suspends belief, thereby dissimulating 
its status as copy and training citizens to mistake the true and false copy (ibid. 
209). There is no possibility of fostering critical interrogation or reflexivity here 
(Gale ibid.). 
Deleuze reverses Platonism in asserting the priority of the simulacra 
(false copies), by arguing against their repression (1969 / 1990: 293 - 294), and 
in suggesting that the very distinction between copy and simulacra undermines 
the 'notations of copy and model' (ibid. 294). But Deleuze also insists that the 
'motivation of Platonism' should not be 'left in the shadows' - the 'will to select 
and choose' (ibid. 291): 'to select lineages: to distinguish pretenders; to 
120 
distinguish the pure from the impure, the authentic from the inauthentic' - hence 
the Platonic metaphor of testing for gold and the principle of division it implies 
(ibid. 292). Here, Plato is not proposing a dialectic of contradiction but a 'rivalry 
of claimants and suitors' that demands claims are screened (ibid.). Plato resorts 
to myth to extract models that function as a 'foundation-test' and 'method of 
selection' between true and false pretenders: 
'The distinction wavers between two sorts of images. Copies are 
secondary possessors. They are well-founded pretenders, guaranteed by 
resemblance; simulacra are like false pretenders, built upon dissimilarity, 
implying an essential perversion or a deviation [ so] on the one hand 
there are copies-icons, on the other there are simulacra-phantasms' 
(ibid. 294) 
'Elective participation' is the response to the problem of a method of selection 
whereby 'different men participate unequally in the mythic model' in a hierarchy 
as follows: 'the true statesman or well-founded aspirer, then relatives, 
auxiliaries, and slaves, down to simulacra and counterfeits' (ibid. 293). Deleuze 
reminds us that resemblance, in this duality of Platonic Idea and image, is an 
external relation. It is resemblance between Idea and thing, rather than between 
things, as it is the Idea which is constitutive of the internal essence. A true 
pretender therefore 'conforms to the object only insofar as he is modelled 
(internally and spiritually) on the Idea"; and conversely, simulacra are guilty of 
an 'internal imbalance' since they have not passed through the Idea - it is an 
image without resemblance (ibid. 295). This latter effect of resemblance is 
achieved by 'ruse or subversion', and in an impression of depth and distance 
that is the becoming-unlimited of the simulacra - a becoming-other that is 
problematic to observers; hence the Platonic imperative that limits must be 
imposed on this becoming that seeks to evade 'the equal, the limit, the Same, 
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or the Similar' demanding 'the selection among pretenders, the exclusion of the 
eccentric and the divergent, in the name of a superior finality, an essential 
reality' (ibid. 296, 297). No becoming-monkey here then either. The human is 
privileged over nature in Platonism - a privileging that Deleuze rejects. I have 
cleariy nailed my sail to the mast of a lineage that is not yet recognised as 
copying a widely established model of scholariy tradition. And I have found a 
rationale for doing so in the writing of Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari. I can 
hardly be accused however of not engaging in an internal spiritual modelling of 
my doctoral odyssey on the Idea of scholarship as Holligan (ibid.) defines it. I do 
not copy a technicist-rationalist and Platonic Idea of doctoral study as the 
mechanical reproduction of a true (postpositivistic) copy. The application of a 
standardised method or model contradicts the traditional quasi-religious 
demand for monastic isolation and asceticism as a condition of originality in 
scholarship. For me, there are no rational or logical rules that can ensure 
painless and timely completion if observed. The Platonic model of 
apprenticeship is self-evidently conservative - working against experimentation 
in knowledge production and encouraging reproduction of familiar frames. The 
priority of the simulacrum in Deleuze, as an affirmation of difference, does 
precisely the reverse. So my strategy for resolving the epistemological 
dilemmas referred to eariier and 'surviving' as a mature doctoral student is the 
privileging of becoming over being. I have tried to (re)constitute a very different 
notion of apprenticeship using Deleuze, and Gale and Wyatt (2009), that 
foregrounds becoming and relationality against prevailing Platonic notions that 
require me to conform to a pre-defined Idea as to what a real doctorate is, and 
how a good doctoral student should behave. I also reject the somewhat Platonic 
strategy of Balatti and Whitehouse (ibid.) of striving to be an authentic copy of 
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the academics within a particular academic 'community' since I find the concept 
of 'community' problematic. Lovitt (2005) recommends early postgraduate 
student induction into the academic community to reduce the possibility of 
attrition, suggesting that this concept functions as a 'given' (Gale, ibid.) and 
implying a homogeneity or pre-defined territory (ibid.) within academic faculties 
that is not necessarily desirable. 
All situations have micro-political potential (Spry 2003: 171; Gale and 
Wyatt 2009) - opportunities to create novel collective solidarities, and to 
dissipate the 'enabling lie' circulated by those with political power and 'love for 
nation-states, tribes, clans, political parties, churches, and perhaps everything 
done up to now in the name of community' (Surin in Parr 2005: 163). The latter 
is community conceived as comprising solitary rational autonomous individuals 
whereas collective solidarities involve a learning process as molar identities, 
structures and stratifications or codings are disrupted and challenged; hence my 
allusion to exposure of widespread abuse of power within the Catholic Church 
eariier. Beyond showing the enduring influence of Christian narrative where 'in 
moral matters we are still weighed down with old beliefs which we no longer 
even believe' (Deleuze 1986 / 2006: 74), I also wanted to underiine the micro-
political dimension of this exposure. I understand the conspiracy of silence that 
surrounds such abuse. And the extraordinary lengths that abusers go to in order 
to protect themselves and their molar reputations. So I find it remarkable and 
inspiring that those who have been affected by such behaviours, isolated and 
silenced, should now form a collectivity that cuts across molar identities and 
confronts one of the most powerful institutions in the worid. There is a lesson 
here about potentiality and the virtual images of opposition that may be 
actualised when criteria of affiliation shift in unexpected ways. Contra my eariier 
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declared intention to distance my writing from Christian narrative, the profound 
historical influence of such narrative, and its ever pervasive character, makes 
electing to 'forget' religion impossible. Besides, the collectivity currently 
protesting against the excesses of the Catholic Church is testimony to what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as 'becoming-revolutionary' (1994: 112). It has 
disrupted my own 'cliched' thinking or 'weary thought' (ibid. 214) that such 
abuse will inevitably, always, ultimately, be concealed. I have been reminded 
that it is a question of rediscovering the singular process of learning beneath 
generalities (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 28). 
I am aware that my brief outline of the Platonic theory of Ideas and 
apprenticeship fails to discuss the role of memory in learning. Nor have I 
mentioned becoming as forgetting (ibid. 9) - a highly seductive notion to me. 
This may have to wait. I want to explore memory and the unconscious, but 
without stepping into a Freudian territory that I find infinitely bleaker than any 
writing about neoliberal managerialism. So I shall return to Holligan and the 
notion of a quiet 'revolution' (ibid.) within higher education. When I began 
writing, it was my past experience of 'old discourses' (ibid.) relating to education 
that I intended to explore. This would, of course, have necessitated looking at 
Deleuze's treatment of memory. But instead, reading Holligan's paper - which is 
a case study of supervision involving a single mature female doctoral student, 
prompted me to reach for Balatti and Whitehouse (ibid.). I remembered their 
writing as being irreverent, and not at all suggestive of the extreme deference 
that Holligan found so challenging when supervising the student of his case 
study (ibid. 274). I had forgotten about the becoming-feral of the former authors 
because I was not sufficiently familiar with Deleuze and Guattari two years ago 
to make any comparison with becoming-animal. It was their experience as 
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female mature students that had interested me back then; and whether the 
concept of apprenticeship was appropriate to such students. According to 
Davies (2005: 11), the neoliberal managerialist higher education regime was 
attractive to female academics in the late 1970s because it promised gender 
parity in employment and promotion prospects. Realisation of this promise 
could perhaps be described as the fulfilment of a liberal feminist agenda where 
women could be 'expert' and speak with authority too (Balatti and Whitehouse 
2001: 51). Others have written about the 'feminization' of teacher training 
(Griffiths 2006) and academia. The latter refers to traditionally female 
professions and vocational subjects becoming university-based, thereby altering 
the historical gender (im)balance at professorial level and above (Bridges 
2006). More recently, I have wondered whether such feminist aspirations have 
contributed to the 'new fascism' in education - a term originally used by 
Deleuze in the context of film censorship (2006: 138) and which I use to invoke 
the distinction between manifest and latent consequences in Merton's 
sociological functionalism (Holmwood 2005). From another perspective, it 
indicates the apparatuses of capture whereby the State has appropriated the 
'war machine' (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 268) of feminism. It is more 
appropriate to speak of 'double capture'; the latter suggests an anti-hylomorphic 
conception of control, and a rejection of unilinear or unilateral causation 
(Toscano in Parr 2005: 140). Instead, Deleuze and Guattari posit the historical 
assemblage as a transformative articulation of becomings (ibid. 288 - 289). 
Feminism was never a homogenous movement as the various labels (liberal 
feminist, radical feminist, socialist feminist, Marxist feminist) confirm. 
Collectivities that cut across such divisions spontaneously formed around 
specific issues - particularly where changes in legislation were sought. The 
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process of becoming - othier\Nas, however, experienced as ongoing. It lacked 
any cleariy defined end point or telos. It was all about transforming reactive 
forces into active forces of becoming. It was about not knowing in advance what 
we might become. As a Marxist feminist in the 1970s and early 1980s, I rejected 
the separatist essentialism of so-called radical feminist politics. I believed that 
real sustainable change had to involve collectivities including men who also 
wanted to become-woman (ibid. 321) or become-imperceptible (ibid. 308) in the 
'active micropolitics' that becoming-minoritarian requires (ibid. 322): 'Every 
block of becoming is a block of co-existence' (ibid.). Radical feminism, with its 
ostensible conflation of sex and gender, was problematic to me. I wanted to be 
part of a pack that continually transformed itself (ibid. 274), that experimented, 
that crossed thresholds. I did not want one historically oppressive milieu to 
simply be replaced by something that could feel equally oppressive or 
restrictive. I struggled however to reconcile Marxism and feminism at an 
intellectual level, although I respected those - like Juliet Mitchell (1974), who 
strived to produce abstract solutions to this problem. But why would I want to 
preserve a timeless mode of reproduction - the Holy Family of religion and 
psychoanalysis, the 'so that is what tfiis meant' (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 
2009: 51 , 67), by mapping it on to a historically variable mode of production? 
My fears that separatist feminism would produce new, but equally fixed, 
identities or rigid orthodoxies were re-affirmed in the mid-1990s. After two years 
of part-time doctoral study, I was invited to re-submit an upgrade or transfer 
panel document on the grounds that it was 'above doctoral level but might make 
the department look right-wing'. I had written about child abuse but included 
boys amongst the abused, mentioned punitive mothering (Miller 1991, 1993), 
and acknowledged that abuse is not an exclusively male activity. The panel was 
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chaired by a male Head of School and comprised several female members of 
staff. I argued that a feminist perspective should not simply ignore these 
phenomena by casting women as universal victims, and boys who were abused 
as merely perpetrators-in-waiting. I feel this position has been subsequently 
vindicated by recent high profile cases in the UK of child abuse resulting in 
fatality. And in a recent article on child abuse in the Catholic Church entitled 
What Would Mary Do? (Miller 2010: 20) - premised on the argument that 'big 
boys do bad things when left to their own devices', it was acknowledged that 
sadistic abuse by female workers in Catholic residential units has also been 
reported (Miller 2010). I had critically reviewed the concept of a cycle of abuse 
as the inevitable return of the Same and hoped that my research would identify 
those factors that lead to very different outcomes for the children concerned (as 
statistics confirm that reproduction of the Same occurs in the minority of cases). 
It seemed to me then - and my view remains unchanged, that any research 
seeking to contribute to efforts to reduce future levels of perpetration should not 
be obstructed on radical feminist grounds, or in the service of a senior 
individual's career (the Head of School had been charged with creating a 
'progressive' image for his department). 
From my perspective at that time, gender parity in academia had hardly 
resulted in a 'revolutionary' change in knowledge production, or much evidence 
of the desire to flatten hierarchically organised power structures that had 
informed feminist political activity two decades earlier. At the institution in 
question, I experienced female academics policing knowledge in a very 
'masculinist' way (Lee and Green 2000: 44). Given that my own teenage years 
included many violations of trust, primarily by a sadistic and violent stepfather 
and secondarily by those not inclined to interfere with his activities, this episode 
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in my academic history was profoundly shocking. I withdrew and moved on. 
Golde (2000: 199 - 227) is correct to suggest that doctoral students who 
withdraw do not always offer the real reasons to their supervisors or their 
institution; I pleaded health grounds. I had also found the conduct of supervision 
meetings to be quite bizarre - surreal even. They began with discussion 
between my supervisors as to which would take notes for the meeting report. 
One would then take copious notes as we spoke such that the content could be 
read, vetted, and signed by me at the end of the meeting. It was an utterly 
soulless academic experience. Despite all the deference to neoliberal 
procedure on the part of my supervisors, neither had volunteered any indication 
of the departmental political objections to my work over a two year period as a 
self-funding pre-transfer student. I feel entitled to be judgmental and perceive 
unethically under the circumstances. I am not however offering a generalisation 
about women in academia - not trying to extract a truth from this particular 
experience. I was a component of that supervisory assemblage and I did not 
overtly object to the way that meetings were conducted. We were all caught up 
in increasing levels of bureaucratic surveillance, and I always concluded that 
they were obliged to dutifully abide by instructions from above. And I too wanted 
the glass ceiling to be shattered. I cared too much about my own professional 
image. 
It would be a mistake to interpret the above account as suggesting that 
Holligan (ibid.) explicitly implicates gender in the 'knowledge revolution' that he 
fears. His use of the term revolution serves however to highlight the difference 
between revolutions as both change in, and repetition of, oppressive power 
structures, and the becoming - revolutionary of Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 
112). If sense is an event and what we call something, as an entity or being. 
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initiates a line of becoming (Coiebrook 2002: 60), tiien calling changes in higher 
education revolutionary indicates that something of dramatic proportions has 
Indeed taken place and that its magnitude demands our attention; particularly 
when it has purportedly happened without our awareness - change without a 
concept or without the conscious awareness of those who have participated in 
bringing it about. Yet Davies (2005: 11) is very clear about how and why the 
'revolution' that Holligan (ibid.) describes has occurred: governmentally-instilled 
fears about individual economic survival have ensured acquiescence in a 
neoliberal form of competitive individualism. The problematic Idea for the future 
is that of how to resist governmental control of education, and demand 
independence from governmental agendas, without either gender securing a 
monopoly on what constitutes knowledge and learning. And without the learning 
process being reduced to the consumption of existing knowledge, or knowledge 
production being confined to a finite range of methodologies and theoretical 
perspectives: ensuring a radical pluralism within higher education. 
I was sensitised to issues of intellectual integrity and scholarly 
independence through this doctoral experience of the 1990s - of being 
obstructed for the wrong reasons. I had taken both for granted previously. An 
undergraduate Gender Studies module had positively encouraged open 
constructive discussion of differing feminist theories without obligation to defend 
a pre-given political identity. I thrived on that freedom. It is clearer now perhaps 
why, for me, becoming - revolutionary and becoming - apprentice are linked; 
there is so much in my background that militates against unquestioning trust of 
power differentials, and both require a trust in the future. There is a vulnerability 
associated with forgetting oneself and one's history. It may also be clearer why 
a philosophy that prioritises becoming over being and identity is so seductive to 
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me - there is much to forget. Like the artist or novelist described as 'a seer, a 
becomer" (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 171), I think that a child who has 
experienced abuse has also: 'seen something in life that is too great, too 
unbearable [ ] the mutual embrace of life with what threatens it' (ibid. 171). 
Trauma of this type can involve a 'shattering of lived perceptions' (ibid.); hence 
my mention of Janet earlier. A philosophy that speaks of 'freeing life wherever it 
is imprisoned' (ibid.) was always likely to interest me, just as I embraced the 
Marxian principle that the only point of life is to change it when I was younger. 
In a televised interview, a young Austhan woman who was kidnapped as a 
child, imprisoned for several years, and subjected to humiliating sadistic rituals 
(Channel 5, UK, 17^^ February, 2010), described being occasionally allowed out 
into a large garden. These tiny events were powerfully significant to her - a 
breeze, the movement of a blade of grass, the vibrant colour of a petal, 'a 
breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world' (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 322). I know this feeling very well - the forgetting through becoming-
breeze, the becoming - alive with nature that is not a remembering but 
something else entirely, a blissful dissolution of the self that represents, and the 
promise of an endless becoming in mutual 'contemplation' (Deleuze 1968 / 
2004; 96). The sadism and physical abuse to which I was subjected pales into 
insignificance when compared to hers. Some of the fall out is very familiar 
however: the sense of being an Outsider (Deleuze and Guattari1980 / 2004: 
275), different, a borderline between parallel universes. So multiplicity, as 
Deleuze and Guattari describe it, speaks to me: becoming and multiplicity are 
the same thing (ibid.) and we become with the 'hour' of the world and the world 
becomes with us (ibid. 274; Gale, 2007:480). It is only the 'now of our 
becomings' that matters (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 112). When writing of 
130 
Virginia Woolf, Deleuze and Guattari also liken artists to philosophers in that 
they may share an 'affective Athleticism'; it is an athleticism of becoming where 
impersonal forces are revealed and which may therefore involve a certain 
fragility of health: 'not because of their illnesses or neuroses but because they 
have seen something in life that is too much for anyone, too much for 
themselves, and that has put on them the quiet mark of death' (ibid. 172). It is 
then explained that this 'something' can also sustain and support; a resonance 
between Nietzsche and Michaux is implied: 'one day we will know that there 
wasn't any art but only medicine' (Michaux 1935: 193; ibid. 172 - 173). 'Sensory 
becoming is the action by which something or someone is ceaselessly 
becoming-other (while continuing to be what they are)' (ibid. 177); I cannot 
eradicate my history but I am forever creating distance from it - living to become 
and becoming to feel alive, defying arborescence as submission of the line to 
the point and passing 'between points' to come up through the middle (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 323). 
No logical order is implied in the movement between becoming-woman 
and becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, and becoming-imperceptible (ibid. 
275). Becoming-woman is necessary however if we are to escape the concept 
of Man. The latter has functioned historically as the privileged point of stable 
being - or identity against which everything is judged; it has set us against a 
world of appearances and devalued those appearances accordingly (Coiebrook 
2002: 139). Deleuze and Guattari state: 
'Man constitutes himself as a gigantic memory, through the position of 
the central point, its frequency (insofar as it is necessarily reproduced by 
each dominant point), and its resonance (insofar as all of the points tie in 
with it). Any line that goes from one point to another in the aggregate of 
the molar system, and is thus defined by points answering to these 
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mnemonic conditions of frequency and resonance, is a part of the 
arborescent system' (ibid.323) 
So even women must become - woman (ibid.) to escape a logic of being in 
favour of one of becoming and difference - a becoming minoritarian (ibid. 321 -
322). Perhaps my Indignation at being silenced for raising punitive or sadistic 
mothering is now self-evident: how could the perpetuation of an image of 
motherhood as sacrosanct (woman = nurturer) be considered radically different 
from a radical feminist position? The feminism I favoured rejected political and 
religious images of the maternal role which portrayed women as fonts of 
boundless compassion, or implied that unthinking nurturance is the fulfilment of 
their biological destiny. I wonder now, as I write, if any of those present at the 
transfer panel I wrote of above have ever bothered to read the account of 
childhood abuse written by David Pelzer (1999). Somehow I doubt it. 
I created a dilemma for myself when I concurred with my current Director 
of Studies that prior experiences will condition the course of events in 
subsequent educational settings. The less sanguine experiences in my familial 
history were those that had most influenced my attitude towards learning and 
educational settings. I did not want to appear to be endorsing the popularised 
Freudianism that I detest whereby psychic maturity is conflated with conformity 
to selected norms. I also recognise that many psychoanalytic concepts -
psychical repetition for example, were popularised through the very self-help 
literature and consciousness raising groups that were integral to feminist 
attempts to curb abusive behaviours (domestic and sexual violence, and child 
abuse); hence my habitual self-checking for damaging patterns. There was a 
moment shortly after I had decided to abandon my postpositivist study in 2009 
when I wondered if I was creating the conditions for history to repeat itself. Was 
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I guilty of an unconsciously motivated academic self-sabotage insofar as my 
work might invite opposition, obstruction even, causing me to eventually 
withdraw as I had done before? My perception of supervision had been 
changed by that unfortunate experience of the mid-1990s which led me to 
anticipate problems and respond accordingly; 'psychoanalytic drift' would set in, 
'bringing back all the cliches' - a former hidden principle or plane of 
organisation, a teleological plane of transcendence (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 
/ 2004: 286, 292). I am writing about my experience in the 1990s in order to 
emphasise that it was my relationship with an 'outside' that triggered this sense 
that history might repeat itself, not some internal psychical compulsion to repeat 
that history. I might insist here that the Idea involved was not a psychoanalytic 
phantasm of my own individual consciousness, but instead a real problem - a 
'system of multiple, non-localisable connections between differential elements [ 
] incarnated on real relations and actual terms' (Deleuze 1968/2004: 231). I 
could also point to the distinction Deleuze draws between psychical and 
historical repetition: the former is a concept produced by reflection, or a matter 
of analogy, whereas the latter is 'above all a condition of historical action itself 
because we create on condition that we identify with figures from the past (ibid. 
114). Deleuze is, of course, writing about revolution and the theatre that is 
history, not about academic relationships. 
Deleuze explains that in psychoanalysis it is repression that purportedly 
causes psychical repetition: 'When the consciousness of knowledge or the 
working through of memory is missing [ ] it is played, that is to say repeated, 
enacted instead of being known' (ibid. 16). An inverse relation is posited 
between 'repetition and consciousness, repetition and remembering, repetition 
and recognition' such that the less one is conscious of remembering one's past, 
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the more one repeats it; so, in theory, remembering and the working through of 
memory prevents repetition (ibid.). On this account, I should never have worried 
about repetition as a psychic compulsion as it is forgetting that I consistently 
find to be difficult. Merely remembering, or not forgetting, is not however enough 
for psychoanalysis - it is the 'working through' that counts. This begs the 
question as to just what 'working through' actually entails. Unsurprisingly, the 
answer for Freud is therapy. And a therapeutic relationship that is not 
concerned with memories in the abstract, but memories where affects 
associated with parental figures can be transferred to the therapist. The latter is 
allegedly able to represent them, and render them conscious in a subject who 
then recognises their truth and finds themselves empowered to break the cycle 
of bare repetition (ibid. 21). Such transference therefore requires a living 
connection with the past and installing ourselves there in conditions Deleuze 
likens to a scientific experiment: 'the patient is supposed to repeat the whole of 
his disturbance in privileged, artificial conditions' (ibid.). Deleuze later points out 
however that transference as repetition in fact serves more to verify or 
'authenticate the roles and select the masks' than to 'identify events, persons 
and passions' (ibid.). 
It is precisely this authentication or verification process that leads me to 
consider psychoanalysis to be potentially damaging to those who have already 
suffered impositions of a sexual or physical or psycho-emotional nature. 
Abusers invariably seek to impose their own definitions of the situation upon 
those they abuse and simultaneously strive to undermine the confidence of 
abusees in their own intuitions, perceptions and judgments. I find the 
suggestion of a purportedly therapeutic relationship, where unconscious desire 
for an abusive parent (or its alleged psychic representatives) is a pre-given 
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assumption the patient must recognise, nauseating; hence my concern about 
Grant's (2005) inadvertent conflation of 'Psy' and 'Psycho' supervision in the 
previous plateau. And, of course, it was Freud's shift in thinking about seduction 
that prompted most anger in the feminist circles in which I mixed in the 1970s. 
The implications of this shift for anyone whose abuse has been denied by those 
responsible, or by those who could have acted to prevent it but failed to do so, 
are deeply offensive. The shift, or inversion, I refer to is Freud's abandonment 
of a hypothesis of real childhood events and traumatisation, and its substitution 
with a seduction theory where only fantasy is at play - the child's fantasy that is. 
I must confess that it was difficult for me to read Deleuze describe this Freudian 
volte-face as a 'decisive moment' before suggesting that 'simulacra are the 
letter of repetition itself (ibid. 19). But then Difference and Repetition was first 
published in 1968 before the medicalisation of child abuse and feminist activity 
in this area. It remains a taboo subject for many. I also understand that Deleuze 
critically engaged with Freud In order to rework key Freudian concepts and 
make them his own. 
Deleuze challenges many popularised versions of Freudian ideas in this 
process. Hence the concept of a death instinct - which for Deleuze marks a 
'turning point' In Freud's work (ibid. 18), is not Interpreted as referring to 
aggression or self-destructive tendencies; instead, it becomes crucial to 
Deleuze's argument about difference and repetition. So too with the seduction 
theory; Deleuze is not denying the reality of childhood events, but insisting that 
they cannot be reproduced as they were experienced at the time of their 
occurrence. We cannot recreate the exact affects and feelings precisely 
because the event has passed. Attempting to represent it is all we can do. So 
what Deleuze is objecting to is Freud's conviction that there is a 'first term that 
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is repeated' (ibid. 19) - specifically, an Oedipal first term that is lurking 
'underneath' the 'disguises' such that our adult loves can only signify an oedipal 
desire for our mothers (ibid.). 'There is therefore nothing repeated which may be 
isolated or abstracted from the repetition in which it was formed, but within 
which it is also hidden' (ibid.) Rather than reducing varied fantasies, 'symptoms' 
and dreams produced by condensation and displacement to some originary 
term related to oedipal desire as Freud conceives it (the Same), Deleuze 
emphasises that these variations are 'the internal genetic elements of repetition 
itself; variation is related to the death instinct in that death is formed from one 
disguise to the other - 'with and within the variations' (ibid.). Hence Deleuze 
argues that the concept of the death instinct functions as a transcendental 
principle for repetition and is characterised by positivity. It is silent insofar as it is 
not given in experience, in contrast to the pleasure principle; but it is Thanatos 
which submits Eros to repetition (ibid. 20). Something must cease for becoming 
to be possible. Deleuze insists that cycles are only abstractions (ibid. 24) and is 
highly critical of the interpretation of psychical repetition as in: 'one repeats 
because one is mistaken, because one has not worked through the memory, 
because one lacks consciousness, because one has no instincts' (ibid. 33). 
Contra the bounded ego of Freud, and indeed our own sense of being as closed 
entities, Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with the social and political 
emergence of the ego - how we come to experience ourselves in this way (1980 
/ 2004: 289 - 292). Against the psychoanalytic notion that desire originates in 
bodies, is oedipally organised, and therefore repressed as a condition of 
sociality, it is argued that desire produces bodies but also exceeds them: 
'Desire is free flow, creative difference and becoming' (Coiebrook 2002: 142). 
Although we have the capacity to recognise ourselves as subjects, the creative 
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forces of life will always exceed us. This is why we repress and why Deleuze 
and Guattari speak of artists and writers who return 'breathless and with 
bloodshot eyes' after having seen 'Life in the living'; they cite Virginia Woolf in 
suggesting how a moment of the world can be captured: 'Saturate every atom' 
(1994: 172). As Colebrook states, this creative force exceeds or transgresses 
the boundaries of persons and intentions; it may be extremely disruptive of 
perceived and stable identities (ibid.): becoming reveals forces that are not our 
own. Sexuality is similarly discounted as a human property that emanates from 
bodies - particularly from that of the child for the prohibited mother as a prelude 
to, and origin of, adult sexuality. Desire is pre-individual (between body parts) 
and pre-human (not reducible to sexual relations between people); and it is only 
through a contraction of political and social investments that the 'figure of the 
mother' which we associate with the nuclear family (and radical feminism?) 
emerges (ibid.). Such invested images demonstrate the social organisation and 
collective nature of desire. To think anti-oedipally, as Deleuze and Guattari 
(1972 / 2009) advocate, is to reject the production of woman as 'an impossible, 
lost and prohibited origin' through the Freudian incest taboo where the child is 
required to repress its desire for the mother and become like the father 
(Colebrook 2002: 143). This brings us back to becoming - woman. It is not 
imputed desires that are unconscious but rather the very real socio-political 
processes through which Man is produced as a transcendent value; becoming -
woman is revolutionary because it is necessarily means the dissolution of 
'oedipal man' (ibid. 144, 145). This is achieved by rejection of a sex in favour of 
a thousand tiny sexes - 'n sexes', as the uncontrolled becomings of organisms 
more used to the fabrication of opposable positionality within a dualism-machine 
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(Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 307, 304-305). It can also be achieved 
through writing (ibid.). 
I suggested earlier that becoming - apprentice and becoming -
revolutionary were connected for me. I meant that I now feel as if I inhabit a 
plane of becoming where old dramas can be (re)written. I am letting my writing 
take me to places that I had not envisaged going. I am no longer quite sure 
what independent scholarship is if it is not the freedom to become immersed in 
this process of learning. In the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage, the thesis is 
an 'enterprise of co-creation' (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 173) not a monument 
to competitive individualism. The 'old discourses' that Holligan describes can be 
(re)worked to function in an 'untimely' way (Deleuze 2004: 139) - to support a 
thousand tiny doctoral projects and thereby expand the definition of 
'excellence', but without simultaneously promoting the 'sink or swim' policy that 
Holligan claims characterises elite institutions (ibid. 268, 276). The latter was 
not my experience many years ago. Informal help was readily available for 
those who required it, but less eagerly provided to those who would be more 
suited to the pending neoliberal managerialist environment where they would be 
told what to think, say, and do and then required to provide evidence that they 
had thought, said, and done it. It is not my experience now. 
I shall briefly describe the role of memory in the Platonic theory of 
learning as reminiscence which was omitted earlier. My planned writing about 
memory and the unconscious remains on hold however for the moment. I sense 
the 'dangers of falling into the black hole of involuntary memory' (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980 / 2004: 186) and the drift in my writing here is testimony to that 
danger perhaps. Memory is powerful if left to its own devices. It is why I entitled 
this piece of writing 'dark precursors' (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 319). Deleuze 
however is referring to the power and violence of nature - its power to break and 
make connections. But I digress. What is the role of memory in knowledge and 
learning according to Plato? It derives from the Pythagorean idea of the 
Immortality of the soul and the belief that once installed in the human body, the 
pure and complete knowledge in which the soul once dwelt is contaminated by 
sensory experience; knowledge is innate and achieved through introspection, 
but sensory experience can serve as a reminder of what is already known 
(Hergenhahn 2009: 47 - 48). Knowledge is recollection of what the soul knew 
prior to entering the body. So Plato's theory of reminiscence is both nativist 
(knowledge as innate) and rationalist (knowledge is achieved through the 
workings of the mind); its idealism stems from the privileging of abstract forms 
and ideas as the ultimate reality (ibid. 48). Plato conceived the soul as 
comprising three conflicting components: the immortal rational, the mortal 
emotional and mortal appetitive. Since fulfilment of the latter is a major 
motivational force, the function of the rational component is to control appetites 
and emotions by deferring gratification, however much energy is required to do 
so, although it was recognised that different components would predominate in 
different people (ibid.). This privileging of the rational forms the basis of Platonic 
morality and politics in that a Utopia was proposed where the philosopher would 
be king or kings would be required to think philosophically; and those unable to 
forget or control the evils of the flesh and attractions of sensory experience 
would be condemned to a life of ignorance and forced to stand aside in order to 
make way for the possibility of life as Plato defined it (ibid. 50). Thank God for 
Deleuze, and Deleuze-Guattarl. 
1 now want to conclude this piece of writing on two lighter notes. The first 
Is another Joni Mitchell (1974) refrain which I discovered in the same year and 
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which always lifted my spirits: 'My analyst told me that I was right out of my 
head. But I said dear doctor I think that it's you instead. Because I have got a 
thing that's unique and new. To prove it I'll have the last laugh on you. 'Cause 
instead of one head, I got two. And you know two heads are better than one'. 
The second is a quote from Anti-Oedipus (1972 / 2009: 14) because I was 
similarly amused, thirty seven years later, by the many irreverent anecdotes 
included by Deleuze and Guattari in this text, however serious the point being 
conveyed. Here they are writing about the inadequacy of a reductive Freudian 
Oedipal perspective and an institutionalised judge - Daniel Paul Schreber, 
whose own memoirs influenced Freud's whting on paranoia: 
'The psychoanalyst says that we must /lecessar/Vy discover Schreber's 
daddy beneath his superior God, and doubtless also his elder brother 
beneath his inferior God. At times the schizophrenic loses his patience 
and demands to be left alone. Other times he goes along with the whole 
game and even invents a few tricks of his own, introducing his own 
reference points in the model put before him and undermining it from 
within ("Yes, that's my mother, all right, but my mother's the Virgin Mary, 
you know"). One can easily imagine Schreber answering Freud: "Yes, I 
quite agree, naturally the talking birds are young girls, and the Superior 
God is my daddy and the inferior God my brother.' 
I think that I need Patti Smith, not Joni Mitchell, right now. Can I be a 
'riot-gurrl' (Lort 2000) at fifty plus? And which cauldron am I in now? Is it really a 
cauldron? If I do not answer in the affirmative, it is because I am no longer 
writing from within that arborescent supervisory assemblage in a top-down 
exercise - by which I mean that everything must follow from a key premise and 
related imperatives. Looking back, I can see a direct relationship between 
critiques of neoliberal managerialism, behaviours within those supervision 
meetings, and the suffocation of thought. Here though, writing now, I feel more 
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like Deleuze (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 1) who once said that there had been 
'too much desire to do philosophy to wonder what it was'. I have been too busy 
writing, making connections, being affected by supervisory questioning to pause 
and ask why, on earth, is it that I am thanking God and not my present 
supervisory team for creating the conditions that are making such writing 
possible. If it is a cauldron that I am in, then they are in it too. So sorcery 
perhaps. But I am growing tired of feeling bound by the neoliberal spell (and the 
critiques it engenders). I - we, are on a witch's flight. 'To think is always to 
follow the witch's flight' (ibid. 41) - to invoke forces without deceiving ourselves 
that they belong to us as individuals. And Stengers' (undated) 'effective 
togetherness' (www.recalcitrance.com/deleuzelast.htm) is rendered ineffable 
within the neoliberal managerialist lexicon, but also in the macro-level critiques 
that accompany it, with their assumption of a central antagonism that functions 
as an organising principle of everything (ibid.). I am unsure where my writing is 
taking me, but it is, I feel, a rhizomatic supervisory assemblage that is taking me 
there now. 
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Divine pleasures and sacred thrills 
Stengers (undated) - a former student of Deleuze, was frustrated by his 
reluctance to give direct answers in lectures, but now describes her joy at 
discovering that an answer 'had to determine its moment, its occasion and 
circumstances, its landscapes and personae, its conditions and unknowns' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 2). This penultimate plateau marks a step-change, 
I feel, in my writing. I confront my historical relationship to feminism by living 
divergent theories of subjectivity in defiance of concerns about consistency and 
betrayal of favoured academic positions. I explain why God is a lobster for 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004), and show how my embrace ofneorealism 
has been complicated by feminist appropriations of psychoanalytic theories and 
my enduring concerns about biological determinism. I consider whether 
linguistic constructivism and social constructionism do, in fact, overcome the 
macro - micro divide such that the affective basis of thought is grasped and 
meso inventions can emerge uninhibited by the ghost of conformity to 
prescriptive orthodoxies. 
May 2010 
The concepts of 'riot girl' and 'outsider women' (Lort 2000) were initially 
appealing. I grew up in the 1960s and 1970s when rejection of the judgment 
machine - the 'judgment of God' (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 45) and the 
impulse to question the status quo was not unusual. My own sense of outsider 
status derived from an oppressive familial situation, and I relied on reading to 
render it intelligible and to manage its fall out. Any text with 'anti' or 'free' in its 
title was attractive to me prior to, and following, escape from my toxic home 
environment at sixteen. I was politicised through my reading of Laing (1960, 
1970), Laing and Esterson (1964), Sasz (1961 / 1974), lllich (1971), and Neil 
(1968). I felt less isolated knowing there were others who found the world and 
the Holy family particularly, to be a cauldron of boiling tar not a harmonious 
trinity. Works by the women whom Lort cites - Kathy Acker, Patti Smith, Anna 
Kavan, also remain on my bookshelves as testaments to a different era - to an 
energising sense that things could be otherwise; old friends to my efforts at self-
transformation and rejection of stultifying gender norms. But they came later. 
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As a fourteen year old, it was the anti-psychiatry literature that I found especially 
engaging. My habitual response when others volunteer accounts of their 
experiences of familial abuse is that I got off lightly. Violence was an easy price 
to pay for the preservation of another form of physical integrity. I invariably 
describe the occasion when, at fourteen, I mustered the courage to hit back, 
and how my stepfather's hasty retreat made me realise that cowardice and 
inadequacy is behind much abusive behaviour. But of course, things were far 
more complex than that and my refusal to be coerced and manipulated invited 
unpredictable episodes of rage and fury, and ritualistic humiliation. I have never 
understood claims that girls become male-identified, or identify with their 
aggressor. Nor do I understand the concept of maternal collusion as yet one 
more way mothers are socially denigrated. I infinitely prefer Deleuze and 
Guattari's take on 'becoming girl' - a fugitive being indifferent to memory (1980 / 
2004: 305 - 306), to the implication that I should have identified with the very 
form of femininity that I understood feminism to be questioning. Whenever it is 
suggested that I celebrate the feminine in a conflation of sex and gender, as it 
was recently by a friend who enjoys Irigaray (1985, 2000), I rail against this 
version of difference and crave the 'song of life' (Deleuze and Guattari ibid. 
304). I was almost fourteen when my step-father's fear of exposure prompted a 
pre-emptive strategy of contacting my school and the parents of friends to 
inform them that I was psychotic and strongly recommend that they dismiss 
anything I might say about my domestic situation. Loyalty to my mother had 
always precluded discussing such matters, but I turned to the psychoanalytic 
and anti-psychiatric literature in order to understand what I had been wrongly 
accused of. I would like to think that today this very parental act would 
immediately raise an alarm. It failed to do so back in the early 1970s. And it 
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was, as always, my mother whom I felt particularly betrayed by. Aware of 
events behind closed familial doors, she worked hard to preserve a veneer of 
normality to protect my stepfather from public scrutiny and preclude the forcing 
of difficult choices. 
I identified with Natascha Kampusch's (c / p.l30) account of what it was 
like to live under the same roof, with no option to do othenwise, with someone 
whose primary objective is to break one's spirit and secure passive compliance, 
her subsequent tendency to self-isolate, and the powerful sense of being, 
freedom, and connection that the natural world afforded her. So I cannot accept 
Judith Butler's (1993: 224) identification, and subsequent dismissal, of a 'kind of 
vitalism' in Foucault in the presentation of power as a ceaseless confrontation 
or struggle. Those who have lived in situations where such struggles were 
ongoing understand the power of contemplation which, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, is self-enjoyment without concepts or knowledge, a pure internal 
Awareness: 'it is sensation itself [ ] beneath the noise of actions' (1994: 212 -
213) - I feel therefore I am. Nor can I wholly endorse the idea of outsider 
women as Lort (ibid.) presents it. The anti-psychiatry literature facilitated the 
use of specific psychiatric or psychological conditions as heuristic devices in 
Deleuze and Guattari (1972 / 2009). This move echoes the sociological tradition 
that looks to deviant cases to illuminate the normative social world. Deleuze and 
Guattari adopted schizophrenia and the writing of schizophrenics such as 
Artaud (ibid. 122, 124 -125; 1980 / 2004: 166) in a similar manner. But they do 
not idealise or romanticise mental illness (Deleuze 2004: 238, 240). Hence 
Deleuze acknowledges the danger of proposing a clinical aesthetic (1981 / 
2005: 31) and madness, like drug addiction, is discussed in the context of the 
dangers of excessive de-stratification (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 316). 
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I therefore feel distinctly uneasy about the presentation of the writer Anna 
Kavan as exemplifying a Deleuzo-Guattarian inspired subversion of the 
masculine-feminine binary. I wonder instead why she died with a needle in her 
hand and how much distress her schizophrenia had caused her. I also doubt 
whether Patti Smith saw herself as shot through with 'shards of masculinity' - a 
phenomenon that Lort (ibid.) suggests is inevitable when women resist 
normative gender relations. Deleuze and Guattari (ibid. 304) reject the tendency 
to view the subject as a container within which a balance of masculine and 
feminine elements should be achieved; this indirectly perpetuates the binary: 'It 
is just as deplorable to miniaturize, internalize the binary machine as it is to 
exacerbate it' (ibid.). 
Perhaps the case of schizophrenia that interests me most, and which I 
first encountered in 1976 when studying English literature before entering 
university, was that of an academic-poet at the University of Washington. It was 
not unusual, I recall, for him to be found on all fours traversing the campus 
lawns at the onset of a schizophrenic episode. And as interested as I was in his 
poetry at the time, it was the fact that his somewhat deviant behaviour was 
compassionately accommodated that I found so surprising. This resonated with 
me since, despite all my courageous defiance of my stepfather, it was not until 
returning to education after two years of living independently, that I 
acknowledged the extent to which my self-esteem had been damaged. For a 
brief period, panic attacks in the presence of others kept me away from 
lectures. But I was encouraged not to abandon my studies rather than identified 
as a student who was falling short of some neoliberal managerialist blueprint of 
the professionally - skilled prospective employee. The education sector had not 
yet been called upon to function as the handmaiden of a knowledge economy. 
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My academic work was valued. I felt valued. Although anti-psychiatry is no 
longer fashionable, I am alarmed by non-specific psychiatric diagnoses like 
borderline personality disorder. I suspect that many abusees acquire such 
labels because it is easier for the feint-hearted to pathologise the individual 
rather than confront unpalatable truths about the society in which they live. 
Perpetrators are adept at engineering the invalidation and isolation of their 
chosen prey. Much has changed since feminists insisted that deviant 
behaviours often, like charity, begin at home, but clearly it is not enough as 
recent high profile abuse cases (institutional and othenA/ise) demonstrate. I 
worry too about schoolchildren in a governmentally-induced culture that 
prioritises examination league tables over and above the welfare of pupils as 
my research in the 1990s indicated prevalence that translates into at least one 
abused child in every classroom. 
I still reach for Patti Smith's Babel (1978) sometimes, but I wondered, 
after reading Lort (ibid.), whether I could identify 'outsider women' in academia, 
although I would prefer to abandon the sexual attribution as Deleuze and 
Guattari do in their gallery of literary becomings (ibid.). Many authors came to 
mind but I re-visited texts by Judith Butler and, to paraphrase another time-worn 
Refrain, saw something of myself in more than one an aspect of her writing. I 
had always neglected to read the 1999 Preface in Gender Trouble (1990 / 
2006) in my haste to extract and engage with key arguments. It contains a 
personal statement that shocked me, although I now wonder why it had that 
effect. Butler mentions an uncle who was incarcerated on account of his 
anatomically anomalous body, her own struggle with a 'scarhng condemnation' 
(ibid, xx), and how a dogged determination to denaturalise gender emerged 
from a 'desire to live, to make life possible, to rethink the possible' (ibid. xix). If I 
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recognise myself in this statement, it is because prior to the mid - 1970s, I was 
only aware of texts on the incest taboo. The term child abuse was not in 
circulation. Homosexuality is the heuristic that permits Butler to explore the role 
of language in subject - formation, feminist appropriations of homophobic 
psychoanalytic theory, and the essentialism of specific feminist writers and 
political economic theories of ideology. 
It had not occurred to me until reading this preface that my own 
experience of abusive behaviour may have always functioned as an unspoken 
personal heuristic and fuelled my interest in trans - disciplinary thinking. Like 
Butler, I have always detested the biological determinism evidenced in popular 
thinking about gender. My appreciation of theories of trauma and child abuse 
informed by evolutionary affective neuroscience is therefore difficult to reconcile 
with an anti-naturalising stance. Why am I reassured by a paper portraying the 
statistical predominance of abuse by stepfathers as an evolutionary hangover 
(infanticide being practiced by the incoming male in some mammalian herd 
species)? And why do I then recoil when considering how this hypothesis might 
function as a potential rationale? It is many years ago that I stopped trying to 
answer the question that preoccupies many abusees - why me? Life is too 
short. But there is a sense in which I have never stopped seeking answers - as 
if making abuse intelligible will somehow liberate me from intrusive memories 
and fall out. Hence: academic texts become personal resources, theories are 
checked for their implications for abusees or their emancipatory potential, and I 
continue to welcome disclosures like those of Butler (ibid, xx) and Wyatt (Gale 
and Wyatt 2009: 227 - 229). Making sense matters, however much I wish that it 
did not. What I took from Laing at fourteen years of age was that schizophrenia 
can be a rational response to a crazy situation - an argument not so unlike the 
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ethological position that behavioural pathologies may be evidenced in captive 
animals deprived of opportunities to exercise their natural behavioural 
repertoire. 
I suspect that my detestation of neoliberal managerialism is attributable 
to its totalising tendencies - the imposition of a reality that is not my own. I was 
precocious enough when younger to know what a totalising head-game was, 
but not aware of how emotionally, and at times physically, isolating the 
consequences of rejecting one would be. When I described my supervision 
relationship in the 1990s as bizarre or unreal, it was because, having known a 
very different academic culture I wanted to hang on doggedly to my sense of it 
in the face of an increasingly totalising paranoia and the resultant feeling that 
we were often speaking different languages. This reference to paranoia is from 
Foucault's preface to Anti-Oedipus (1972 / 2009: xiii). I have resolved to read 
more prefaces. In this one, Foucault pays a 'modest tribute' to a seventeenth 
century priest who wrote 'Introduction to the Devout Life' by suggesting that 
Anti-Oedipus might be read as an 'Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life' (ibid.). 
Foucault describes the latter as a book of ethics: 'The Christian moralists 
sought out the traces of the flesh lodged deep within the soul. Deleuze and 
Guattari, for their part, pursue the slightest traces of fascism in the body' (ibid.). 
The three adversaries that must be confronted are: 'Bureaucrats of the 
revolution and civil servants of Truth' (political ascetics, sad militants, terrorists 
of theory), 'poor technicians of desire' (psychoanalysts and semiologists), and 
crucially 'the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour [ ] 
that causes us to love power' (ibid.). In the summary of contents provided, 
Foucault lists the principles that inform 'the art of living counter to all forms of 
fascism': abandonment of pyramidal hierarchisation and subdivision, freedom 
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from all unitary and totalising paranoia, constant generation of de-
individualisation, using analysis to multiply domains and forms for political 
action, and a final principle that I will quote in full: 
'Withdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative (law, limit, 
castration, lack, lacuna), which Western thought has for so long held 
sacred as a form of power and an access to reality. Prefer what is 
positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, 
mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not 
sedentary but nomadic' (ibid, xiii-xiv) 
Foucault advises that Anti-Oedipus should be read, not as a 'flashy Hegel" - as 
an all encompassing philosophy with all the answers, but as an 'ars erotica, ars 
theoretica, ars politica' (ibid, xii) where instead of asking why, we ask how to 
proceed in disrupting established orders. The blasphemous and humorous style 
of Deleuze and Guattari is viewed as an attempt to neutralise the power of 
academic discourse and avoid manipulative rhetoric (ibid. xiv). 
There is little humour in this thesis of mine but I would like to think that in 
alternating between a traditionally rhetorical academic style and a more 
autoethnographic genre, I am subverting both - albeit in a modest way. These 
ebbs and flows have as much to do with my own reactions to relating details of 
my past to a wider audience as anything else. My writing is nomadic in this 
sense and I do not believe that an autoethnographic genre necessarily 
demands every autobiographical detail to be laid bare. I think of 
autoethnography as a fluid tendency that can accommodate very different 
conceptions of subject-formation and modes of presentation, and not as a 
Church dictating rigid methodological ritual. Richardson writes of a story she 
wishes to tell but does not know how (Bochner and Ellis 2002:167). I see my 
writing here as proceeding in a similar spirit. I also quickly learnt not to appear 
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too clever within a nuclear complex where any intelligent remark might trigger a 
violent reaction from a stepfather who had to have the last authoritative word. 
All these years later, writing in a heavily academic style as a woman - when I 
feel inclined to do so, still feels like a self-affirmatory statement. Deleuze and 
Guattari politicise the organism (1972 / 2009: 8; 1980 / 2004: 175 - 176) and 
posit an anti-essentialist radically decentred subject. A feminist politics based 
solely around molar identity is considered dangerous however in that it limits 
subversive becomings and risks reproducing what it seeks to challenge; it is a 
molar politics that is deemed 'indispensable' in allowing women to 'win back 
their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity' and become a 
collective subject of enunciation - 'we as women' (1980 / 2004: 304). 
Butler also recognises a problem with political signifiers like 'women' and 
'freedom' (1997: 160-161); 'freedom' belongs to a 'political discourse of 
modernity' that was premised on the exclusion of women, but it can be 
reappropriated to configure a future that embraces excluded groups. It is an 
unknown future that can 'only produce anxiety in those who seek to patrol its 
conventional boundaries' because it will be supported by an anti-foundationalist 
position (ibid. 161). I am still unravelling the continuities and discontinuities 
between Butler, Deleuze-Guattari and Deleuze. The former links socio-political 
oppression and the traumatisation and demonisation of individuals. The latter 
link social oppression and psychic repression under capitalism but reject the 
positing of a psychic reality and criticise Kant for perpetuating a Platonic logic of 
desire as lack of a real object. Hence Kant's critical revolution is deemed 
spurious in that it posits desire as productive, but confines it to the realm of 
fantasy or the imaginary, such that the real object called into being is a fantasy 
or an hallucination (1972 / 2009: 25 - 27). Butler draws on what reads like a 
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distinctly Platonic conception of the false copy found in Derrida (1997: 151; 
Derrida 1978: 17). Here citationality is conceived as mimesis without end and 
the 'imposture' - as false copy or simulacra, is a condition of the legitimacy of 
the performative (ibid. 151), whereas for Deleuze, all we have is simulacra. 
Butler argues that naturalised knowledge of gender operates as a pre-emptive 
violent circumscription of reality (1990 /1999: xxiv) but supports her linguistic 
constructivist separation of sex and gender with genetic research. Deleuze and 
Guattari write of the introduction of desire into neurology and thereby imply a 
biological realism (1972 / 2009: 40). They will argue that sexuality is poorly 
explained by the binary organisation of the sexes (1980 / 2004: 307), as will 
Butler; but Butler rejects the suggestion of a 'thousand sexes' (ibid.) by implying 
that Deleuze and Guattari are referring to the allocation of sex - as a stable 
biological category, which clearly they are not. Butler criticises Monique Wittig 
(1979: 119) for endorsing this idea on the grounds that a limitless proliferation of 
sexes logically entails the negation of sex as such: 
'If the number of sexes corresponds to the number of existing 
individuals, sex would no longer have any general application as a term: 
one's sex would be a radically singular property and would no longer be 
able to operate as a useful or descriptive generalization' (ibid. 161) 
I feel that this counter-argument contradicts Butler's own destabilisation of sex 
as a self-evident and fixed category. Deleuze and Guattari (ibid. 167, 286 - 7) 
are advocating experimentation, or openness to desire and becomings that 
underlines the fluidity of sexuality and sexual identity. They are not referring to 
biological categories, rather, writing about disrupting any sense we may have of 
possessing 'a' sex as an enduring personal property. They are arguing against 
conformity to any prescribed molar identity: desire is de-subjectifying and defies 
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the plane of organisation - the socially prescribed gender binary and the sex-
gender conflation, the Freudian privileging of genitality and mandatory 
heterosexuality. Butler maintains that the radical disjuncture between 
heterosexuality and homosexuality is far less rigid than Wittig suggests, and 
Deleuze and Guattari would no doubt concur. But they would be unlikely to 
endorse the notion that: 'there are psychic structures of homosexuality within 
heterosexual relations, and structures of heterosexuality within gay and lesbian 
sexuality' (ibid. 165). Their rejection of structure (ibid. 57) and critique of 
Freudian oedipalisation - with its related concept of a pre-oedipal stage that is 
passed through en route to sexual maturity, would preclude consensus (1972 / 
2009: 44 - 45). An anti-hylomorphic stance is claimed by both Deleuze-Guattari 
(1980 / 2004: 449 - 451) and Butler. The former write of surrendering, or 
connecting operations, to a materiality and not imposing form on matter, while 
Butler refuses to see nature as a unified and prediscursive reality and focuses 
upon materiality as an effect of language (1993: xi, 2). Given my interest in 
theories of trauma that detail the somatic impact of traumatic events and 
consequent unsuitability of talking therapies for some traumatised abusees, the 
conception of the body offered by Butler, and necessitated by her emphasis on 
(re)signification, is particularly important to me. Later I will introduce a 
naturalising philosophy of political physiology and political affect derived from 
Deleuze and Guattari, and developed by Protevi who theorises the body - the 
anoedipal and vital body (2009: 89 - 122), in a way that Butler cannot given her 
anti-naturalisation stance. This will include an outline of Deleuze and Guattari's 
use of schizophrenia as a heuristic device in their promotion of a materialist 
psychiatry and countering of a psychoanalysis they assert is: 
'taking part in the work of bourgeois repression at its most far-reaching 
level [thus] keeping European humanity harnessed to the yoke of daddy -
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mummy and making no effort to do away with this problem once and for 
a/r (1972/2009: 50) 
That problem is the 'age-old tendency to humble and demean us, to make us 
feel guilty', which psychoanalysis revived by rendering the production of desire 
a 'dirty little family secret' (ibid. 49). It now occurs to me that Butler has been 
inadequately introduced and I should rectify that omission given her enduring 
contribution to gender and identity politics. 
Subversion of the categories through which we see and in which we 
invest usually begins with a problem that has no name (Friedan 1963: 56) - one 
that cannot be articulated within existing frames but which causes what Butler 
(1990 / 2006: xxvi) terms 'psychic difficulties'. Friedan asked why so many of 
the women in post-world war America, who were striving to conform to an 
image of the nuclear family as the natural sacred unit of capitalist consumption 
(where happiness was a new Hoover and bliss achievable through efficient 
domesticity and confinement to the suburban home), should be consuming 
Valium with similar levels of enthusiasm. In France, Simone de Beauvoir (1949 / 
1972) had already insisted that women are made not born, thereby drawing a 
clear distinction between sex and gender - between the biologically given and 
the socially produced. But it was Butler who challenged the category of sex by 
demonstrating that social processes of naturalisation were at play, even where 
our most taken for granted categories (male-female, masculine-feminine) were 
concerned. Drawing on genetic research and papers like Life in the XY Coral 
(Fausto - Sterling 1989: 333 - 348), Butler shows that allocation of sex at birth 
may in fact be a lottery for some and that biology is certainly not immune from 
ambiguity when it comes to the determination of sex (ibid. 224). 
153 
The persistence of gendered subjectivity, despite its fragile biological 
ground, is attributed to the iterability of performativity: the wedding ceremony 
figures prominently in the examples of performative speech acts (Austin 1962: 
52), where 'I pronounce you' effects the relation that it names and carries an 
authoritative force. Iteration of such speech acts lends them a citational power 
not unlike the function of precedent in legal proceedings (Derrida 1988: 18). 
Hence for Butler (1993: 226 - 227): 
'If a performative succeeds (and I will suggest that "success" is always 
and only provisional), then it is not because an intention successfully 
governs the action of speech, but only because that action echoes prior 
actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or 
citation of a prior authoritative set of practices' 
To politicise gendered identity and desire is therefore to challenge the 
constitutive historicity of discourse (ibid.). Given that the subject is constituted 
within a pre-existing language, Butler argues that saying T is a citation of the 
place of '1' in speech - a place characterised by 'a certain priority and anonymity 
with respect to the life it animates' (ibid. 226): 'it is the historically revisable 
possibility of a name that precedes and exceeds me, but without which I cannot 
speak' (ibid.). In the nexus of power and discourse proposed, subjective 
intentionality is replaced by a reiterative acting (speech) that is power in its 
persistence and concomitant instability. 
A condition of political revolution is therefore the questioning of 'reality' -
what is taken for granted, what qualifies as intelligible and is considered to be 
real, yet which is simultaneously often violently policed (Butler 1990 / 2006: 
xxiv). That reality is produced through discursive performativity in a theory that 
privileges speech over writing given its affective power in subject formation and 
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reproduction, and role in political control. Butler invokes Althusser's (1971: 170 
- 186) biblical example of the divine power to name in explaining the concept of 
'interpellation' in the context of ideological state apparatuses (1997: 31-32). And 
also the paternal law of Lacanian psychoanalysis (1985: 83, 85), where the 
incest taboo is enforced in the Name of the Father within a signifying economy 
that renders the feminine a signifier of lack; i.e. sexual differentiation and 
gender positionality are achieved through the operation of linguistic rules -
mechanisms of exclusion or foreclosure (ibid. 38, 135; 1990 / 2006: 38, 58 - 62). 
The personal is political (or ideological) for Butler because a structural 
homology can be identified between the mechanisms through which both are 
organised (1993: 190, 193). Following Rose (1987: 90), Butler argues that the 
paternal law of Lacan should not be interpreted as a deterministic divine will, but 
instead as a 'perpetual humbler' that prepares the ground for insurrection 
against its authority (1990 / 2006: 39). Butler's arguments refuse the status of 
the subject as a 'monotheistic singularity' (ibid.), and it is the individuated body 
which is posited as the site where the security and risks of linguistic life are 
experienced; hence words that 'wound', 'injurious speech', 'linguistic injury' 
(1997: 2): 'Insurrectionary speech becomes the necessary response to injurious 
language, a risk taken in response to being put at risk, a repetition of language 
that forces change' (ibid. 163). 
Our 'vulnerability' to language is therefore two-fold: we are vulnerable 
simply by virtue of being constituted within it - 'insulted from the start' by the 
power of its constitutive historicity; and we risk loss of psychic and bodily 
integrity when language derogates and demeans us, or fails to provide us with a 
vocabulary that permits articulation of our bodily sense (ibid. 2). Signification 
practices are held to both constrain and enable resignification. It seems 
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legitimate to question where bodies figure in this process. The title of the 1993 
text informs us that bodies do matter - in opposition to linguistic idealism where 
naming purportedly brings into being what it names. For Butler, discourse 
materialises sets of effects that form the basis or condition of future actions, and 
sex is viewed as a performative which evokes norms - chains of iteration 
invoked in the performative utterance. Bodies are materialised and sexed 
through a differentiated production (is it a boy or a girl?) and regulated by an 
enforced masculine or feminine identification that can only be unstable (isn't it 
time to stop being a tomboy?). Regards the latter, Butler is referring to 
oedipalisation. We are all familiar with popularised interpretations of 
homosexuality as a failure of the oedipal drama whereby girls must abandon 
both parents as objects of desire and boys their mothers (ibid. 187 -188). 
Lacanian psychoanalysis purportedly explains the impossibility of identity as 
coherent or stable by highlighting the constitutive exclusions upon which the 
illusion of coherence and stability is based. So iterability implies exclusion, or 
what Butler terms the 'constitutive outside' - 'the unliveable, the 
nonnarrativizable, the traumatic' (ibid. 188). The concept of abjection (Kristeva 
1982: 4, 13) is mobilised on two levels: 'social abjection' is the unspeakable 
within language or what is speakable only in pejorative terms, while the body 
must live with the pain produced by the failure of exclusion and iteration in order 
to secure the borders of its materiality: 'in the case of bodies, those exclusions 
haunt signification as its abject borders or as that which is strictly foreclosed' 
(ibid.; 1993: 243). 
Resignification becomes possible, Butler argues, precisely because 
discourse injures bodies and places some at the limits of intelligibility or of 
available ontologies (ibid. 227). Resistance demands the appropriation of 
156 
performatives that shame, insult and pathologise those who resist prescribed 
social forms and therefore lack hegemonic sanction; the recommended political 
response is 'practices of parody' (1990 / 2006: 200) that challenge the 
conflation of sex and gender and expose the socially constructed character of 
both. It is not whether to repeat, but how to repeat, such that the sex / gender 
conflation as a foundational assumption, and a politically constructed hierarchy, 
is displaced; a 'radical proliferation of gender' (as material 'effects') is to be 
achieved through the subversive resignification of bodily categories (ibid. 202). 
We could say that parody troubles existing categories without positing 
alternative universalising prescriptive definitions of Woman and Man. Identity 
politics will always be confronted with the impossibility of coherence since 
definition is conditional upon exclusion and inherently unstable however 
politically attractive its 'phantasmatic promise' (ibid.). 
Butler exposes and rejects the reification of psychoanalytic prohibitions, 
insisting instead on the possibility of non-heterosexual vahants as the return of 
the excluded - but not as psychosis or the figure of the psychotic within politics: 
'How might such socially saturated domains of exclusion be recast from their 
status as "constitutive" to beings who might be said to matter' (ibid. 189). I still 
feel however that Butler simultaneously foregrounds and neglects the body or 
the affective power of judgments of God. Deleuze and Guattari deride the 
emphasis placed on the power of language by 'signifier enthusiasts' (1980 / 
2004: 74). And I assume that it is Butler who Protevi (2009: 188) has in mind 
when criticising socio-linguistic constructivists for failing to theorise affect 
(particularly collective affects and emotions as their subjective correlate); 
Protevi proclaims himself to be one of the 'naturalizers' (ibid. 187) who is 
condemned for his interest in affective neuroscience. So on one hand we have 
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Butler, whose refusal to afford the body any prediscursive reality leads her to 
suspect any theory that might (directly or indirectly) naturalise gender. On the 
other we have Protevi, who maintains that Deleuze and Guattari provide a more 
comprehensive theory of subject formation (and deformation) and account of 
affective political power given their readiness to draw upon scientific disciplines. 
I explain below why I am provisionally inclined to align myself with Protevi, but 
why one of the illustrations that he utilises to support his arguments (the 
mother-child relationship in primates) suggests that Butler's fears about 
naturalisation and the representation of gender relations are not ill-founded. 
By neglect of the body in Butler, I mean that rhetorical descriptions of 'bodily 
productions' to which we can relate are supplied: 
'One need only to consider the way in which the history of having been 
called an injurious name is embodied, how the words enter the limbs, 
craft the gesture, bend the spine [and ] how racial or gendered slurs live 
and thrive in and as the flesh [thus ] taking on the semblance of the 
natural, configuring and restricting the doxa that counts as "reality"' 
(1997: 159) 
The way in which the body can 'disorientate' cultural sense or popular opinion in 
the moment of 'expropriating' the discursive means of its own production is also 
mentioned (ibid.). Yet I am not sure that how words enter limbs and condition 
future actions is actually explained. While I would not disagree with Butler that 
words can function as a form of violence, I find her response to Elaine Scarry 
(1985) to be inadequate. Contra Butler, torture, severe violence and terror at the 
prospect of further violence, can indeed be profoundly de-subjectifying and 
'efface its witness' as Scarry suggests (ibid. 6); erase is perhaps a better word 
in this context. Surely it is not just a question of logic - of ignoring this issue due 
to an alleged logical error on Scarry's part in implying that the body is anterior to 
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language? I believe that the concepts of the body politic, political physiology 
and affective cognition proposed by Protevi are pertinent here (2009: 33). 
For me, the fundamental point made by Protevi In response to fears concerning 
biological determinism and naturalisation, is that everything depends on the 
scientific theory deployed; a corollary is that engaging in debates about human 
nature and gender is a more appropriate and efficacious strategy than 
wholesale dismissal of naturalisation (ibid. 188). Sensitivity to such fears is 
shown in a quotation which I will cite at length. It touches my deeply-rooted 
sociological nerve and captures my own feelings about the use of biological 
models in theorising the social prior to reading Deleuze and Guattari: 
'I have finally come to the conclusion that all extension of biological 
models to the social level is to be avoided [ ] for political reasons [ ] 
History has shown that biological holism [ ] has always had its dark side, 
a black side, each time it has allowed itself to be applied to a social 
model. There are always slippages towards fascism, towards 
authoritarian impositions, eugenics, and so on' 
(Varela 2002 cited In Protevi 2009: 41) 
The key word here is holism. Deleuze and Guattari criticise a particular version 
of vitalism and the concept of mechanism; the latter abstracts a structural unity 
through which the self-perpetuation of that unity (system or organism) is 
effected, while the former invokes an 'individual and specific unity of the living, 
which every machine presupposes insofar as it is subordinate to organic 
continuance' (1972 / 2009: 284). The normative and repressive potential of such 
holism when applied to the social arena is self-evident. Like Deleuze and 
Guattari, Protevi wants to go above and below the rational cognitive subject, but 
alongside the nomadic subject, in order to integrate the socio-political field with 
the field of sub-personal, autonomic and somatic cognition (affective cognition). 
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Protevi therefore mobilises the concepts of transversality (Guattari 1972: 79; 
Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 323), assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980 / 2004: 289 - 290, 367) and concepts drawn from complexity theory that 
are pertinent to the idea of transverse emergence (2009: 1 0 - 1 1 , 15 - 16, 42). 
A succinct summary of the key concepts proposed in Anti Oedipus (1972 / 
2009) and A Thousand Plateaus (1980 / 2004) is provided in the development 
of concepts of political affect and affective cognition. I will briefly outline 
elements of this summary here. 
Capitalism involves a radical deterritorialisation of material flows. Prior to 
capitalism, and in tribal societies, territorialised qualitative judgments linked 
such flows to the earth. Within empires, such flows were deterritoralised but 
overcoded such that despotic power and the socius were linked. Under 
capitalism, both type of link gives way to basic rules of quantitative calculation 
of differences (between the flows of capital and labour and surplus extraction). 
The socio-economic capital-labour relation is represented, and experienced, as 
one between private individuals; the site of subject formation consequently 
becomes the oedipalised familial relation (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 
262 - 263). The accelerated deterritorialisation of flows and exhaustive 
commodification under advanced late capitalism has prompted many critiques 
of consumerism, the social control necessary in sustaining it, and the 
atomisation and lack of reciprocity with which it is associated (e.g. Packard 
1957; Baudrillard 1970; Galbraith 1958). For Deleuze, the contemporary 'control 
society' implies a perpetual self-checking or surveillance and self-improvement 
(1990 /1995: 177 - 82). Hence Protevi (2009: 161) argues that we all 
experience becoming - minoritarian as the judgment machine of advanced 
capitalism, and particularly neoliberalism conservatism, leads everyone to feel 
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they are falling short of some norm or another - but usually many (Ibid. 99). 
Judgment consequently provokes flows or vectors of desire which, by virtue of 
the developmental process of oedipalised personalisation or subject formation, 
we claim as our own; we feel that desire and attribute it to a single embodied 
ego that is ours and ours alone (ibid.). 
Deleuze and Guattari introduce desiring-production as a universal 
primary process (1972 / 2009). They aim to synthesise Marx and Freud whilst 
avoiding reductionism through the privileging of either one. Traditionally, such 
privileging means presenting neuroses or psychoses as inevitable 
superstructural features of an economic structure, or conversely, positing an 
original oedipal libidinal investment that is subsequently sublimated through the 
investment of social figures. Dualist ontology is rejected as the universality of 
desiring-production implies no categohcal distinction between nature and 
society, or between the individual and the social. Instead, it embraces all 
processes as a creative, autonomous and self-constituting force, and is 
therefore profoundly anti-anthropomorphic and a radical break with the 
presupposed subject of liberal humanism (Protevi 2009: 91). Contra Butler, who 
rejects the assumption of nature as a unified prediscursive reality, the nature 
posited in the ontology of Deleuze and Guattari is bivalent, as the concepts of 
stratification (the judgment of God) and lines of flight (creative escape) indicate. 
Protevi therefore maintains that the natural world should not be understood as 
chaotic in the sense of escaping any determination, since chaos theory implies 
lack of predictability rather than an absence of determination (ibid. 7). 
I should now clarify what Deleuze and Guattari mean by the judgment of God 
and why their challenge to this idea is expressed as: 'God is a Lobster' (1980 / 
2004: 45). Strata give form to matter by imprisoning intensities or locking 
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singularities into systems of resonance or redundancy. They are acts of capture 
and, lil<e black holes, strive to seize whatever comes within their reach: 
The strata are judgments of God; stratification in general is the entire 
system of the judgment of God (but the earth, or the body without 
organs, constantly eludes that judgment, flees and becomes destratified, 
decoded, deterritoralized' (ibid.) 
The lobster, with its double pincers, indicates a double bind - a double 
articulation. Using the example of sedimentary rock formation, the first 
articulation chooses from unstable particle-flows to form metastable molecular 
units (substances); it imposes a statistical order of connections and successions 
(form) upon them in a process of sedimentation. In the second articulation, 
stable functional compacted structures (forms) are established; they are 
simultaneously actualised (substances) through this process. Hence, each 
articulation possesses form and substance, and a coding and decoding; but 
where the first displays systematic interactions (being more supple, molecular, 
and merely ordered), in the second, phenomena constituting an overcoding are 
produced, i.e. phenomena of centring, unification, totalisation, integration, 
hierarchisation and finalisation (the more rigid, molar, and organized) (ibid. 46). 
The word 'structure', we are informed, is the sum of both binary relations and 
biunivocal relationships that obey far more complex laws; however: 'it is an 
illusion to believe that structure is the earth's last word' (ibid.). Examples from 
biochemistry, genetics and linguistics are given to demonstrate that double 
articulation does not derive from the latter and that content and expression 
should replace substance and form: 
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To express is always to sing the glory of God. Every stratum is a 
judgment of God; not only do plants and animals, orchids and wasps, 
sing or express themselves, but so do rocks and even rivers, every 
stratified thing on earth. T^e first articulation concerns content, the 
second expression' (ibid. 49) 
They exist as reciprocal presuppositions - neither can pre-exist their double 
articulation; and expression is as variable as content. This is, I suspect, how 
bodies matter to speech and language for Butler. 
Protevi contrasts the theo-bio-politics of Aristotle, Kant, and Deleuze -
Guattari. For the latter, the phrase judgment of God refers to the Western 
philosophical tradition in which God's perfection is the model for the self-
ordering of the ideal politically attuned human organism - what Protevi 
describes as 'the projection of a hierarchically ordered body politic onto a divine 
natural order' (ibid. 61). Aristotle and Kant posit the organism as a microcosm of 
nature conceived as a unified and teleologically ordered finality. This is the 
unified natural whole, patterned on divine perfection or effected by a divine plan, 
that Butler alludes to when rejecting nature as a unified prediscursive reality 
(Protevi 2009: 61 - 88). Protevi (2001: 62) maintains that the choice of Kant 
and Aristotle is random as similar pairings (e.g. Hegel and Plato), reveal the 
repetition of this structure - God as the model for the organism. 
Protevi insists the question of God is inextricably connected to that of 
nature (2009: 62) and that directionality matters. I sense that Butler (1997) is 
sometimes acknowledging the excess that the body produces as that which 
cannot be expressed in language to imply bi-directionality; but that ultimately 
language is the only true God in the Butlerian universe. In the bio-ontology of 
Ahstotle, animals are paradigmatic instances of substance. It is questionable 
whether Aristotle derived his ontology from this assumption, or whether the 
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nature of substance was derived from his ontology. Either way, it is this view of 
individual substance as the acting out identity in the world that forms the basis 
of Aristotelian ethics, logic and metaphysics (Kosman 1969: 62; 1987: 303 cited 
in Protevi 2009: 64). In this posited hierarchy of substance, only a god is 
capable of the immanent pure activity of insight which is deemed to be life itself, 
and which affords a pure constant pleasure; a transcendent ordering principle 
and an immanent order is thus implied. An identity can be found in Aristotle 
between divine and human theoretical intuition - although the latter may be 
confined to intermittent flashes (ibid. 65). A polis is also required that facilitates 
theoretical insight by ensuring theoreticians have a 'leisured body' or freedom 
from stress (ibid. 64 - 65, 72). Whereas the god is a unified and simple 
substance, man and higher animals are composites of heterogeneous 
materials. The latter cannot achieve the constancy of a god, so their biological 
regeneration can only form the closed circle of life valued by Aristotle through 
individuals becoming members of an enduring continuous series of organisms, 
and the sharing of a common form. Change is purportedly tamed within the 
circle of the species to ensure the continuity of forms through an orientation 
towards the ideal case in which the superior male principle produces the 
appearance of the same form in the production of a male child resembling the 
father (ibid. 66). The feminine is reduced to functioning as a necessary 
supplement that risks monstrosity in what Protevi dubs a 'teleological 
semenology of animal generation' that is 'literally a patri-archy, since the father, 
the one responsible for form and finality, is also the efficient cause, the 
foundational principled source of the change' where form dominates repetition 
(ibid. 67). 
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To avoid the problem of individuation in the hylomorphic position, 
Ahstotle conceives of substance as self-directed activity and the ability to unify 
energetic dynamisms. The soul (psuche) is the principle of unification or 
integration and the body becomes a single instrument devoted to performing the 
functions that define the organism, or 'an entity whose essential nature is to be 
telle, an entity whose being is to be for the sake of that activity of which it is the 
organ' (Kosman 1987: 379 cited in Protevi 2009: 68). A unified formation is 
always a relation of domination and subordination in Aristotle, hence Protevi 
states: 
'The bio-political register is never more clearly articulated than in the 
Aristotelian demand that the energetic organization of the emergent 
organism, the obedience of the body as instalment of the soul, entails 
somatic enslavement' (ibid. 68) 
This is because, for Aristotle, the telos of the human body as an instrument is 
logos or reason, and the body - as an emergent whole, is premised on the 
cultivation and selection of potentials; i.e. on an ethical training of the emotions 
and appetites through the strategic application of pleasure and pain (initially 
corporeal and subsequently through discussion). The eventual convergence of 
nature, habit, and discussion purportedly produces a good man whose moral 
intuition accords with that of earlier generations of good men (ibid. 69). In this 
attunement of the embodied soul, moral intuition can be theoretical or practical. 
Practical intuition is the enmeshing of the social and somatic but, as Protevi 
explains, ethical choice is better thought of as a duality where reason and 
desire are aligned such that reason reveals the true while desire pursues the 
correct. A properly trained person exhibits principled self-direction that goes in 
the right - socially prescribed, direction (ibid. 70). The unidirectional orientation 
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to principled self-direction is consequently analogous in Aristotelian theology, 
biology, and politics: god is the model of principled self-direction and of 
organismic unity. Those unable to achieve the consolidation of self-directing 
traits because they suffer from an excess of appetite or weakness of intellect -
namely women and slaves respectively, are held to lack decision-making ability; 
deviation from such self-direction is consequently considered to unnatural 
(monstrous, feminine, slavish) (ibid. 62). For the same reason, male children 
are likened to women prior to undergoing appropriate subjectification practices 
and becoming the organised instrumentalised bodies that must resemble those 
of their fathers: 
'The ethico - political formation of citizen male children is a process of 
pedagogic corporeal masculinisation, the selection and reinforcement of 
the right quality of the faculties of the embodied soul with the capacity to 
withstand the powerful changes to the body that oven^/helm the weak 
person' (ibid. 70) 
Those who disapprove of Butler's contribution to sexual identity politics might 
concur with Aristotle that rhetoric is dangerous. Although rhetoric normally relies 
on the predictable responses of well-trained citizens, unpredictable flows of 
passions can also be inflamed. As Protevi suggests: 'it exposes the embodied 
and imitative nature of the political animal, its condition of political affect - that 
is, precisely that which disnjpts the transcendent vision of the intellect'; rhetoric 
disrupts the wisdom which Aristotle rates as the fullest expression of the 
organism as the judgment of God (ibid. 71 - 72). It is equally disruptive of the 
polls - a source of disharmony within what Aristotle conceives as an organic 
natural whole and not merely an aggregate of parts. The crucial role of the 
legislature within the polis is ensuring that male children of citizens reproduce 
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the model of their fathers in becoming self - directed emergent wholes 
displaying excellent reason (ibid. 71). The end state or telos of both citizen and 
polis is the eudaimonia or flourishing of three types of lives specified by 
Aristotle: pleasure, honour, and theory. The latter is the most honourable logos -
mled function of the soul whereas politics is simply a necessary supplement 
that ensures the leisure (or balance between work and leisure) upon which 
theory and wisdom - the excellence of vision, is conditional (ibid. 72). Protevi 
reviews divergent opinions as to whether theory contributes to flouhshing or is a 
superior form of flourishing in Aristotle; he concludes that theory is the best life 
(ibid.). The theoretician is perceived as less likely to be controlled by rhetoric, or 
subject to change from the outside, as a being able to experience the divine 
pleasure of theory and rise above base pleasures of the body - the childish or 
trifling (ibid. 73). 
'Aristotelian political physiology thus requires that the organism, whose 
masterly enslavement of the body is exemplified in the theoretician's rule 
of the appetites, be the judgment of God' (ibid. 71) 
Protevi explores two senses - restricted and extended, in which the 
organism is the judgment of God in Kant's transcendental philosophy (ibid. 82 -
88). The first concerns the relation between teleological judgments and those of 
natural causality that rely on the concept of mechanism. For Kant, mechanism 
refers to forces of attraction and repulsion specific to unorganised matter. 
Biological phenomena resist explication in terms of mechanism, so teleological 
judgments must be deployed as heuristic presuppositions. Such 
presuppositions permit the generation of principles that enable phenomena to 
be ordered in sense-making exercises even though knowledge of things in 
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themselves is precluded. It is suggested that teleological judgments are 
warranted if nature is observed 'by ana/ogy with causality in terms of purposes, 
without presuming to explain it in terms of that causality' - a causality produced 
in the mind of the observer (Kant 1987, 360: 61 ; ibid. 83). Kant identifies three 
foci of teleology - the organism, development of the organism, and the whole of 
nature. Individual things that are natural purposes are deemed to be both cause 
and effect of themselves in three senses. Hence a tree will: produce itself to 
preserve its membership of the same species, assimilate matter in order to 
acquire the quality of a tree, and display a mutual dependency of parts upon 
each other. Kant maintains that a thing is a natural purpose if the connection of 
efficient causes can be judged to be a causation through final causes, i.e. if 
parts exist for each other (efficient causality) but also for the whole (final 
causality); this affords a systematic focus whereby the whole plays a 
constraining role in the development of parts, and for Kant, this means that a 
natural purpose is both an organised and self-organising being (ibid.). Contrary 
to the motive force of machines, Kant argues that natural purposes (intrinsic 
organisation) reveal a formative force which imparts form to matter in an 
'analogue of life' (1987, 374: 65); an organised being thus comprises parts 
which are both ends and means in themselves. Yet when considering nature as 
a whole, intrinsic organisation is also said to lack any causality that is familiar to 
us and should therefore be restricted to reflective judgment (ibid. 84). To posit a 
final causality to the natural world rather than an individual entity would, 
according to Kant, require the presupposition of a suprasensible end -
something beyond nature (ibid. 378). Kant resolves this antinomy of teleological 
judgment (mechanical versus teleological causality) through the principle that 
the suprasensible is thinkable but not knowable given the limitations of our 
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cognitive powers (Protevi 2009: 85). Kant's argument is that we can only think 
of nature as a purposive whole by positing a supreme cause that acts 
intentionally (ibid. 399). Because our knowledge of particulars is sensibly 
derived using the a priori forms of intuition of space and time according to Kant, 
it becomes necessary to posit a different form of understanding - namely, the 
intuitive. A necessary harmony is then assumed between biological diversity 
and universal physical laws, and also a fit between the particular and universal 
(ibid.). Kant seeks to coordinate the mechanism and teleology through 
subordination of the former in the development of a 'supreme understanding' 
(ibid. 414). We can investigate mechanism but will always, by virtue of the 
nature of our reason, presuppose an ultimate purpose and designer: the 
biological organism is thus rendered a judgment of God (ibid. 86). When 
exploring the extended sense of the judgment of God in Kant, Protevi describes 
how this teleological judgment of nature's purpose folds back onto the Kantian 
conception of the organism, and how a theo-bio-politics is evolved: only a moral 
God, as a purposive intelligence, would possess the possibility of man's 
morality as the final purpose of nature - the production of man as a moral 
subject (Kant 1987, 435: 83; 443: 86): 'In this way a mora/teleology 
compensates for the deficiency of physical teleology and for the first time 
supplies a basis for a theology (ibid. 444: 86). Nature and freedom are finally 
related in the thought of God as a 'legislating sovereign in a moral kingdom of 
purposes' (ibid.). God guarantees that nature must at least cooperate with our 
moral action and the systematicity of nature requires the thought of God as a 
practical supplement (ibid.). 
Protevi argues that to fully understand the Kantian body politic, the 
distinction Kant draws between the cultures of skill and of discipline must be 
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grasped (ibid. 87). The former refers to cultivation of the capacity to act 
purposively, while the latter is designed to liberate our will from 'the despotism 
of desires' (ibid. 432: 83), i.e. from excessive indulgence in those things that 
ensure our biological survival and further our life forces. Freedom means 
learning to control our biological impulses through self-chosen pain over 
pleasure 'as the purposes of reason require', but without injuring our 'animal 
characteristics (ibid.). For Kant, science and the fine arts ensure that man's 
orientation towards the senses gives way to a 'sovereignty in which reason 
alone is to dominate' (ibid. 433: 83). Moral law is established by evoking 'a 
feeling which can be called pain' that effects a 'striking down, i.e. humiliating 
self-conceit' (Kant 1956: 73 cited in Protevi 2009: 87). In this 'sublime mental 
attunement [ ] to the pain of self-reprimand' (Kant 1987 264: 28) and self-
inflicted humility, Protevi identifies a parallel between the political affect of 
morality and that of the sublime: 'the violent, painful striking down of our natural 
body will rebound to reveal a suprasensible vocation' (ibid.). 
'The painful frustration of our inclinations itself makes palpable to our 
senses the majesty of the moral law, which produces a positive feeling of 
admiration for the principle of our own will and activity' 
(Guyer 1996: 358 - 359 cited in Protevi 2009: 87) 
Self-flagellation allegedly induces a rational self-governance and respect for 
moral law that precludes the revolution which would 'place self-love in charge' 
(Protevi 2009: 88). What I take from this is: never apologise for being 
narcissistic or over-dramatic unless you want to make a veritable Kant of 
yourself. 
170 
It was in opposition to this deeply ingrained social predilection for 
punishment and humiliation that I invoked the 'tantric egg' in an earlier plateau; 
Deleuze and Guattari use this phrase when discussing male masochism. My 
understanding of their argument is that such masochism does not indicate an 
unconscious desire to submit to a punitive mother figure, or a regressive fixation 
on partial objects. It is about reaching a state of arousal whereby the entire 
surface of the skin is eroticised and the subject who says T is displaced along 
with the molar identities that would contain and restrict that desire to legitimate 
Freudian channels or the 'three great strata' of organism, significance, 
subjectification (1980 / 2004: 176 - 177). When I invoked the tantric egg in 
relation to learning, it was to convey the unadulterated pleasure I can derive 
from pursuing ideas across disciplinary boundaries, and from reading to learn 
about the thinking of others rather than to hastily extract key arguments and 
construct counter arguments for academic writing purposes: learning is affective 
and not merely an exercise of purely cognitive faculties. Reading the 
background material that Protevi (2009) provides on Kant and Aristotle was an 
experience of joyful composition. Deleuzean and Deleuzo-Guattarian texts 
assume a familiarity with Western philosophy and my understanding -
particularly of their politics of the organism and the subject, has been 
broadened. And, of course, the issue that Kant - to my knowledge anyway, 
does not address when advocating pain as a prelude to the crushing of 
inclinations (nor I presume Aristotle in referring to corporeal means of training) 
is that bodies do not always do what they are told and may react unpredictably 
(or predictably from a physiological perspective) in such outwardly aversive 
situations. I will now return now to the organism as the judgment of God in 
Deleuze and Guattari and their heuristic use of schizophrenia. 
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The phrase 'God is a Lobster' challenges the notion of God as a 
transcendent unity upon which the organism or subject is modelled by asserting 
the immanence of natural processes and their bivalence; tendencies to 
destratification as well as stratification indicate the priority of flux and becoming 
in the ontology of Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004: 45). This phrase also 
implies any transcendental illusion that is effected through overcoding: 'The 
abstract machine begins to unfold, to stand to full height, producing an illusion 
exceeding all strata, even though the machine itself still belongs to a 
determinate situation' (ibid. 70). Deleuze and Guattari are writing here of the 
'imperialist pretensions' of language due to the translatability that it makes 
possible; translatability is not that between human languages but: 
'the ability of language, with its own givens and its own stratum, to 
represent all the other strata and thus achieve a scientific conception of 
the world. The scientific world {Welt, as opposed to the Unwelt of the 
animal) is the translation of all of the flows, particles, codes, and 
territorialities of the other strata into a sufficiently deterritoralized system 
of signs, in other words, into an overcoding specific to language' (ibid. 69 
- 7 0 ) 
This capacity to overcode all other strata means that the relation between 
content and expression is unlike that found in, for example, RNA and DNA since 
expression is now independent of content and form of expression is 
independent of substance (ibid.70). Two points should be noted here: firstly, it is 
important to recognise the historical scale of Deleuze and Guattari's thinking 
and that they are not offering a Heideggerian critique of science and 
industrialism. On the contrary, Darwin is celebrated for shifting the focus away 
from the perfection of forms in a quasi-religious evolutionism to one on 
populations, packs, collectivities and multiplicities - to the diversity and unity 
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within strata, the shifting relations between organism and milieu, and 
movements of territorialisation and deterritorialisation. Hence the hand is said to 
be a deterritoralised paw making tool use possible, while migration from forest 
to steppe means that a large laryngeal sack is unnecessary allowing the 
emission of sound to become speech. It is not however a linear teleological 
evolutionary process that is proposed in either Darwinism or Deleuze and 
Guattari as the concepts of mutation and genetic drift imply (ibid. 59). 
'It is difficult to elucidate the system of the strata without seeming to 
introduce a kind of cosmic or even spiritual evolution from one to the 
other, as if they were arranged in stages and ascended degrees of 
perfection. Nothing of the sort' (ibid. 77) 
The hand-tool couplet forms a 'technical social machine' and language permits 
a regime of signs which together comprise a formation of power; this third 
stratum sees the 'emergence of Machines that are fully part of that stratum but 
at the same time rear up and stretch their pincers out in all directions at all the 
other strata' (ibid. 70). Such formations can then select and consolidate. Hence 
the question: 'who does man think he is?' and the constitutive illusion of man 
that derives from the overcoding immanent to language itself (ibid. 71). Deleuze 
and Guattari go on to say that different formations of power should be thought 
of as different strata in human populations; they also ask how this third stratum 
effects the relation between content and expression and respond rhetorically 
'It's all in the head. Yet never was a distinction more real': the external milieu for 
this stratum is the cerebral-nervous milieu - not as a passive support but as the 
'prehuman soup immersing us' (ibid.). 'The brain is a population, a set of tribes 
tending towards two poles' - things and words (ibid.). 
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The second point to note is that Deleuze and Guattari are setting the 
scene for an assault on 'signifier enthusiasts' (ibid. 74). The issue is not whether 
language affects all of the strata but whether all signs are signifiers endowed 
with significance: 'for the primacy of the signifier over language guarantees the 
primacy of language over all of the strata even more effectively than the simple 
expansion of the sign in all directions' (ibid. 73). Theories that posit the primacy 
of the signifier are referred to as one posture of the abstract machine, and the 
illusion specific to this posture is 'that one can grasp and shuffle all the strata 
between one's pincers' whereby direct contact with all the strata is claimed 
without having to go through the supposed signs in each one (ibid.). Deleuze 
and Guattari allude to Saussurian structuralist linguistics and state: 'There is 
only one thing that can be said about the signifier: it is Redundancy, it is the 
Redundant. Hence its incredible despotism, and its success' (ibid.). There is 
clearly an intentional play on words here - a reference to repetition and 
reiteration, but also to their own rejection of the signifier as the reduction of 
expression: a form of content is not a signified, any more than a form of 
expression is a signifier, and to determine their relation requires a variable and 
specific assemblage (ibid. 73). In structuralist linguistics, language is presented 
as a system of differences between signifiers such that there can be no intuition 
of terms or things in themselves since thought itself is conditional upon a prior 
structure where there are only differences and no positive terms. The question 
that Deleuze and Guattari are posing is: how is it that we have come to think of 
thought, or indeed the world, as reducible to a system of linguistic signifiers? 
'The most that can be said of significance is that it characterizes one regime [ ] 
content and expression are never reducible to signified - signifier' (ibid. 80). 
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Deleuze and Guattari are rejecting the 'imperialism of the signifier' (ibid. 73) in 
favour of signs found throughout the natural and social world: 'Signs are not 
signs of a thing; they are signs of a deterritorialization and reterritorialization; 
they marl< a certain threshold crossed in the course of these movements' (ibid. 
75). Signifiers are merely examples of the way in which life is expressed in all 
its positivity - of its power to differ, and language should be viewed as equally 
subject to deterritohalisation through that power of difference (Colebrook 2005: 
249). Contrary to the metaphysics of presence criticised by Derrida (1967 / 
1976: 49), Deleuze and Guattari (ibid. 50, 574) draw on the linguistics of 
Hjelmslev (1943 /1969) which assumes the existence of differentiations prior to 
the effect of language. Hjelmslev broke with the form - content duality and 
explored language in terms of stratification; the strata were matter, content and 
expression, form and substance, and matter refers to the plane of consistency 
or Body without Organs - 'the unformed, unorganized, nonstratified, or 
destratified body and all its flows: subatomic and submolecular particles, pure 
intensities, prevital and prephysical free singularities' (ibid. 48 - 49). It is not an 
opposition or dualist conception of the strata that is proposed: 
'The strata themselves are animated and defined by relative speeds of 
deterritorialization; moreover absolute deterritorialization is there from the 
beginning, and the strata are spinoffs, thickenings on a plane of 
consistency that is everywhere, always primary and always immanent' 
(ibid. 78) 
Deleuze and Guattari therefore reject the analysis of social formations in terms 
of base-superstructure, and it is likely that Butler would also be criticised: 'Nor 
can the status of social formations be analyzed by throwing some signifier into 
the base, or vice versa, or a bit of phallus or castration into political economy' 
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(ibid. 77). The depiction of materiality as an effect of language (Butler 1997: 5, 
158 - 159) does not rest easily with Deleuze and Guattari's concern with 
process rather than effect, nor with their conception of the real as comprising 
both the virtual and the actual. 
The organism can be conceived as a stratum (habituated, centralised, 
and hierarchically organised) and the Body without Organs (BoW) - the 
anorganic body as Protevi prefers to describe it, the converse (2009: 107). 
Protevi notes a shift between Anti-Oedipus (1972 / 2009) and A Thousand 
Plateaus (1980 / 2004) concerning the 'full' BwO; in the former it refers to 
catatonia - or in the social register the socius, while in the latter it is the 'empty' 
BwO that is to be avoided as a black hole for subjectivity and the 'full' BwO is 
valued by Deleuze and Guattari because it permits connection with other 
destratified bodies (ibid. 107). For Deleuze and Guattari, the organism as a 
socio-biological entity is already political in that it is organised in accordance 
with the demands of the social field: 
'The organism is [ ] a stratum on the BwO, in other words, a 
phenomenon of accumulation, coagulation, and sedimentation that, in 
order to extract useful labor from the BwO, imposes upon it forms, 
functions, bonds, dominant and hierarchized organizations, organized 
transcendences. The strata are bonds, pincers [ ] the BwO is that glacial 
reality where the alluvions, sedimentations, coagulations, folding and 
recoiling that compose an organism - and also a signification and a 
subject - occur. For the judgment of God weighs upon and is exercised 
against the BwO [ ] the judgment of God uproots it from its immanence 
and makes it an organism, a signification, a subject' 
(1980/2004: 176) 
Protevi draws on several sources, including complexity theory - dynamic 
nonlinear modelling, to posit a BwO that is receptive to, or participates in, a new 
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field of connections or becomings - tliat leaves a state of equilibriunn (the fixity 
of a habitual state) to enter into an intensive realm where enduring patterns or 
habits become changeable or metastable (ibid.). 
Understanding how schizophrenia functions as a heuristic for Deleuze 
and Guattari requires clarification of their conception of the organ as a desiring-
machine: organs constitute flow-break couplings whereby matter-energy flows 
are internjpted and a surplus is released into the economy of the body. Organs 
function as an interface between inside and outside - or, in Protevi's terms, they 
provide homeostatic regulation for the body as an autonomous system (ibid. 
16). Deleuze and Guattari make no categorical distinction between organ and 
machine: all machines are systems of flow breaks and the example most 
frequently cited in the secondary literature is that of suckling (e.g. Colebrook 
2002: 141; Protevi 2009: 94). The breast is a part - object but contra Klein 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 47), it does not represent the mother; It 
does not represent anything in fact, but is simply one component of a breast-
mouth machine - a multiplicity that lacks individuation and localisation through 
any interpretative framework. Schizophrenics can experience their organs as 
machines. Hence Kavan wrote of the machines In her head: 
The cogs are moving, the engines are slowly gathering momentum, a low 
humming noise is perceptible even now [ ] The wheels revolve faster, the 
pistons slide smoothly in their cylinders, the noise of machinery fills the 
whole world' (1972: 116, 118) 
This phenomenon Is very different to the somatisation of trauma where the body 
becomes the medium of articulation of what is othenA/lse inexpressible and 
acutely felt. Speedy provides a good example of the latter (2005: 293). Protevi 
defines part-objects as: 'points of intensity, nodes In a network of material flows 
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in and out of bodies, the connection of the ecosocial and the somatic'; hence 
the body politic is ordered and patterned according to the ecosocial milieu but, 
Protevi argues, 'while it must be ordered [it] need not be an organism' - i.e. 
function in the service of the social machine as a transcendent unity (ibid.). 
Protevi reiterates the critique of the Kleinian part - object found in Deleuze 
(1972 / 2006: 44 - 45), and Deleuze and Guattari, where the impersonal nature 
of infantile connections is stressed: 'It seems [ ] self-contradictory to maintain, 
on the one hand, that the child lives among partial objects, and that on the other 
hand he conceives of these partial objects as being his parents, or even 
different parts of his parents' bodies' (1972 / 2009: 47). A libido that is 'open in 
all directions to a social field' is to be preferred to forcing the 'interplay of 
desiring-machines to fit within the restricted code of Oedipus' (ibid.). The 
pertinent question, they suggest, is what are the forces causing the closing up 
of Oedipal triangulation? 
'Under what conditions does this triangulation divert desire so that it 
flows across a surface within a narrow channel that is not a natural 
conformation of this surface? How does it form a type of inscription for 
experiences and the workings of mechanisms that extend far beyond it in 
every direction?' (ibid. 47 - 48) 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the child is a 'metaphysical being' and 'the 
unconscious is an orphan' (ibid. 48, 49): it asks who it is, what it is, what its 
body can do, and these questions have nothing whatsoever to do with parents 
or 'a repugnant artificial triangle' (ibid. 49). Protevi concurs with the distinction 
between bodies and persons since the infantile unconscious lacks any sense of 
global persons, and the infant does not possess the higher cognitive functions 
required to formulate a body image upon which an ego is based. A distinction 
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between body image and 'body schema' is posited however; the latter is some 
level of awareness of sensory - motor capacities in the absence of perceptual 
monitoring, whilst the former is conditional upon input from social systems (ibid. 
95). Anyone who has experienced the profound depersonalisation that 
accompanies physical violence or a protracted threat of violence, where flight is 
not possible, may comprehend why this idea is compelling for me. The body 
assumes an importance that Reason would not afford it: I breathe therefore I 
am. 
I fail to see how such bodily sense can be viewed as strictly (and 
logically) an effect of language. And I wonder how research into affect-
regulation in the traumatised through artistic and physical activity (Van der Kolk 
2002: 34 - 50) can be reconciled with a prioritising of the signifier. The 
opposition between the 'motor program of experimentation' and psychoanalytic 
interpretation of phantasy posed by Deleuze and Guattari is pertinent here. Re-
education of the body through the experience of intensities and the construction 
of a BwO as a surface of re-inscription or, rather, novel inscription (1980 / 2004: 
168) is precisely how such activities have assisted me: 
'The BwO is what remains when you take everything away. What you 
take away is precisely the phantasy, and the significances and 
subjectifications [ ] Psychoanalysis does the opposite; it translates 
everything into phantasies, it converts everything into phantasy, it retains 
the phantasy. It royally botches the real, because it botches the BwO' 
(ibid.) 
I am referring to basic emotions here and fight-flight responses to triggers - the 
signs (not signifiers) that an abusee, years later, may react to however irrational 
they understand their bodily reactions to be. Van der Kolk (1994: 253 - 265) 
writes of this bodily misreading of signs as either lack of reaction to genuinely 
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threatening situations or misplaced reaction to those which are genuinely 
innocuous. When much younger, phrases like 'cerebral override' captured the 
divorce of head and body that coping with difficult interpersonal situations 
required - another parallel universe scenario. 
Returning to schizophrenia as a heuristic, Deleuze and Guattari isolate 
different syntheses and their functions based on features of schizophrenic 
breakdown and recovery with which to think the process of ontogenesis as a 
differential patterning involving political markers (sex, gender, race, class). The 
connective synthesis derives from the paranoid phase of schizophrenia, where 
desiring-machines are acutely sensed and repulsed, and it evokes the social 
repression of desiring-flows in the production of persons (Protevi 2009: 96). 
'Beneath its organs it senses there are larvae and loathsome worms, and 
a God messing it all up or strangling it by organizing it [so] what is 
ordinarily referred to as primary repression [ ] is not "eountercathexis", 
but rather this repulsion of desiring-machines by the body without 
organs; the paranoid machine is the avatar of desiring machines' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 9) 
The second synthesis, whose function is that of recording, is the disjunctive. It 
relates to the catatonic phase of schizophrenia in which the body that has 
repulsed invaders shuts down. In physiological terms, the body becomes an 
'undifferentiated mass' and flows fall in intensity to reach zero which, according 
to Protevi, is when established patterns of flow-breaks among organs can be re-
patterned. Hence the BwO becomes the site for the inscription of social 
relations or the site on which 'a social machine regulates the flows of its 
connections with (and in) somatic bodies' (ibid. 97). Social repression is 
effected through the formation of exclusive disjunctions that force organ 
connections into fixed patterns thus precluding inclusive disjunctions (this not 
180 
that, rather than, this and this (ibid.). In schizophrenia, the catatonic phase is 
followed by one in which a 'miraculating-machine' displaces the 'paranoia-
machine'. I.e. the 'repulsion-machine' gives way to an 'attraction-machine' 
where the BwO falls back on deslring-production and appropriates it; this is 
where the 'full' BwO is presented as the socius, and the body of capital is given 
by way of illustration: 
'This is the body that Marx is referring to when he says that it is not the 
product of labor, but rather appears as Its natural or divine 
presupposition [ ] In a word, the socius as a full body forms a surface 
where all production is recorded, whereupon the entire process appears 
to emanate from this recording surface' 
(Deleuze and Guattari ibid. 11, 10) 
When the organs are regenerated and miraculated on the body of Judge 
Schreber, he attracts God's rays to himself as the BwO comes to function as: 
'an enchanted recording or inscribing surface that arrogates to itself all 
the productive forces and all the organs of production, and acts as a 
quasi-cause by communicating the apparent movement (the fetish) to 
them. So true is It that the schizo practices political economy, and that al 
sexuality is a matter of economy' (ibid. 12) 
The schizophrenic may appear to accept the 'banal Oedipal code' but then 
'scrambles all the codes' by completely disrespecting the disjunctions that 
Oedipalisation Is designed to eradicate; hence Artaud's statement that he had 
been his own son, father, and mother (ibid. 15). 
The third synthesis is the conjunctive which is the production of 
consumption and of the subject. It is also described as the production of 
recording since there is now a subject to be found on this recording surface 
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(ibid. 1 6 - 1 7 ) . This is the process of Oedipalised subject formation and its 
function is pleasure or the production and consumption of energetic surplus 
value: 'At each connection of the organs, a little bit extra - a surplus value - is 
produced and consumed in enjoyment'; in physiological terms it is the 
subjective enjoyment produced by the flow of energy through different singular 
states of the body (Protevi 2009: 99), a being 'reborn with each new state' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 16). This is the privatisation of subjectivity 
that capitalism demands- the single ego that deludes itself in saying 'It's me, 
and so it's mine' (ibid. 17) and the habit of saying T and 'Me' (Deleuze 2006: 
365) or 'the habit of registering all these experiences under the same name' 
(Protevi ibid.). It is how we come to be 'nailed to a dominant reality' (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 177). As a third phase of schizophrenia, a new 
machine - prompted in Freudian terms by the 'return of the repressed' (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 17) is necessitated by the need to reconcile the 
opposition between the repulsion - machine and the attraction - machine; the 
former is never completely displaced in the miraculating phase and can persist 
in the form of mocking voices or self-recriminatory interjections (ibid. 11). 
Deleuze and Guattari dub this new machine the 'celibate machine'; it brings 
about a new subject through the residual reconciliation of desiring - machines 
and the BwO, and for Judge Schreber, the recovery phase involves finding 
himself on occasion dressed as a woman (but only when alone unless it is 
unavoidable) and deciding that he is entitled to derive a little pleasure from this 
becoming - woman - which, of course, he has only engaged in because God 
has demanded a 'constant state of enjoyment' and it is his duty to provide God 
with it (ibid. 16 -18). Hence, the conjunctive synthesis of consumption and 
'consummation' taking the form: 'So that's what it was!' (ibid. 18). Or the 
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prescribed realisation on the couch of Freudian or Kleinian psychoanalysis that 
it was mommy or daddy all along. 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to the pleasure produced by the celibate 
machine as automatic not autoerotic; in the schizophrenic this eroticism is said 
to be accompanied by a sense of the unleashing of 'unlimited forces' as if 
'intensive quantities' are experienced in their full state: 'to a point that is almost 
unbearable - a celibate misery and glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry 
suspended between life and death, an intense feeling of transition, states of 
pure, naked intensity stripped of all shape or form' (ibid.) that others describe as 
hallucination or delirium. What is missing from this description, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, is the role of emotion: 
'the basic phenomenon of hallucination (/ see, / hear) and the basic 
phenomenon of delirium (/ think. . .) presuppose an / feel at an even 
deeper level, which gives hallucinations their object and thought delirium 
its content - an "I feel that I am becoming a woman", "that I am becoming 
a god", and so on; I.e. hallucinations and delirium are secondary to the 
really primary emotion, which in the beginning only experiences 
Intensities, becomings, transitions' (Ibid. 1 8 - 1 9 ) 
These pure intensities are produced by tension between forces of attraction and 
repulsion, but do not reach an equilibrium that can be characterised as a neutral 
state; they are all 'positive In relationship to the zero Intensity that designates 
the full body without organs' (ibid. 19). They mark the return of the positive 
power of difference - its eternal return. So when Judge Schreber 'imagines' that 
he has breasts, Deleuze and Guattari describe them as zones of Intensity on his 
BwO and not delirious or hallucinatory: we are In the realm of: 'lived experience: 
the actual, lived emotion of having breasts does not resemble breasts, it does 
not represent them any more than a predestined zone in the egg resembles the 
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organ that it is going to be stimulated to produce within itself (ibid.). Hence, the 
BwO is likened to an egg containing only bands of intensity, potentials, 
thresholds, and gradients. Matter and emotion are deployed interchangeably in 
this passage where Deleuze and Guattari also acknowledge how harrowing or 
emotionally overwhelming this schizophrenic experience of pure intensities can 
be: 'one's entire soul flows into this emotion and makes the mind aware of the 
terribly disturbing sound of matter' (ibid.). 
Given my interest in Protevi's concepts of political physiology and 
affective cognition, I emphasise that Deleuze and Guattari insist that the tension 
between forces of attraction and repulsion does not constitute 'an expression of 
the final equilibrium of a system, but consist rather, of an unlimited number of 
stationary, metastable states through which a subject passes' (ibid.); hence -
'structuration' (1980 / 2004: 57) and Protevi's 'patterning' (ibid. 104 -105). It is 
the nomadic subject that paradoxically both persists and becomes through 
participation in assemblages that occur on varying temporal and compositional 
scales (short, mid, long term, and personal, group, civic); and Protevi adopts the 
term 'core self to refer to this nomadic subject (ibid. 99). It should also be 
recognised however that destratification is a condition of assemblage formation, 
and therefore this 'core self is not the instinctual asocial self of liberal 
humanism but a subject that emerges transversally within assemblages that 
facilitate rhizomatic connections and that rely on the heterogeneity, not 
homogeneity, of their parts. Butler is particularly dismissive of the notion that the 
subject is constantly created anew (1997: 224). Yet this is how I experience 
myself, and again, surely it is such becoming that allows resignification as a 
political strategy with material effects for Butler. The dismantling of oedipally -
induced egocentrism enables participation in encounters that surpass an 
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individual's ability to identify and separate their contribution to those encounters 
(Protevi 2009: 103) - a phenomenon highlighted by Gale and Wyatt in their 
nomadic writing project as a 'between-the-twos' (2009: 50). It is possible to alter 
habitual patterns through exposure to, and participation in, new assemblages 
however difficult and protracted a process this may prove to be (ibid. 36). Quite 
often this happens in unforeseen ways rather than by design. 
Protevi regards neuro-endocrinological homeostatic regulation as a form 
of expression involving the overcoding of the regulation of flows provided by 
organs, and the organism as a unifying emergent effect of multiple systems of 
homeostatic regulation - the organism is a thickening of flows of biomass and 
genetic material and therefore a stratum which benefits from the labor of the 
organs and which works to constrain the BwO upon which it is constructed (ibid. 
104). It is thus both self-organising and organised through the very syntheses 
identified by Deleuze and Guattari (1972 / 2009: 12, 15). The organs, for 
example, are patterned by exclusive disjunctions conceived as series of virtual 
singularities that are actualised, thereby preventing the actualisation of other 
patterns; hence stereotypical behaviours that arise within periods of 
developmental plasticity, and I would add, in response to pathological situations 
(ibid. 105). For Protevi, thinking in terms of a pre-given biological reality of the 
organism denies the 'concrete reality' of that plasticity (ibid. 105). It is 'that 
which sets life against itself in order to limit itself (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 
2004: 554). Yet when Protevi argues that the thresholds at which homeostatic 
regulation set in can be measured by species-wide norms (ibid. 105, 189), my 
habitual sociological sensibility kicks in and its nerve becomes very raw indeed. 
I appreciate Protevi emphasising the enormous variability within populations 
which can be far greater than that found between species or populations or 
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between the sexes (ibid. 42). This argument is reminiscent of Deleuze and 
Guattari's observation that a work horse has more in common with an ox than 
with a race horse (ibid. 283). This variability seems to reinforce Protevi's point -
and the key one I take from Deleuze and Guattari (ibid.) that both the social 
AND the biological must be viewed as virtual and therefore variable or 
changeable fields. But once I think of population studies and statistical species-
norms, all I see is the potential for the use and abuse of data, for socio - political 
engineering, for the reinforcement of social stereotyping. And all I feel is my 
nomadic self starting to move towards a becoming - Butlerian, despite my 
stated reservations about socio-linguistic constructivism. Military training 
programmes have taken up behaviourist operant conditioning techniques to 
facilitate the suppression of a protoempathic aversion towards killing in soldiers 
(Protevi 2009: 173). This suggests that the rejection of a crudely mechanistic 
behaviourism in favour of concepts such as neural plasticity and decentralised 
nonlinear dynamical models has yet to be acknowledged by those forces that 
seek to engineer human behaviour in the service of the state. And although 
optimal and pessimal limits for the horse are mentioned in the passage referred 
to above in Deleuze and Guattari, species norms are not. Instead, they refer to 
'unknown assemblages' and not knowing what a body can do prior to its 
participation in an assemblage - including one through which a more powerful 
body might be composed (ibid. 284). 
Protevi proposes a political economy of consciousness to counter 
neoliberal efforts to render the effects of subjective agency irrelevant and 
produce 'rational (predictable) behaviour' by inducing fear of isolation in a 
population that is fundamentally prosocial (ibid. 182, 189). This alternative 
conception of human nature where prosociality is predominant, and premised 
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on a capacity for protoempathic identification, clearly challenges the depiction of 
competitive individualism as inherent or innate (ibid. 189). Protevi seeks to 
naturalise social cooperation by demonstrating how it is engendered and 
reproduced in the 'reciprocal causality of emergent social groups'; his intention 
is to enter the debate about human nature with 'eyes peeled for racist and 
sexist assumptions' (ibid. 188 - 9). No one who has read the entire book could 
doubt the sincehty of this conviction. But just how ingrained those assumptions 
actually are is unwittingly demonstrated when even Protevi cites research into 
primate mother-child relations in support of his arguments about prosociality 
and human solidarity (conceived as Aristotelian ptiilia or love) (ibid. 187). Why 
choose a species that doxa understands to be genetically similar to homo 
sapiens, or immediately below us in popular teleological evolutionism, while 
simultaneously confirming the lack of any categorical difference between the 
natural and social in a Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology? Why not mention the 
Harlow and Suomi (1971) monkey experiments that substituted a cloth 
caregiver for the real thing and found less behavioural pathologies than 
occurred in the event of premature isolation from a primary caregiver; or the 
kindergarten behaviours (collective and cooperative care of young) evidenced in 
other mammalian species? Although it is not what Protevi intends, this reliance 
on primate research is evocative of Butler's critique of the inability of Zizek 
(1989: 69) to let go of the 'rock' of castration or the centrality of the phallus 
(1993: 197 - 198). From my feminist perspective, emphasising the diversity of 
forms of infant care would undermine attempts to naturalise a socially 
prescribed maternal role. I would point out that it is Deleuze and Guattari (ibid. 
38) who argue against Lorenz and the idea that some forms of social 
organisation of species are superior to others based on their behavioural 
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proximity to our own. Why then would genetic proximity to homo sapiens imply 
superiority over other species? Nevertheless, they do link ethology and Spinoza 
In their interpretation of the latter's reference to what bodies can do (ibid. 284) -
hence Protevl's reliance on species norms as limits. Molar aggregates are 
statistical aggregates which Imply the efficacy of the group and that of 
aggregates in influencing the behaviour of individual subjects, In opposition to 
the view that such aggregates are merely composites of pre-existing subjects. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, it is the biological that is political because It Is 
through socio-bio-political processes that the biological becomes personal. 
My ambivalence towards science clearly contradicts the generally 
positive attitude of Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 202 - 203, 206). Am I over-
sensitised to the issue of fascistic import that Varela (2002) raises? If feminist 
research finds prevalence rates showing that the majority of female members of 
the human species experience abuse during their life time, as I recall some 
studies once doing and still doing overseas, then what is the species norm or 
what will doxa make of such information? If evolutionary affective neurosclence 
draws on such prevalence rates to liken abusive stepfathers to Incoming 
infantlcidal stallions, how will dissemination play out In the popular domain? I 
have written that abuse functions as a personal heuristic but I am also aware of 
the confusion it induces in my thinking. Is this evidence of stultitia {cf. p.56 - 57) -
the restlessness that manifests as Inability to wholeheartedly commit to any one 
theoretical or epistemological perspective? Or evidence of my capacity for 
critical and independent thought? Do I want to let go of my cynical feminism? 
No, I do not. My own experiences of repressive and controlling behaviours 
within a toxic familial environment, and contact with the darker side of 
prescriptive theories and models, are heavily implicated in this impulse to 
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question and keep moving that I am unlikely to ever lose. And this is not such a 
bad thing. I want my own students to question far more than they do. I welcome 
transversal thinking - the ranging across registers (biological, social, 
philosophical, literary, psychoanalytic and psychiatric) in Deleuze and Guattari 
and the freedom promised by the concepts of rhizomatic thinking and nomadic 
writing. We need more becoming-anti-oedipal and more 'molecular woman' ( c / 
p. 131) if academia is to subvert the fascistic potential of molar identity that is 
founded upon the reification of the molar aggregate. 
What then do I make of Deleuze and Guattari's reference to primordial 
'soup' in the context of the neurobiological? And the frequent references to the 
brain in the later collaboration of Deleuze and Guattari (1994). My own feeling is 
that Deleuze and Guattari anticipated published research into neural plasticity 
(e.g. Kandel 1998: 457 - 469) in understanding the unpredictability and 
complexity of neural pathway formation and the implied reversibility or 
malleability of those pathways in the complex interaction of exogenous and 
endogenous factors. We are talking here about a probabilistic and open or 
decentralised network that defies any type of determinism. So 'soup' does not 
imply complete randomness as in ancient cosmogony, but a complex system 
that can become predictable in the longer term (i.e. qualitatively predictable but 
defying detailed quantitative prediction) (Protevi 2009: 6). Protevi draws on 
complexity theory to describe assemblages as functional wholes subject to 
stratification and destratification depending upon the negative and positive 
feedback loops in operation; the former restore stability (homeostasis) and the 
latter move the system to a threshold at which an alternative behavioural 
pattern becomes possible (ibid. 6 - 7). My sociological sensibilities lead me to 
cringe at terms like functional whole, but Protevi explains in some depth how 
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complexity theory precludes any implication of an organic unified whole or 
suggestion that there is an analogy between the microcosm (individual 
organism or subject) and the social macrocosm - a judgment of God (ibid. 9). 
What I find particularly useful in Protevi is the attention to fear and 
depersonalisation (ibid. 50, 187), fear and its impact on physiology across 
different temporal scales, the co-emergence of emotion and cognition, 
unconscious affective evaluation (ibid. 25 - 26), how intense episodes of fear 
constitute 'affect programs' that operate pre-discursively (ibid. 26, 187), and 
how affect is inherently political (ibid. 50). I understand - my own body knows, 
why Scarry (1985) posits a body that is anterior to language. And Protevi 
provides a vocabulary that allows me to make sense of that feeling in 
supervision meetings of the 1990s - that they were bizarre or unreal at times: 
'Intensity is felt both positively and negatively, as inviting or repelling or even as 
simply strange, as in the sensation of being off-kilter, when things do not make 
the sense that they ordinarily do' (ibid. 51). Intensities can be read as 
approaches to 'switch points', but in negative situations where we can retain 
control of our reactions, we elect to stay below the threshold or 'on this side of 
irrevocable change' (ibid.). I should have walked away after the first meeting. At 
the institution in question, critical theory had been separated off from sociology 
into a different school and 'outsider women' were outlawed following the 
determination of permissible orthodoxies. And I was far too busy, for far too 
long, playing the game of seeking acceptance as a mature student / 
professional woman to prioritise intellectual integrity. I should have reached for 
Patti Smith's Babel (1978) after that first meeting instead of hanging on in there 
before finally allowing myself to cross that threshold marked 'irrevocable 
change' / withdrawal. The phrase cognitive dissonance (Holligan 2005) fails 
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dismally to capture the affective and embodied nature of this earlier academic 
experience. 
'Sacred thrills' is a reference to the Kantian sublime which is presented 
as a form of spiritual tourism In Protevi (ibid. 80). It is drawn from a passage 
where Kant differentiates between fearfulness and fear (Kant 1987: 269 cited in 
Protevi 2009: 80). The point here being that I was in a position to walk away 
from a toxic academic situation that was diminishing my power to act (as the 
exercise of freedom of thought). But it took a long time to do so and a long time 
to forgive myself for doing so. Playing the game is a loaded issue however for 
someone with my background. In referring to the Kantian sublime, I am also 
alluding to the sensation of physical insufficiency in situations where walking 
away is not an option. I feel now that I should let Butler and Protevi have the 
last word. I have followed both in re-presenting their arguments as a 
denaturalising and naturalising stance respectively, but there are commonalities 
that can be identified. Butler maintains that discursive performativity requires 
what it cannot abide (1993: 8, 188). And when Protevi states that 'the negative 
affects of panic and rage - and the milder forms of fear, anger, anxiety, and 
sadness - are the emotions most susceptible to political manipulation' (ibid. 
187), he is also positing a required negative - the tendency towards prosociality 
and the related fear of the social isolation that arises when contemplating any 
refusal to be manipulated, and that therefore encourages compliance (Ibid. 
182). 
Alternatively, Szaz should perhaps have the last word; Szaz viewed 
biologically determinist psychiatry as inevitably coercive and his was one of 
those outsider voices that were friends to me, and that kept me amused, in my 
darker teenage years: 'If you talk to God, you are praying. If God talks to you. 
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you have schizophrenia' (1973: 113). God never did respond to my requests for 
assistance. We remain incommunicado. Instead, I will mention Broca's area of 
the brain - the one required for putting feelings into words, and the one 
compromised during periods of high neuro-endocrinological arousal in response 
to a perceived threat: in other words, the traumatised can indeed experience 
speechless terror (Van der Kolk 2002). And this has absolutely nothing to do 
with foreclosure. The latter is the necessary exclusion of the real that is 
postulated as a universal and ahistorical originary trauma related to 
individuation, and construed as a condition of language and sociality within a 
psychoanalytic theory where to resist oedipalisation is to risk psychosis. While I 
appreciate Butler's criticism of Zizek's reduction of events like the Holocaust to 
this originary trauma, and her demand for consideration of the historical 
specificity of different forms of traumatic events (1993: 202), I cannot see how 
theories that render the body a logical function of language can be utilised at an 
individual level, i.e. in the sense - making and affect-modulation of someone 
who has experienced severe trauma of either a sexual, physical or 
psychological nature. Some of my students will eventually work in the field of 
gender-based conflict-related trauma and violence. Should I tell them that a 
word is just as injurious as being abducted, enslaved, raped or otherwise 
maimed? Would Natascha Lampusch (c / p. 130,144) imprisoned at ten years 
old and subjected to deeply humiliating sadistic rituals, concur? 
After so much science and logic, it is poetry and a gentle Nile breeze I 
find myself craving. I need the power of nature. I need to saturate every atom. 
There is no possibility, of course, of a last word, as Nietzsche maintained. The 
gradual refinement of a Christian conscience that had connected God, morality, 
and truth, eventually produced the 'self-overcoming' of metaphysics, theology, 
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morality, and positivistic science in a revaluation of tmth itself (Nietzsche 1974: 
357). And it was a madman (ibid. 125) that Nietzsche reiterated in writing: 
'You see what has really triumphed over the Christian god: Christian 
morality itself, the concept of truthfulness that was understood ever more 
rigorously, the father confessor's refinement of the Christian conscience, 
translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience, into intellectual 
cleanliness at any price. Looking at nature as if it were proof of the 
goodness and governance of a god; interpreting history in honor of some 
divine reason, as a continual testimony of a moral world order and 
ultimate moral purposes; interpreting one's own experiences as pious 
people have long enough interpreted theirs, as if everything were 
providential, a hint, designed and ordained for the sake of the salvation 
of the soul: that is all over now' 
(ibid. 357 cited in Cox 1999: 18) 
The quest for 'intellectual cleanliness' is purportedly evidence of a residual 
theology - the continuation of an ascetic ideal, and indicative of a continuing 
faith in the metaphysical value of 'truth in /tee/f (Nietzsche 1887 /1966: 24). It 
was positivistic science that Nietzsche critiqued not modern experimental 
science, but a culturally pervasive 'unconditional will to truth' (ibid.), or desire for 
divine truth, is held to persist as an 'unconscious imperative' (1974: 357). 
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Wanderers, free spirits and dancing stars 
In this final plateau, I apply Deleuzean and Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts in 
recognising that I will resolve the tension of my epistemological conundrum 
affectively. I demonstrate the non-linearity of thought and problematisation by 
moving across, and within, very different knowledge-production paradigms. I am 
able to do so with an unprecedented ease, which underscores the importance 
of a pedagogic practice that ensures students are granted opportunities for 
experimentation. This plateau is equally a rejection of the suggestion 
(Wellington ibid.) that writing which is experimental for the student concerned 
should be permitted as a prelude to universal conformity to prescribed generic 
models of good academic writing. This is not, I believe, what Richardson (1997: 
93 - 94) was advocating when describing how such experimentation can 
improve more conventional academic textual production. 
August 2010 
When I write of needing to imnnerse myself in a de-deified nature and the poetic, 
it is because both provide a freedom from: 'the control of the rational mind and 
its desires to pin down, record, make sense, construct some sort of narrative' 
(Gannon 2004: 113). I am seemingly driven by two powerful forces that now 
play out in academia as an epistemological conundrum; hence the tension 
reproduced here between the self-professed naturalising and de-naturalising 
positions of Protevi and Butler respectively {cf. p. 158), and my ambivalence 
about narrative realism {cf. p. 47) and aspects of science. Those forces are the 
need to make sense of abusive behaviours and the equally, if not more 
powerful, need to move on from their fall-out. The former fuels my 
interdisciplinary tendencies thereby enriching the life of my intellect. At doctoral 
level however there is no modular course structure to hide behind and I am 
writing for a single supervisory team with divergent epistemological loyalties. I 
therefore risk charges of epistemological inconsistency in wanting to bring the 
poetic in from the cold - to develop an interest in experimental writing as a 
method that disrupts the sense of being 'nailed down to a dominant reality' 
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(Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 177). Nevertheless, inducing the affective 
production of a (re)newed self and transforming the 'I feel' and the 'I think' is the 
embrace of life that no memory can negate (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 
18). 
What am I saying here? That I have needed my powers of reasoning, and 
always will, to problematise (and politicise) situations that make no sense or 
that disorientate me in the toxicity of their lived experience; hence my 
appreciation of Deleuze's account of his youthful experience of learning about 
'the identity of thought and liberty' (2004: 77), and of Richardson's reference to 
sociological sensibility - the acknowledgment that sense-making usually 
demands contextualisation however provisional (1997: 2). Both resonate 
strongly with me given my own, intermittently pressing, need to question and 
make sense of seemingly bizarre familial, social, and higher educational 
dynamics. For Deleuze, this sense-making is not a voluntaristic option but an 
ontological condition of all of life: 'problematization' (1968 / 2004: 249). For 
Nietzsche, it was 'evaluation' and 'interpretation' (1967: 560, 616). Yet I am also 
strongly drawn to the 'poetic politics of resistance' and exploration of 'shifting 
subjectivities' (Gannon ibid. 108). This is despite the fact that the privileging of 
language, emphasis on discursive constitution of subjectivity, and attention to 
competing discourses in constituting dominant realities associated with 
poststructuralism - feminist and otherwise, does not appear to rest too easily 
with the naturalism of Deleuze and Nietzsche. So my interest in writing 
practices and the poetic is not confined to private encounters with specific 
female poets - as an escape from, or antidote to, the rationality of academia or 
my own tortuous (as in potentially infinitely regressive) sense-making. After 
writing my last piece, I was invited to explore the concept of theoretical 
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assemblage as it might facilitate connections and permit me to pursue the 
continuities between Deleuze and Cixous for example, without triggering the 
self-mortification around epistemological purity that the ascetic ideal dictates. 
Nietzsche is right about unconscious imperatives (ibid.). They can be energy 
sinks that work, so easily, to stifle creativity and experimentation - the 
rhizomatic impulse. So I remind myself that, contra Protevi's (2009: 44) 
insistence that epistemology matters, Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 51) state that 
it does not. And for Nietzsche, there was no world other than the natural world, 
and the interpretation of which it is composed. Nietzsche is distinctly 'anti-
epistemological' (Cox 1999: 242) in his rejection of both foundational truths and 
a knowing subject that is prior to interpretation - one who strives to view the 
world 'from the outside' when only views 'from the inside' are possible 
(Nietzsche 1886/1966: 36). 
I am unsure what a 'rational mind' is beyond the sense in which I have 
deployed it here - a power of reasoning that has assisted my own sense -
making in situations where the capacity to question, to identify contradictions, to 
assess alternative explanations, to contextualise and so forth has been a matter 
of self-preservation. I hesitated before using the latter phrase. I am definitely not 
contradicting my endorsement of Tami Spry's criticism of survivor narratives (c / 
p. 40). Such narratives suggest, I maintain, an underhanded Social Darwinism 
that individualises events and thereby dilutes their political import. Nietzsche 
was highly critical of a distinctly unDanA/inian teleological 'adaptationism', 
regarding it as a reintroduction of the 'argument from design' that Darwin 
explicitly rejected (Cox 1999: 226; Nietzsche ibid. 12). A conscious desire to 
survive, or bodily sense of the need to struggle for survival, was viewed by 
Nietzsche as symptomatic of atypical conditions of extreme distress that 
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represented a temporary imposed limitation on the 'really fundamental instinct 
of life' which is 'growth and expansion [or] the will to power which is the will of 
life' (1974: 349). The drive for self-preservation is not therefore indicative of a 
universally applicable or ontological state. On this account, narratives of survival 
and adaptation are not causes for therapeutic congratulation. Political 
contextualisation is one possible, and potentially more appropriate, therapeutic 
objective. 'Let us beware of superfluous teleological principles!—one of which is 
the instinct of self-preservation' (Nietzsche 1886 /1966: 13). 
There are many therapeutic alternatives to adaptationism and 
reductionism including: philosophy for Nietzsche {cf. p. 40), political 
contextualisation for White (2007), and the poetic for Speedy (2005). And affect, 
and therefore the body, is implicated in each; sense-making should 
consequently not be identified exclusively with rationality. I want to disrupt the 
binary of rationality and bodily intuition or knowing, and to explore the poetic as 
a form of sense-making that functions as a third space (OIkowski 1999) 
between such binaries. Or better still, to have done with this particular binary for 
once and for all. I see the poetic as a form of experimentation and problem 
resolution that is a (re)newing, a becoming - that moving on from what can 
never be changed but only rewritten in a (re)writing of the flesh. Events happen 
but our narratives necessarily change as new resources are brought to the 
sense - making process - as our lives change, as we change, as our 
subjectivities shift in the assemblages through which we become. The revision 
of linear narratives is not always the most emancipatory resource at our 
disposal however and I feel powerfully attracted to those writing practices 
associated with feminist poststructuralism. I am eager to follow Cixous and 
Gannon into a landscape of poetic language and the unconscious. But I want to 
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take Deleuze with me. Like Nietzsche who once wrote of Heraclitus: 'in [his] 
proximity I feel warmer and better than anywhere else' (1872 / 1966: 3), and 
contrary to my desire to be a thorough - going 'pagan' (Lyotard 1989: 123), 
engaging with the texts of Deleuze is how I have negotiated that passage 
between the abusee's valorisation of truth and integrity and the impulse to 
experiment that moving on entails - between the refusal to be 'pinned down' by 
postpositivism or narrative realism and my use of an autobiographical genre 
that is troubled (Lather 1993, 1995, 2004) by Gannon (ibid.). Deleuze is my 
metadiscourse (Lyotard 1979 /1984) , the most recent friend (Gale and Wyatt 
2009: 224) who I understand to be saying: Go with the dice that life has thrown 
you! Be brave enough to throw the dice! (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 248). Assemble 
and become! Move on! 
Nietzsche too writes of becoming as a dice game (1881 /1982: 130) and 
I will return to this image. My current interest in,Nietzsche was prompted by an 
observation of Spinks (2005: 178 - 179 in Parr 2005) that Deleuze's conception 
of subjectivity as the 'habit of saying ' " I " and "Me"' (Deleuze 2006: 365) owes 
more to Nietzsche than to Hume and the former's attention to reason. If my 
powers of reasoning are precious for historical reasons, then Nietzsche offers 
an alternative position that decouples reason from those conventional standards 
of rationality and objectivity that Nussbaum defended against a 'feminist assault 
on reason' (1994: 59). According to Nietzsche, my power to reason is simply my 
ability to explore and evaluate 'a variety of perspectives and affective 
interpretations' (1887 / 1966: 12). The 'intellectual conscience' so valued by 
Nietzsche is one that refuses uncritical acceptance of dominant perspectives or 
existing frameworks and, in that sense, is able to understand varied 
perspectives and differing affective interpretations; in the same passage 
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Nietzsche urges experimentation with 'new or forgotten' interpretations (ibid.). 
This is not the 'Man of Reason' rejected by Genevieve Lloyd (1984): 
'The strongest and most evil spirits have so far done the most to advance 
humanity: again and again they have rekindled the passions that were 
going to sleep—all ordered society puts the passions to sleep—and they 
reawakened again and again the sense of comparison, of contradiction, 
of the pleasure in what is new, daring, untried' 
(Nietzsche 1974: 4) 
That Nietzsche refers to affective interpretations indicates the embodied nature 
of knowing which resonates with the conflation of 'I think' and 'I feel' in Deleuze 
and Guattari (c / p. 183). 
I follow Alcoff (1995: 1 -26) here in offering another treatment of reason. I 
concur with her characterisation of Nussbaum's argument as highly dogmatic in 
its claim that a specific concept of reason should always be retained. To retain a 
mind of one's own (Antony and Witt 2002) is, in Nietzsche's terms, to restore 
the 'innocence of becoming' (1888 /1968: Errors: 7 - 8). It is to recognise the 
contingency of interpretations in opposition to epistemologies that pin us down 
to methods of generating knowledge which presuppose the neutrality of 
language, objectivity, and a capacity for logic in the production of purportedly 
timeless and disinterested truths. Antony (2002: 110 - 153) argues that feminist 
writers like Jaggar (1983) and Flax (1987) mischaracterise both the rationalist 
and empiricist traditions in failing to acknowledge the extent to which analytic 
philosophy has discarded aspects of both. Feminists have consequently, it is 
claimed, misidentified analytic epistemology with empiricism and neglected 
more rationalist options (Garry 2004). Cox (1999: 114- 115) also argues that 
both the analytic and Continental philosophical traditions now acknowledge that: 
'our knowledge is not an edifice built upon a foundation of indubitable beliefs but 
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rather an interpretative web of mutually supporting beliefs and desires that is 
constantly being rewoven'; hence his characterisation of a 'holistic empiricism' 
as one that recognises the situated historically variable nature of knowledge 
(ibid. 115). And Garry (2004) too suggests that the category of feminist 
empiricism introduced by Harding (1986) is too broad in scope since the 
methodologies that qualify as holistically empiricist differ significantly from 
logical positivism - a philosophical methodology which once sought to 
dehistoricise truth through precisely the assumptions of linguistic neutrality, 
objectivity, and the valorisation of logic already referred to. I am not convinced 
however and consequently tend to use the terms positivistic and postpositivistic 
interchangeably. As Passmore (1967: 57) states, logical positivism is 'as dead 
as a philosophical movement ever becomes. But it has left a legacy behind'. It is 
the same legacy that requires us to address issues such as researcher values 
and bias via positionality in doctoral research proposals whatever our chosen 
qualitative method. And scientific holistic or contextual empiricism (Longino 
2002: 122, 145 - 148) will continue to require the selective isolation of variables 
as entities from multiplicity (Nietzsche 1974: 112). 
Harding critiqued the concept of a value-free objectivity that presupposes 
a researcher able and willing to: 'constantly police the borders of a gulf, a no-
man's land, between himself as the subject and the object of his research, 
knowledge, or action' (1991: 158) - one who possesses what Hartsock (1983) 
succinctly dubbed abstract masculinity. The level of generality of Cox's 
argument glosses over the continuities in both practice and theory between 
logical positivism and postpositivist methodologies. And I note in this context 
that Nietzsche rejects both positivistic and pragmatic conceptions of truth: the 
former because only affective interpretation is possible and the latter because 
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the knowledge thereby generated has a tendency to assume the identity of a 
given - to ossify and reify (Nietzsche 1888 /1968: 2). I do not intend to map 
developments in feminist philosophy here however. As Garry (ibid.) states, the 
two principles that inform the work of all the writers cited in her discussion of 
analytic feminist philosophy are: PHILOSOPHY MATTERS. GENDER 
MATTERS. I make no apology whatsoever for dramatising by capitalisation. 
Philosophy is a vulnerable discipline within the neoliberal managerialist higher 
education regime (Faust 2008). And I detest the thought that in years to come, I 
will like Richardson ( c / p . 48), be writing about an ironic or convenient 
coincidence - in this case, that philosophy departments were disbanded just 
when students needed them most, or when Foucault's prediction that the 
century would be Deleuzean looked increasingly accurate (Reggio 2007: 145). I 
also feel that feminist poststructuralism matters precisely because it 
foregrounds issues of normative dualism and abstract individualism (Jaggar 
1983: 40, 42), and provides an anti-essentialist interpretation of gender that is 
compatible with the non-foundationalist metaphysics of Deleuze - where 
difference is affirmed, the flux of non-teleological becoming assumed, a 
polymorphous sexuality implied, and a 'logic of sensation' evidenced (Deleuze 
1981 /2005). 
Nietzsche would, I suspect, portray the dogrnatism of Nussbaum's 
reference to a feminist assault on reason (Nussbaum 1994: 59) as a denial of 
the 'uncertainty and interpretative multiplicity of existence' (1974: 2) and a 
refusal to experience the 'trembling' - the affect, the 'craving and the rapture' 
that questioning and experimentation with new modes of thinking can invoke 
(Nietzsche 1974: 2). Even if it were possible, which Nietzsche refutes, the 
suspension of affect would be to 'castrate the intellect' (1887 / 1966: 12); 
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objectivity as contemplation without interest is therefore dismissed as a 
'nonsensical absurdity' (ibid.). When Nietzsche declares: 'Let us be mummies! 
Let us represent monotone - theism by adopting the expression of a 
gravedigger' (1888 / 1968: Reason: I), it is the eradication of the body through 
the rigid hierarchised binaries or dualisms found in Christianity, traditional 
metaphysics, and Kantianism in the search for ahistorical truths that is being 
parodied and that we are urged to abandon. Like Deleuze, Nietzsche often 
adopts an intense and polemical writing style; both resisted any form of 
dogmatism that inhibits enquiry or questioning: 'interpretation that permits 
counting, calculating, weighing, seeing, and touching and nothing more—that is 
a crudity and a naivete, assuming that it is not a mental illness, an idiocy' (1974: 
373). Both viewed thinking and writing as forms of experimentation, or as 
'experimentation with intensities that foster patterns of becoming' where 
creativity is understood as 'a multiple and complex process of transformation, 
otherwise the flux of becoming' (Braidotti 2005: 307 in Parr 2005). The 
importance of affectivity in Deleuze's thinking about becoming cannot be 
underestimated. Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004) prioritise affectivity in their 
theory of subjectivity which emphasises the specific temporality of the embodied 
human subject. I should now outline the role offerees in both Nietzsche and 
Deleuze since it is through such forces - or degrees of affectivity that are 
receptive to encounters with other affects, that becoming or transformation 
occurs (ibid.). Recall that Protevi (cf. p.190) describes powerful affects as 
potential switch points thus implying the multi-layered but distinctly embodied 
character of the changes that affect can effect. 
Cox outlines the Nietzschean influence on Bataille (1988). The latter 
argued that the dynamic force of both nature (growth, sexuality, procreation. 
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struggle, and death) and culture (production, form-giving, creativity, and play) 
reflect the superabundance of energy in the biosphere and the compulsion to 
expend it (ibid. 231). As in Deleuze, neither the human or nature, nor the 
organic or inorganic is ontologically privileged. Becoming however is privileged 
over being. Nietzsche's will to power is univocal in that human life is 'translated 
back into nature' (1967: 692); both are characterised as being in perpetual 
motion, driven by attraction, repulsion, tension, resistance, integration, 
disintegration, assimilation, incorporation, and alliance: life is a relation of forces 
or 'dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta' (1967: 
635; Cox 1999: 238). Although Cox therefore portrays the will to power as a 
unifying theory, it is one which: eschews transcendence in favour of 
interpretative knowing - the 'death of God' (1974: 344), emphasises change and 
becoming rather than being, and that underlines contingency, multiplicity and 
chance (ibid. 238). For Nietzsche, Darwin emancipated nature from being, 
essence and God, and emphasised chance, random variation, and time. 
Nietzsche retains the materialism of Darwin whilst extending this rejection of 
being, essence and God to both language and subjectivity through a polemical 
'assault' on the concept of mechanism as matter in motion; this concept implies 
the passivity of matter or otherwise static entities, and what Nietzsche 
considered an erroneous concept of motion (Cox ibid. 217). Will to power is the 
continual rearrangement of assemblages of forces, thus evoking the theory of 
assemblage in Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004: 155). And Deleuze 
describes the eternal return as the 'power to affirm divergence and decentring' 
(1969 / 1990: 302). 'Nature must be thought of as the principle of the diverse 
and its production [ ] that does not assemble its own elements into a whole' 
(ibid.). It is precisely this principle that informs feminist poststructuralist theories 
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of the subject and of language. Gannon writes in defiance of the fixity of 
meaning or self-identity and disrupts the linear causality associated with 
autobiographical writing (ibid. 107). Language is clearly pertinent to any human 
'self-overcoming' and Nietzsche's principle that: 'All great things bring about 
their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming' (1887 / 1966: 27) is 
evocative of the idea that discourses behave in a similar way by inevitably 
sowing the seeds of their own deconstruction (Derrida 1967 /1973: 64 - 66; 
1989: 25; 1992: 24 - 25; 2000a: 300). 
Nietzsche argues that our faith in being, matter, or substance - in entities 
that have acquired the status of 'thinghood' (1888 / 1968: Reason: 2), derives 
from ontological, psychological, and linguistic prejudice. The privilege of being 
is, as Cox (ibid. 217) states: 'inscribed in the very structure of our language'. It 
is language that assumes 'the ego as being' and 'the ego as substance' 
(Nietzsche ibid. 5); and it is language that: 
'projects this faith in the ego-substance upon all things—only thereby 
does it first create the concept of "thing." Everywhere "being" is projected 
by thought, pushed underneath, as the cause; the concept of "being" 
follows, and is derivative of, the concept of "ego." [ ] I am afraid we are 
not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar' (ibid.) 
The subject does not exist outside of interpretative becoming as some 
transcendental source (or objective spectator). For Nietzsche, any such 
suggestion is tantamount to claiming God-like status and we therefore remain in 
a 'shadow of God' (1974: 108) for as long as we believe otherwise. This is why 
will to power should not be confused with free will as a property Inhering in the 
speaking and thinking subject since for Nietzsche: 'the deed is everything' -
there Is no 'doer' behind the deed (1888 /1968: Reason: 5) as required by the 
abstract individualism critiqued by Jaggar (ibid.). I want say here that my 
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feelings about Butler's conception of the relation between the body and 
language {cf. p. 159) remain unchanged. I am not about to recant. Nor have I 
fallen victim to a masculinist 'adversarial paradigm' (Moulton 1993: 149) in 
refusing to see the body as an 'effect' of, or not anterior to, language (Butler 
1993: 11; 1997: 5). There is no unidirectionality posited in Nietzsche; 'effects' 
are what happens when forces are at play and this applies to any kind of force 
(1886 / 1966: 36). Butler (ibid. 224) cites Nietzsche (1887 / 1966: II: 12) on the 
'continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations' in support of a linguistic 
constructivism (the body as an effect of language). But Nietzsche is actually 
arguing against a misreading of Danwin as a teleological adaptationism: 
the entire history of a "thing", an organ, a custom can in this way be a 
continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations [Interpretationen] and 
adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one another 
but, on the contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with one 
another in purely chance fashion' 
(ibid, cited in Cox ibid. 227) 
If I find Gannon's work attractive (ibid.), it is because no such 
unidirectionality is implied; references to the flesh rather than the body evoke 
the Deleuzo-Guattarian (1972 / 2009) challenge to the oedipalised or privatised 
body as unitary organism. Writing unfurls memories that are stored in the flesh 
(Gannon ibid. 112-113) ; language does not write the body. So when I wrote of 
(re)writing the body, I was referring to a 'flux of becoming' (Braidotti ibid.) that 
defies such oppositions and their hierarchical organisation. I was thinking too of 
affectivity. And since Deleuze makes no categorical distinction between writing, 
painting and thinking (Braidotti ibid. 306), I will mention Helle Wintrier here. 
Witnessing an improvised performance of 'data' where Wintrier responded 
bodily to the transcript from which she read (Winther 9'^ September 2008), was 
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one of the most extraordinary academic experiences I have ever had - a short-
lived but profoundly affective encounter, an event, an assemblage. There were 
other events at that conference that I could, and perhaps should, have attended 
given my academic interests at the time. But then there is nothing stable about 
the complexes of power - that tension between forces, in Nietzsche's view 
(1886 /1966: 19; 1967: 492). And rather like Judge Schreber and his 'so that's 
what it was' moment (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 18), I felt that the right 
force had won and knew what I had been missing. Bodies. Affectivity. I now see 
my presence at Helle Winther's performance as a divine accident, however 
chaotic my learning choices seemed to me back then. I am mindful that 
Nietzsche once wrote: 'one must still have chaos in oneself to give birth to a 
dancing star' (ibid. Prologue 5) - a chaosmos of our own (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 208). This is, of course, where the title of this piece of writing comes from. 
Nietzsche wrote: 'He who has attained to only some degree of freedom of mind 
cannot feel other than a wanderer on the earth—though not as a traveller to a 
final destination: for this destination does not exist' (1878 /1991: 638). Is this the 
'rational mind' that would 'pin down' and be pinned down (Gannon ibid.)? Or 
one that values experimentation as much as Deleuze did (1980 / 2004: 166 -
167), or indeed, as Gannon does (ibid. 113). I think of Deleuze as an intellectual 
nomad determined to seek out joyful connections in his learning, and I imagine 
him as someone who knew much about relational learning long before his 
collaborations with Guattari. I think of Cixous like this too. 
Cox Insists that Nietzsche's naturalism (the refusal of onto-theological or 
metaphysical posits) means that relativism is avoided; poor and better 
interpretations are distinguishable through affective evaluation (ibid. 70). Contra 
Protevl's assertion (2009: 189) that a theory of consciousness Is required in 
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order to rectify a perceived omission in theories that highlight affect, Nietzsche's 
refusal of binaries (reason-nature, mind-body, consciousness-instinct, and so 
forth) means that thinking or 'being conscious' (1886 /1966: 3) is 'merely a 
relation of [ ] drives to each other' (1974: 333), and reason is a 'system of 
relations between various passions and desires' (1967: 387). As Cox points out, 
it is not a question of supplying a theory of consciousness that is lacking, but of 
accepting that Nietzsche is resisting the construction of binary oppositions and 
insisting that consciousness is a 'residuum' of bodily processes - of impulse, 
passion, instinct and desire (ibid. 76 - 77). It must be remembered that, for 
Nietzsche, the organic process presupposes interpretation and that breathing is 
consequently no less an intellectual activity than the production of meaning 
(1967: 643; Cox ibid. 240). Nietzsche (1878 /1986: 2) would concur with 
Gannon (ibid.) that the body cannot be erased through the abstractions of high 
theory, and the writing of Cixous is premised on this principle. Intuition, 
sensuality and aesthetic understanding is ultimately to be preferred to 'the 
ghostly land of schemata, the land of abstractions' (1873 /1979: 88 - 90), and to 
the positivist desire for certainty and scientific reductionism. 'Against positivism, 
which halts at phenomena—"there are only facts"- I would say: no, facts is 
precisely what there are not, only interpretations' (1967: 481); there are no 
unmediated 'brute facts' (1887 /1966: III: 24), and there is no God's eye view 
(Cox ibid. 111) of the world. Nietzsche regards linear causality (the identification 
of cause and effect) as the 'arbitrary division and dismemberment' of what can 
only be 'a continuum and a flux of occurrences' (1974: 112). Before I continue, I 
feel that I should clarify Protevi's demand for a theory of consciousness. The 
objective is two-fold: to understand episodes of violent rage where the body 
functions in the absence of consciousness of its actions (where consciousness 
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is assumed to be located within a rational cognitive subject), and crucially, to 
evolve a theory of consciousness that is informed by political economic factors 
(ibid.). The production of those capable of military violence through training that 
involves brutalisation and incitement to rage is a key concern of this text. 
For Nietzsche, positivism and what Garry (2004) terms a foundational 
style of metaphysics are 'secret allies' (1887 /1966: III: 24); both remain faithful 
to the concept of a world 'as it really is' (Cox ibid. 92). Against Kant's 
transcendentalism, which posits a priori categories of cognition that we impose 
on a sensory world purportedly unknowable in itself, Nietzsche accuses 
'Reason' of producing mistrust in our senses and insists our senses 'do not lie' 
insofar as they grasp the 'becoming, passing away, and change' that is the 
world (1888 /1968: Reason 2). Christianity is deeply implicated here too since, 
as Cox mentions, modern rationalism ultimately surrenders to religious faith. It 
is God who: guarantees all knowledge in Descartes, distinguishes better from 
worse and actual from merely possible worlds in Leibniz, exists as the sole 
substance of which all else is an expression or attribute in Spinoza, and 
provides the ultimate unity and ground of all possible experience in Kant (ibid. 
199). Returning to the Platonic opposition between essence and appearance 
evidenced in Kant, Nietzsche refers disparagingly to object x (c / p. 98) as 'a 
dead mask that one could place over an unknown x or remove from it!' (1974: 
54). Kant's antithesis of 'thing in itself and appearance is dismissed as 
untenable (1967: 552). Nietzsche accuses Kant of being an 'underhanded 
Christian'; the positing of a true world behind appearances - a noumenal world, 
constitutes a 'symptom of the decline of life' (1888 / 1968: Reason 6). It is how 
Kant avoids letting go of God and the soul. The latter, for Nietzsche, is 'only a 
word for something about the body' (1968: 1). 
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I have already written about the enduring influence of the Platonic form in 
neoiiberal managerialist higher education regimes where thesis production and 
assessment is more about conformity to a pre-defined template or a dead mask 
than learning through experimentation. I am reluctant to labour this point further 
other than to reiterate that a rigid hierarchical ordering is necessarily involved in 
this authentication process: God, Man in the image of God, the monstrous 
feminine and animality (understood literally and metaphorically) (c / p. 166). 
Nietzsche argues that any conception of Man as a 'fixed form' (1878 /1986: 2) 
which privileges the faculty of cognition in a purportedly timeless hierarchically 
organised dualism is more indicative of a human need for security: 
The inventive force that invented categories laboured in the service of 
our needs, namely of our need for security, for quick understanding on 
the basis of signs and sounds, for the means of abbreviation:— 
"substance," "subject," "object," "being," "becoming" have nothing to do 
with metaphysical truths' 
(1967: 513) 
Cox maintains that it is Nietzsche's admiration for modern experimental science 
(as the questioning of all truths) and his naturalism that dictates the 
presentation of his polemical ideas as hypotheses; they also account for 
Nietzsche's refusal to posit two realms of existence and instead to view 
language, logic and reason as sensual and empirical in origin (ibid. 85). This is 
why Nietzsche posits a 'fundamental human drive' towards the 'formation of 
metaphor'; the same processes of, for example, invention, incorporation and 
assimilation are involved such that to dispense with metaphor in thought would 
be to 'dispense with man himself (1873 / 1979: 88): 
'This drive is not truly vanquished and scarcely subdued by the fact that 
a regular and rigid new world is constructed as its prison from its own 
ephemeral products, the concepts. It seeks a new realm and another 
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channel for its activity, and it finds this in myth and in art generally. This 
drive continually confuses the conceptual categories and cells by 
bringing forward new transferences, metaphors, and metonymies' (ibid. 
88 - 90) 
To reiterate: Nietzsche makes no categorical distinction between thinking, the 
production of metaphor and meaning, eating and breathing. This naturalised 
ontology permits Nietzsche to endorse aesthetic understanding or 'intuitive man' 
(ibid. 89 - 91) as closer to Darwinian thinking than to other modes of thought -
as an anti-theological extension of non-reductionist empirical science and not 
one element in a reifiable dualism that promotes the latest fixed form of Man. 
If art is considered dangerous by Plato ( c / p . 120) - 'the instinctive 
deifier' and 'slanderer of life' (Nietzsche 1887 / 1966: III: 25), it is precisely 
because, for Nietzsche, art affirms sensuality, materiality, experimentation or 
the continual production of new interpretation(s), and therefore acknowledges 
the contingency and multiplicity of life (Cox ibid. 65). Art rejects the 'ascetic 
demand for desensualization' in its celebration of creativity and transformation 
(ibid. 65) and, like the poetic, it is the 'refinement of hesitation' and 'art of 
keeping alive' (Cixous 2007: 15) that is also Nietzsche's death of God - the 
demise of Being and transcendent grounding principles. To allude to Deleuze 
and Guattari (1994: 64): the Cartesian 'idiot', who thinks as an engagement in 
pure abstraction and therefore is, is more idiotic than was hitherto supposed. An 
ontology of becoming precludes the ego as substance, as pre-existent matter 
somehow detached from thought, as essential self, as a unified whole 
comprised of homogeneous parts, as Being; it defies characterisation in a 
perpetual displacement, a 'way of going which doesn't mean getting there' 
(Cixous ibid. 17), a moving on because that is all there is in all of its materiality 
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and sensuality - a 'world of relations', a 'world in itself (Nietzsche 1967: 568) in 
all its difference and becoming other. 
Cox (ibid. 202 - 204) turns to Derrida and Deleuze to clarify why 
Nietzsche refers to becoming as 'chaos', and to distinguish a Nietzschean 
'chaos' from the Kantian 'manifold'; the latter is conceived as a mass of 
sensations upon which order is imposed as a condition of intelligibility - a 
primordial 'soup' (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 56) that our innate 
cognitive faculties can readily convert into recognisable dishes with common 
categorical recipes. Derrida (1978: 279) identified and rejected the metaphysics 
of presence or Being that dominates the Western philosophical tradition and 
developed the concept of differance - the differing and deferring of Being and 
presence that follows from the death of God. Cox claims that Derrida provides a 
'better name' (ibid. 203) for the complex notion of becoming since 'differance' 
undermines the image derived from Heraclitus of fluidity, of the river, of the 
soup. It is allegedly more suggestive of a Nietzschean 'assemblage of 
differences' (ibid.) within which becoming is a productive ongoing tension 
between forces, i.e. a confllctual or agonistic movement where there can be no 
original identity, unity or simplicity. Differance embraces two senses of 
difference: that within the order of the same or self-change and non-identity (the 
continual self-differing or becoming other that renders definitive characterisation 
impossible) and that where the one is simultaneously the other. The latter 
evokes Roethke (1908 - 1963), the episodically schizophrenic or manically 
depressive academic-poet - philosopher whom I read about in my late teens 
and whose observation - that to go forwards is to go backwards, I have always 
remembered. Memory Is powerful. Derhda writes of roads that go up and down 
at the same time (1976: 50). I wonder what happened to Roethke. And I note 
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that I am still deferring my outline of a Deleuzean take on memory but know that 
it can wait. Cox also states that differance emphasises that becoming is not 
something that happens to 'beings' but is constitutive of them (ibid. 203 - 204). 
As in Nietzsche, Deleuze, Cixous, and Gannon, there is no arrival at a pre-
destined point, no telos, no linearity, no cycle. There is no arrival and the 
movement towards /lof getting there is errant, contradictory and complex. Never 
arriving makes us human, all too human, but it also places us back with the 
animals (Nietzsche 1968: 14), with the earth, with language and writing -
perhaps especially with writing as the phrase 'physio-writing' in Cixous (2007: 
22) implies. There are no boundaries or dualisms intended here. On the 
contrary, like Nietzsche: 'We laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of 
"man and world," separated by the sublime presumption of the little word "and"!' 
(1974: 346). Cixous (1976: 875 - 893) laughed too but Nietzsche may have 
been one of the objects of her derision. 
Cox (ibid. 207 - 208) goes on to discuss Deleuze's adoption of the 
Joycean term chaosmos (c / p. 206) which is intended to underline the contrast 
between theologically - informed conceptions of chaos and post - theological 
ones. I think immediately of the doubled-pincered lobster in Deleuze and 
Guattari (1980 / 2004: 45) that can be read as signifying a de-deified nature, 
and as a metaphor capturing the complexity of the content-expression relation 
in all its Derridan differance - the doubled action of difference within the same 
and of non-identity. And I am reminded of the principle of the prevailing middle 
(ibid. 290) where there can be neither origin nor end; it is evocative of the idea 
that meaning can never be fixed but is always, necessarily, deferred (Derrida 
1978: 113). What I do not think of - however long I physically contort before my 
keyboard, is 'world views' or how Deleuze grasps the 'complication' (Cox ibid. 
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207) of innumerable irreducible hemneneutic horizons. I understand what Cox 
intends; he wants to undermine readings of Nietzsche that imply a Kantian 
position whereby knowledge is limited to a phenomenal world constructed 
through innate individual cognitive powers (ibid. 170-171) . But I am unsure 
why Cox believes that a hermeneutic reading dispenses with an implied 
abstract individualism and the associated sociological problem of then 
explaining the relationship between the social and individual. I am thinking now 
of the object-subject dualism and the transcendental idealism evidenced in 
Husserl's phenomenology (Moran 2000: 92) which also presupposes what must 
then be explained, and which subsequently privileges language to overcome 
such abstract individualism: how else do atomised cogitos communicate? 
However invaluable my sociological sensibility has been, and may continue to 
be at times, I endorse Gannon's view (ibid. 107 -108) that a life-writing practice 
is needed that: 'dislodges sociology as the pre-eminent frame for understanding 
feminist autobiography' and expresses the 'fragmented and tenuous self; and 
which recognises flesh as inextricably bound up in a becoming through writing 
that can only be 'intersubjective' or inter-affective. As Nietzsche stated: 
'Duration, identity with itself, being are inherent neither in that which is 
called subject nor in that which is called object; they are complexes of 
events apparently durable in comparison with other complexes—e.g. 
through the difference in tempo of the event (rest-movement, firm-loose: 
oppositions that do not exist in themselves and that actually express only 
variations in degree that from a certain perspective appear to be 
oppositions. There are no opposites: only from those of logic do we 
derive the concept of opposites—and falsely transfer it to things)' 
(1967: 552) 
I only wish Cox had mentioned the non-foundationalist metaphysics of Deleuze. 
However profound the influence of Nietzsche on Deleuze's thinking (Spinks 
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ibid.), the distinction between traditional foundationalist and non-foundationalist 
metaphysics (Garry ibid.) is important; differing political imperatives follow from 
Nietzsche's antipathy towards metaphysical thinking and Deleuze's concept of 
the virtual. Political imperatives are easily forgotten amidst academic pressure 
to 'pin down' (Gannon, ibid.) or, to paraphrase Cox (ibid. 203), to definitively 
characterise 'a' position and construct a linear narrative around it in defiance of 
Derrida's differance and Deleuze's law of the prevailing middle. I ask myself, 
having admired the phallogocentric (Cixous 1976: 885) dexterity of Cox's work: 
what happens to the body, to affectivity, to sensuality, to materiality, to 
relationality, and to metaphoricity as the production of meaning and the body -
soul in these obligatory displays of academic craft? Writing inspired by Deleuze 
and Deleuze-Guattari is, as Braidotti maintains, NOT the 'self-assertion of a 
rationally ordained imaginative subject, rather its eviction' (ibid. 306). It is a 
rhizomatic subjectivity that is able to sustain the 'impact of affectivity' and this is 
not achieved 'dialectically within a dominant mode of consciousness' (ibid.). A 
lengthier quotation underlines what is at stake here: 
'The singularity of this rhizomatic subjectivity rests on the spatio-
temporal coordinates that make it coincide with nothing more than the 
degrees, levels, expansions and extensions of the "outside" as it rushes 
head-on, moving inwards and outwards. What are mobilised are one's 
capacities to feel, sense, process and sustain the impact in conjunction 
with the complex materiality of the outside; a sort of fluid but self-
sustaining sensibility, or stream of consciousness that is porous to the 
outside' (ibid. 306 - 307) 
Stream of consciousness is a modernist literary style of writing associated with 
authors like James Joyce and traditionally overcoded as feminine (ibid. 307). It 
disrupts both the presupposition of a unified self-transparent subject or cogito 
and the narrative realist genre that accompanies that presupposition. It reveals 
214 
the subject as a 'plurality of centres' and 'tangle of points of view' (Deleuze 
1968 / 2004: 67). The philosophic underpin for the concept of stream of 
consciousness derives from William James (1890/ 1981, 1899, 1902/ 1916, 
1907/1979). 
I should explain that phallogocentrism is a (re)worklng of the concepts of 
phallocentrism (Derrida 2000b: 1 4 - 2 1 ; Cixous 1976: 879) and logocentrism 
associated with charges of essentialism and biological reductionism in the 
purported linking of sex, gender, modes of thought, and writing and language 
(Weedon 1999: 26 - 50). Logocentrism Is the Saussurlan privileging of speech 
and concomitant dismissal of writing as a vehicle for representation of the 
spoken (Saussure 1972 /1983: 24). Phallocentrism - a term coined by Ernest 
Jones (Gallop 1982: 16 - 18), is commonly deployed In critiques of a Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory that privileges the Phallus and castration (Cixous 1976: 
884, 885, 879). Phallogocentrism conveys the primacy of, and connections 
between, specific terms within the binary oppositions pervading Western 
thought and culture (Cixous Ibid. 879). Butler (1990 / 2006) captures the 
theoretical debates, and something of the political atmosphere, that prevailed 
during the late 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, so I will not dwell on the diversity 
of politicised feminist interpretations within this period. It is precisely the refusal 
of consistency, and insistence on the freedom to (re)think 'a' position, that is 
compelling in Cixous. The self-emancipation from repression and abuses of 
Institutional and interpersonal power that Cixous has always sought requires 
this. I follow Cixous in resisting attempts to reduce freedom to a political signifier 
(Butler 1997: 160). A poetic-political imperative informing feminist 
poststructuralist theorising and writing is that of speaking and writing the 
unsayable, or what cannot or should not be said or written, in order to challenge 
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repressive marginalising exclusionary practices, as evidenced in the academic 
writing of Richardson (1997), Gale and Wyatt (2009), and many others. Such 
writing conthbutes to the radical plurality of ideas, methods and genres that 
should be available to students in higher education. I am only too aware of the 
politics of labelling - the imposition of dead masks that can deter engagement 
with primary sources. This accounts for my adoption of a Nietzschean principle 
(1974: 319) in exploring why I once found the concept of phallogocentrism so 
objectionable, and why even now I find phrases like 'white ink' (Cixous 1976: 
881) vaguely chilling. My familial history hardly encouraged celebrations of 
either the feminine or of female reproductive biology. I recoiled at De Beauvoir's 
(1949 /1953 /1972) suggestion that being drawn towards the natural world, 
and finding a freedom there, was evidence of greater proximity to nature by 
virtue of my reproductive biology. I still do. 
Concepts like phallogocentrism felt similarly restrictive. Or rather, I 
worried that women would forever be confined to poetic side-swipes at a 
masculinised language which ultimately they could not escape or which reduced 
the feminine to a 'subversive undershadow of the Symbolic Order' (Mansfield 
2000: 89). So although my body can feel the musicality of my writing (Barthes 
1976: 220; Cixous ibid.), and like Cixous, I love to write 'with my eyes closed' 
(Conley 1984: 146), my embodied thinking is insisting that I find another way of 
articulating that rhythmic energy. It is not a semiotic 'chora' (Kristeva 1977: 57, 
1998: 143) or a language deriving from, and seeking to return to, the maternal 
body (Barthes 1982: 119; Cixous ibid., 1980: 9). I prefer the flows and 
intensities of Deleuze and Braidotti's 'fluid but self-sustaining sensibility' (ibid.) 
where I am filled with a sense of movement that cannot be limited, a becoming 
without end, and where I am transported to thinking spaces I prefer to go to. 
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This is not to say that I did not once read authors like Kristeva; her texts remain 
on my bookshelf. And I laughed when I read Deleuze and Guattari's comment 
(1980 / 2004: 265) that they had always found Jung far more profound than 
Freud could ever be. I had to acknowledge the system of knowledge - apartheid 
(Conquergood 2002) that I adopted during my undergraduate studies. Kristeva 
was initially confined to my 'leisure reading only' category but later allowed 
through the academic checkpoint since Freudian (re)workings were so 
fashionable at that time - but only to visit a Gender Studies module, while her 
work continued to be debarred from entry into mainstream Sociological Theory, 
as was Jung's on epistemological grounds. 
My doctoral reading now includes Cixous - particularly The Book I Don't 
Write (2007: 9 - 30). But not Irigaray, beyond a brief piece in a treasured 
feminist theory anthology on the sex that is 'not one' (1980: 99) that still shocks 
me in its apparent biological reductionism (and now disappoints in its failure to 
recognise those older African women amongst whom I live and work who may 
once have been pharanoically circumcised - what does no lips mean?). Such is 
the prejudice of which Nietzsche (1974: 57) writes. And I mean mine. I have 
elected not to read Irigaray's more recent work. And I should emphasise that 
only I was responsible for the reticence evidenced in my undergraduate 
selection of texts for citation purposes. My tutor was a seminal figure in the 
establishment of a Gender Unit at the institution concerned. I question now why 
I so readily presented lengthy essays on the finer points of Marxist theory to this 
tutor's predecessor - who had barely heard of Althusser (1966 /1969, 1970, 
1971) and Gramsci (1971), thereby risking rejection as a potential academic, 
yet refrained from introducing feminist texts. I was policing the very boundaries I 
now seek to subvert in all their guises. This demonstrates why phrases with 
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forceful performative potential - like 'white ink' (Cixous ibid.) were so necessary 
back then, and remain so. They force thinking; they shift the ground(s); they 
disrupt cliched thinking; they demand attention to feminist values. Hence the 
image of the warrior in Nietzsche (1881 / 1982: 370) and Deleuze's observation 
(2004: 260) that the nomad must sometimes seek to remain in the same place 
in order to resist re-territorialisation; i.e. to preserve an alternative thinking 
space for others to step write into. 
'A new image, or philosophical concept, is an affect that breaks through 
established frames and representations. It illuminates a territory through 
the orientation of its coordinates: it makes visible / thinkable / sayable / 
bearable forces, passions and affects that were previously unperceived' 
(Braidotti ibid. 307) 
Creativity here is technological (how?), geological (where?) and ethical (where 
are the limits set and how can altered states or processes of change be 
sustained?) (ibid.). Feminist poststructuralist theorising and writing shows me 
how. So does the writing of Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari. I have looked to 
both for support of my own creative experimentation and when interrogating, or 
engaging reflexively with, my writing and pedagogic practices. 
The Cixous (2007) text I now regularly return to is profoundly affective: 
Helle Winther (ibid.) on paper, in the paper, in the writing, in my body, in my 
thinking. I feel Cixous is a 'private thinker' (Deleuze 2004: 77) despite her 
collaborative style of working, and her troubling of the subject - object dualism 
through the concept of the entrenous - the in-between (1976: 883). If there is a 
paradox here - that private thinking is achieved through collaboration, then 
Cixous might advise me to forego anguish about paradox (Conley 1991). And 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004: 28) would remind me of the 'logic of the 
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AND' and that there is no dialectical contradiction here. I return just as 
frequently to writing by Deleuze (originally published in 1964) which opens: 'The 
sadness of generations without "teachers'" (2004: 77). Deleuze writes with 
reverence of Sartre and his role as a 'private thinker', along with Nietzsche; he 
notes Sartre's profound influence upon a generation who were consequently 
taught a 'new way to think' (ibid. 77 - 78). The philosopher now so closely 
identified with becoming, and thought without image as an anti-totalising 
strategy, writes: 
'what is missing today, what Sartre knew how to bring together and 
incarnate for the previous generation, were the conditions of totalization: 
a totalization in which politics, the imagination, sexuality, the 
unconscious, and the will are all united' (ibid. 79) 
The 'private thinker' is one who defies the 'moral order, the "representational" 
order [that] has closed in on us' and the 'fear' upon which it depends; and who 
'requires a world that contains a certain minimum of disorder, even if only 
revolutionary hope, a seed of permanent revolution' (ibid. 78). And if such 
private thinkers become our teachers, it is because they come to us in an 
'agitated world' and end our 'solitude' (ibid.) in an overcoming of our own 
situation (ibid. 79; Nietzsche 1974: 357) that is, paradoxically, both individual 
and collective in nature. In a statement that is suggestive of the concept of the 
untimely, Deleuze observes: 
'We speak of Sartre as if he belonged to a bygone era. Alas, we are the 
ones who in today's conformist moral order are bygone. At least Sartre 
allows us to await some vague future moment, a return, when thought 
will form again and make its totalities anew, like a power that is at once 
collective and private' (ibid. 79) 
And Deleuze cites Sartre on the purpose of writing. The writer: 
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'must address a public that has the freedom to change everything, which 
implies, beyond the suppression of social classes, the abolition of all 
dictatorship, the perpetual renewal of categories and the continual 
reversal of every order, as soon as it starts to ossify. In a word, literature 
is essentially the subjectivity of a society in permanent revolution' 
(Sartre 1947: 162-163 in Deleuze 2004: 78) 
This language may seem dated to those who did not live and read through the 
1960s. Or the 1970s, before phrases like 'self-emancipation' were dismissed as 
evidencing a repression hypothesis. The latter refers to criticism that 
emancipatory discourses assume the very liberal humanist subject or 
essentialist self they seek to decentre - deconstruction made to eat its own tall. 
Moi (1985 / 2002: 100), for example, later criticised Cixous for an implicit 
essentialism and failure to provide a historically and contextually specific 
analysis of the situation of women. It is surely the case that 'early Cixous' is 
evocative of De Beauvoir's arguments about reproductive capacity and 
immanence (Lloyd 1984: 100- 101); and that her depiction of mother-daughter 
relationships is idealised (my own experience precludes such idealisation). 
Cixous, however, also writes of men who are not afraid of their femininity (1976: 
885) and of the mother as metaphor (ibid. 881 - 882); she has also consistently 
declined to define I'ecriture feminine on the grounds that definition is impossible 
(ibid. 883). Such ambiguity or ambivalence allows Cixous to avoid theoretical 
and political debate that would only stifle or Inhibit the self-emancipation and 
becoming through others that she has consistently strlved for. Like so many 
who recognised the impact of Freudian Ideas in popular thinking, Cixous, and 
Deleuze, needed to know whether psychoanalytic concepts and theories could 
be (re)worked In the service of a difference cause. Anyone familiar with the 
prescriptive Freudian notion of polymorphous pen/ersity, which is presented as 
a developmental stage that children normally (read: should) grow out of on their 
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way to sexual maturity, will understand how both Cixous and Deleuze 
appropriated and transformed this concept into political imperatives: the tantric 
egg of Deleuze and Guattari implies a diffuse sexuality, or sensuality, that 
escapes the phallic economy (symbolic or otherwise), and bisexuality in Cixous 
is outlined as follows: 
'This does not mean that in order to create you must be homosexual. But 
there is no invention possible, whether it be philosophical or poetic, 
without the presence in the inventing subject of an abundance of the 
other, of the diverse: persons-detached, persons-thought, peoples born 
of the unconscious, and in each desert, suddenly animated, a springing 
forth of self that we did not know about - our women, our monsters, our 
jackals, our Arabs, our fellow-creatures, our fears. But there is no 
invention of other I's, no poetry, no fiction without a certain homosexuality 
(interplay therefore of bisexuality) making in me a crystallized work of my 
ultrasubjectivities. I is this matter, personal, exuberant, lively masculine, 
feminine, or other in which I delights me and distresses me. And in the 
concert of personalizations called I, at the same time that you repress a 
certain homosexuality, symbolically, substitutively, it comes out through 
various signs - traits, comportments, manners, gestures ~ and it is seen 
still more clearly in writing' 
(1980a: 9 7 - 9 8 ) 
Gannon's use of the concept of the unconscious (ibid. 119) - as a 
'subterranean map of relations' and not a repository of repressed instinctual 
individualised but familially - orientated drives, is indicative of the shift in 
thinking about the unconscious. The latter is implicated when memory unfurls 
from the flesh and when forces vie for articulation - inevitably erupting into the 
text of self - writing (ibid. 113). Freudian reductionism, normative neurosis, and 
linear causality are displaced and (re)placed elsewhere on this account; and 
dream analysis becomes an exercise in poetic nomadic subjectivity in the 
production of an embodied textuality (ibid. 119). I suspect, at this point in my 
writing, that academic convention might demand fuller exposition of these shifts 
in thinking - a taxonomy of thought or the mapping of a terrain noting seminal 
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figures and excluding others. Right now however, I can feel myself tensing and 
sensing the possibility of another form of infinite regress. So I refuse to go there. 
I am assembling. I am moving on. God! I am imagining my own version of The 
Dinner Party.... but it is not Judy Chicago's (1979).... it belongs to no ONE.... I 
am reserving the best places for Deleuze and Cixous but when I look again it is 
a library of plates and I am shouting I am not a fucking librarian! I have too 
much history! Too many places to set, too many invitations to send, how can I 
invite everyone when some I have forgotten and some I cannot forget? And 
what about the Deleuzian tangle!? All I can be certain of is that I am not the 
unknowing trainee of neoliberal managerialism and that the diversity and 
intensity of writing by Deleuze, and now Cixous, has corresponded to my own 
'modernity '(Deleuze ibid. 77).... there were innumerable modernities before this 
one.... I want to show the chaosmos of the personal (Cixous 1976: 892) not 
implode under its weight.... defy the 'demon of interpretation' (ibid.).... I need to 
be a dancing star, a free spirit, a wanderer, a nomadic subjectivity I crave 
those sacred thrills .... what happened to becoming-scholar? I am reading 
about Montaigne (1533 - 1592) (Foglia 2009) right now.... Cixous did that (2007: 
28).... Nietzsche was influenced by him too.... and I read that Montaigne could 
move between philosophic concept and personal anecdote with great ease.... I 
cannot... self-writing becomes a minefield strewn with dead bodies that I must 
tiptoe around.... but I have citational support now for students who can, and 
want, to go there without imploding, without tripping over the dead bodies. 
What is becoming - imperceptible if it is not a self - overcoming, a self -
(re)newing that is simultaneously and paradoxically both singular and collective 
- a moving on in which others are deeply implicated and that is empowering in 
its totalisation (as Deleuze once defined it). This is (MY) learning. Cixous will 
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insist on meditations over abstractions and taxonomies, and resist tlie 
identification of themes across lier lifetime's work or even a single text; and 
where she has engaged in a more expository style of academic writing, the 
position will be contradicted, undermined, disrupted in subsequent works; it is 
the flux of becoming that matters - exploration, meditation, experimentation. To 
pin down and to be pinned down is to celebrate death rather than the 
abundance - the excess of energy, which is life itself (Bataille 1988). I take 
meditation to imply an activity akin to Nietzschean interpretation and Deleuzean 
contemplation; an affective processing that is fast or slow, rhythmic or irregular, 
that involves a tension of forces - tort or fluid, and where connection with the 
Proper Names (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 24) of academia is precisely that: 
connection, relationality, reciprocity, the appreciation of a life time's work in all 
its diversity, and not restriction to abstraction or the extraction of disembodied 
positions or key arguments. At the outset of my research into Deleuze, and then 
Cixous, I noted their pedagogic practices and collaborative projects; it was a 
provisional contextualising that amplified my interest in their writing and 
thinking. When Cixous engages with Derrida, she describes their first meeting 
and her reactions; it is not a purely cerebral engagement. 
Freedom is the sacred in Cixous. It is more than a theme. 
Phallogocentrism conveys the belief that, in the prison house of language 
(Jameson 1972), some are more imprisoned than others. Or some thing is more 
imprisoned than some thing else, and what it is can vary according to purpose: 
reclaiming the organism, its history and the molar identity of Woman (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 304) or challenging the denigration of the feminine (in 
Woman or in Woman and Man) (Cixous 1976: 879). I will come back to this 
thing, this it, since Cixous (2007) meditates on the status of the it in this text. 
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And Derrida, her close friend, insists that 7/ must be written' (1981a: 279) (my 
italics) and inverts the privileging of speech over writing as the mere recording 
of the former (1967 /1976: 144, 295). We have seen that - where 'we' are 
those with philosophical and academic problems to resolve (Scheman 1993: 7), 
that for Nietzsche, God died but was resurrected and lives on in grammar - in 
the illusion, and delusions, of the sovereign subject (1967: 488); and in those of 
the detached observer which is our forgetting that we inhabit the world and that 
the poetic is how we accomplish that inhabitation - aesthesis, esthetique, the 
aesthetic, not episteme, sensation not semantics (Barthes 1982: 225). I now 
want to question the opposition that Cox (ibid. 203) sets up between chaos as 
differance and the chaotic as fluidity before I say more about language 
specifically. It is differance that ensures the fluidity, the productivity, of the 
poetic in the meditative and allusive writing of Cixous (ibid.) - the sense of 
process without telos as I read her, the affectivity, my dissolution as an 
oedipalised organism and (re)composition around the new affects that 
philosophical images and words evoke (Braidotti ibid. 306). 
Cixous, like Barthes (1976: 225), was influenced by Jakobson (1960: 
356, 358) and the notion that the poetic is constituted by an aesthetic signifier 
which is affective - that mobilises heterogeneous sensation as well as 
destabilising meaning (Oboussier 1995: 117). The latter outlines the 
neurological syndrome of synaesthesia as relevant to the metaphoricity found in 
Cixous and Barthes, and in a manner reminiscent of my turning to Protevi and a 
scientific register in search of a theory of the body with which to supplement that 
of Butler (c/ p. 158). Unlike me however, Oboussier acknowledges that this 
outline can only function as an 'intertext' designed to ensure an 'open' text - one 
that declines to pin down or be reductive (ibid. 122). Defrommont (1990: 116) is 
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cited on the marginalisation of metaphorical thinl<ing as a distraction from the 
'pure vision of abstractions' in seventeenth century rationalism, and concomitant 
feminisation of such thinking. This denial of the corporeal basis of thought 
removes it from the flux of becoming, prioritises separation over continuity, and 
pre-empts recognition that metaphorical thinking can rattle the bars of, or 
severely distort, the prison house of language in exceeding the purportedly fixed 
repertoire of the latter (Oboussier ibid.); in undermining grammar as god-maker 
(Nietzsche 1886 / 1966: 17). Cixous however was determined to hear the call of 
things themselves (1979: 117-118). 
Cixous, like Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004: 73) confronted the 
'imperialism of the signifier', i.e. structuralism as a theory of everything, the 
Derridan notion that discourse is everything (1978: 280), and the Saussurian 
dichotomy of word (signifier) and referent (signified) (Portis-Winner 1999). Each 
removes us from the world that can only be inhabited in a relation of proximity 
(Levinas 1969, 2000) and through assemblages that bypass the subject-object 
dualism (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 73). Cixous applies Heidegger's concept of 
the entrenous (Shiach, 1991: 60) in two senses: to refer to the 'expanded 
intersubjective economies' (Oboussier ibid. 124) that subjectivity as relationality 
implies, and to conceive of the relationship between words and their referents 
as a direct physical relationship such that when we use the word sea we smell 
and taste salty seaweed and feel the energy of waves. The word - referent 
relation in Cixous is a reciprocity - a giving and receiving of knowledge through 
the senses, or as Oboussier (ibid.) states, a 'mobile crossing' where smell and 
taste or a synaesthetic confusion of the senses foregrounds the body and lets 
us grasp the materiality of things in themselves. It is symptomatic of our 
alienation from language that words so often feel 'dried up, embalmed, and 
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reduced' or inadequate to their referent (Oboussier ibid. 125). For Cixous, as for 
Nietzsche, metaphohcity is the signing of the body in, or rather with, the 
material world; knowledge can never therefore be a matter of abstraction - of 
knowledge purified of contamination by the sensual and the material. In a 
passage in Ilia (1980b) Cixous describes how, as a child who had not 
discovered proper and common nouns, she would find her way in an Algerian 
market using her senses. As Oboussier (ibid. 126) puts it, Cixous writes towards 
a direct sensory contact with the world where she lives and with what surrounds 
her; she lives the colour and the smells that she moves through without 
compartmentalisation of the senses, and without the separation that words 
imply. This is the de-deified nature and the poetic that I escape to. It is how I 
stay in the elusive present moment and catch the scent of the future, the yet to 
come. 
I am affected by the fluidity of Cixous' movement and sensing - the 
continuity of her becoming with the market, by the seamlessness of her 
movement between the then and will be of memory, and by her metaphoricity 
that is the fluidity of language as meanings proliferate without end - without 
telos or finality. Raschke defines postmodernism as: 'the lightning storm of the 
twentieth century that at last became lyrical' (2003: 1) and identifies Bataille as 
a 'writer / creator' rather than the artist - philosopher envisaged by Nietzsche 
who also wrote of the 'hardness' of creation (ibid. 4). Bataille wrote of the 
'incomplete' nature of being and truth, and of knowledge as a 'huge architecture 
in deconstruction and construction' (1961 / 88: 42 cited in Raschke ibid. 2 - 3) 
long before Derrida. Writing here is a flowing signature that explores signifying 
possibilities and thereby deconstructs what Derrida (1982: 195) terms 
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logocentrism - the grand narrative of Greco-Christian onto-theo-grammatology. 
Bataille's writing is described thus by Raschke (ibid. 4): 
'Like all signatures, it is unique, a rhythm and a "fractal geometry" of 
projections and eruptions, of intricate breaks and flows [in which] logos 
becomes rhetor' 
The latter is a flux of 'intimations and signs' and a 'retreat from the advancing 
armies of scientific, cognitive, and discursive precision'; hence Bataille is as 
likely to write of the reddening sunrise of female sensuality as of philosophy 
(ibid.). And for Bataille, like Nietzsche, it begins with the birth of art that is also a 
self-overcoming - the overflowing of life beyond its forms and boundaries. The 
earliest art is therefore aboriginal for Bataille (1955 /1988) as it does not strive 
to record, but is symptomatic of ecstasy, excess, festivity prior to eschatology -
the doctrine of judgement, the birth of prohibition and transgression. Raschke 
(ibid. 5) states: 'Theology is to art as taxidermy is to the procreative process' 
because to avoid mediocrity art must capture this transgressional impulse. 
Bataille (1955 / 1988) links art with sacrifice; both contain a festive 
transgressive exuberance in their exhibition of excess, and both imply a quest 
for self-transcendence or a sacred instant which is achieved through sensual 
transgression from prescribed routines. Primitive art 'created the world' (Bataille 
1955: 130) that it figured prior to the institutionalisation of sacred forms and 
rituals that sought to curb the impulse to aesthetic transgression. Raschke (ibid. 
7) discusses the role of those 'extremes of eroticism, obscenity, cruelty, and 
violence' in Bataille's writing and concludes: 'Thought can only accomplish its 
task when it ponders the unspeakable'. Bataille deploys perversion and an 
apparent fixation on bodily fluids as a trope for the fluidity of thought and 
language, for the mobility of signifiers, or rather, in order 'to make our notions 
fluid' - to shock us into thinking outside of tired frames and into (re)examining 
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those cruel practices that keep us from the art of keeping alive. If 
postmodernism is a religious act for Raschke, it is because the signifier is the 
apotheosis of the sacrifice in all its exuberance. Raschke also argues that the 
theory of the gift, which Cixous takes up, originates with Bataille (1988) not 
Heidegger, and that the concept of the 'general economy' in Bataille (which is 
not an economy of scarcity, demand and exchange but one of excessive giving) 
was intended to trouble existing discourses and signifying economies (ibid.). 
Given that Bataille began writing his journal of 'poetic self - mortification' 
(Raschke ibid. 2) entitled Guilty (1961 / 1988) in 1939, as the Nazis assaulted 
Poland, it is self - evident which discourses and signifying economies Raschke 
is referring to. Bataille meditates on 'themes' relating to Catholicism and the 
logocentric tradition from which it emanates after beginning: 'The date I start 
(September 5, 1939), is no coincidence. I'm starting because of what's 
happening, though I don't want to go into it. I'm writing it down because of being 
unable not to' (1961 /1988: 11). 
It is difficult to comprehend the enormity of it used in this context given 
it's affective potential. Raschke implies that the 'abdication' of language 
evidenced in Bataille's statement: 'I won't speak of war, but of mystical 
experience' (ibid. 12), and in the metaphysical particularism of Deleuze, is a 
defiance of a speech that was once so excitable (Butler 1997) it rendered 
systematic genocide possible. Some tiling that is almost too unbearable to 
contemplate. Some tiling that requires we become the new God-makers (Hale 
ibid. 52) and create the world anew, or as Hilfrich (2010) implies in comments 
on Cixous, to keep making it anew as the exiles from certainty and 
completeness that twentieth century events have made us. Bataille wrote: 
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'A few Christians have broken from the language world and come to the 
ecstatic one. In their case, an aptitude has to be supposed which made 
mystical experience inevitable in spite of Christianity's essential reliance 
on speech' (ibid. 4) 
This aptitude is reminiscent of the Nietzschean wanderer who has some thing 
chaotic inside them that leads them to question and to experiment. 'Aptitude' 
here strikes me as problematic. On this account, it would easy to reduce any 
wanderer, free thinking spirit - in the popular sense, or dancing star to their 
social context thereby producing a sociological version of 'so that's what it was!' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 18). Or to engage in some other form of 
reductionism. This is precisely the linear causality in liberal humanist self-writing 
that Gannon (ibid. 121) is writing against and that Cixous rejects. Braidotti 
asserts that all women know this state of nomadic subjectivity, but avoids the 
metaphor of exile on political grounds and instead posits the nomad as a 
figuration conveying 'political resistance to hegemonic and exclusionary views 
of subjectivity' (1994: 23). My own nomadic writing has led me to write of an 
abusee's sense of exile from everyday life. Exile seems appropriate. I use the 
term abusee to avoid the V word (c/ p. 40), though it too could be used 
reductively and does not begin to capture the singularity and complexity of the 
events prompting its adoption. Can such experiences be interpreted as 
explanatory principles or defining features of my identity? Which identity is that? 
There are many. They are always changing. When I read Cixous (2007) it is the 
movement, the fluidity, that I am caught in and surf; I become with that wave, I 
move on. There is no quest for some primary or originary trauma that I would 
make my theory of everything or the missing piece in a puzzle of the Law's 
making. I am not a problem to be solved, and like Cixous (1976), and Deleuze 
and Guattari (1972 / 2009), I reject the Law(s) that would make me One. I will 
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laugh like the medusa of Cixous (1976) at the suggestion that I necessarily lack 
some thing and let my body do the thinking and the writing in all of its desire 
that is not lack. Deleuze and Guattari (ibid. 25) state: 
'the traditional logic of desire is all wrong from the very outset: from the 
very first step that the Platonic logic of desire forces us to take, making 
us choose between production and acquisition. From the moment that 
we place desire on the side of acquisition, we make desire an idealistic 
(dialectical, nihilistic) conception which causes us to look upon it as 
primarily a lack: a lack of an object, a lack of the real object' 
The medusa of Cixous (ibid.) is a metaphor for multiplicity. It also 
emphasises the productive nature of desire in opposition to this traditional 
concept of desire as lack which both Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic 
theory assume. So to accuse Cixous of essentialism is perhaps to 
misunderstand the rhetorical strategy deployed: logos becomes rlietor 
(Raschke ibid. 4) in the feminine writing - I'ecriture feminine, Cixous proposes. 
In a strategy that is not dissimilar to the parodic practices of Butler (1990 / 2006: 
200), Cixous adopts the very binarised categories she wishes to deconstruct: it 
is subversion by appropriation, the transformation of a negative into an 
affirmative. On this account, I'ecriture feminine represents the other voice of 
libidinal feminine sexuality that gives the world creativity and an otherness that 
is separate from those structural positions that locate desire and expression 
through anatomical division. Cixous can be read as rectifying (flattening and 
disrupting) the hierarchical structure of psychoanalytic and linguistic binaries 
that render women passive and unknowable / inaudible / invisible. That Lacan 
describes the phallus as a signifier not an anatomical organ hardly matters; the 
pertinent question is how much more freedom from oppressive structures can 
be generated from this shift towards the Symbolic in Lacan? The medusa 
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laughs derisively. Is he becoming mad? How can a medusa point out anything 
in her multiple condition? She can write though. And find a freedom for her 
tangled dis-integrated body there - in the affective and deconstructive fluidity of 
that writing, in the metaphoric productivity that wonders what an 'arbitrary' 
metaphor (Deleuze, 1985 /1989: 129) is. Why should she care? She is a 
paradox - both singular and multiple. 
Deleuze knows this (ibid, xxvii). It is there in his writing too - the same 
problems: how do you write outside of tired frames without using metaphor? 
How do you disrupt the psychoanalytic connection between desire as lack and 
metaphor and metonymy? You get rhizomatic. You go with the flows and 
intensities. You come to writing and you let it come to you. You assemble. You 
connect. You do not separate. You rebel. You write your way through or around 
the checkpoint of: Lacanian Phallus this way / no Lacanian Phallus that way 
(Rose 1982: 29). Self-mortification, as required by the Law(s) that instil guilt, 
fear, and thoughts of death, is outlawed on this slippery slope without 
parameters, without fixed meanings, without immutable structures. You slide 
unashamedly past phallogocentric discourse with your jouissance intact. You 
say to men who fear the abyss that Freud prescribed for Man and Woman: The 
'litany of castration' (Cixous ibid. 891) no longer applies. So you get writing (c/ 
p.42). I am alluding here to Joyce, the modernist writer studied by Cixous (1969 
/1976), and the ambivalence his writing evoked - appreciation of its fluidity but 
dismay at the familiar Freudian themes of guilt and death that inform it. 
The 'insurgent' (Cixous ibid. 883) body must write itself, or rather, the 
feminist insurgent must write from the body in order to overcome prescription, 
oppression, and silence - to laugh at rules that fix standards (Cixous ibid. 884). 
The body of one's own is a mind of one's own as it was for Bataille. The 
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recurring literary figure of a woman made mad through confinement or imposed 
passivity is symptomatic of an enduring suppression of feminine creativity for 
Cixous (ibid.). I remain, however, unable to respond positively to the figure of a 
mother - artist - creator (Cixous ibid. 884 - 885), or the positing of a pre -
Oedipal land of 'mother's milk and honey' (Moi 1985 / 2002: 114). Some thing 
stops me in my writing tracks. I do not recognise myself in this image of Woman 
as perpetual giver suffused with maternal love. For Cixous (ibid.) it is the body's 
memory of an originary maternal love which renders it an 'intimate recipient 
[that] makes all metaphors possible and desirable'. But this seems to re-
introduce the very notion of desire as lack that Cixous was so anxious to 
deconstruct. It is the 'pre-Oedipal causality' rejected by Deleuze and Guattari 
(1972 / 2009: 37). Cixous has moved on however and so must I. I prefer to think 
of metaphor as what the body does with the forces, affects, and energy 
generated through encounters with others and with Life - with the excess of 
Bataille (ibid.), and the productive desire and potentialities of Deleuze (ibid.). I 
want to suggest however that the mode of writing that Cixous engages with -
that privileges an embodied yet open-ended depersonalising (or deconstructive) 
process or flow over logical exposition, accords with the interpretation of life as 
an undivided creative flow. The latter is found in Bergson (1896 /1994) and 
influenced Deleuze (Colebrook 2005: 304). And both Cixous and Deleuze reject 
a structuralist linguisticism that renders thinking as structured by, or limited to, 
what can be thought within language (ibid.). 
The concept of radical immanence which Deleuze derives from 
Spinoza's univocity (c/ p. 17) precludes the separation of mind and body as 
distinct substances. Both univocity and the Nietzschean eternal return imply that 
completeness is unattainable (Colebrook 2005: 292) and Cixous' deconstructive 
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writing embodies this principle. Cixous' edenic conception of language 
(Oboussier ibid. 125) precludes any suggestion that Derrida's influence has 
resulted in a linguistic constructivism or idealism. It was heavy reliance on 
metaphor in Derrida's own writing that prompted me to reconsider metaphoricity 
in Deleuze. Becoming in Deleuze is about actualising new modes of affective 
interaction not signification (Braidotti ibid. 304). And the form of receptivity 
Cixous proposes (ibid.) is clearly affective - having the potential to bring about 
heterogeneous multiplicities that disrupt hierarchical binaries. I shall provide 
examples of metaphor in Derrida that may explain my ambivalence towards 
abstract masculinity, and towards the style of academic writing with which it 
associated, that I so often adopt yet feel compelled to subvert. Why, in Deleuze 
and Guattari's terms, I am 'schizo' (ibid. 40) in sometimes wanting to be 'at the 
limit of social codes' and allow desire to break through the 'Great Wall of China', 
i.e. 'to create a new polyvocity that is the code of desire' (ibid.) and in which the 
body is deeply implicated. Like Bataille, Deleuze and Guattari refer to an 
energetic surplus or 'income', 'a share that falls to the subject', and 'that comes 
its way as something left over' (ibid.). Familiar socially prescribed signifying 
chains are disrupted in the action of the 'desiring - machine' or process of 
desiring - production: through breaks in flows. When writing of the unconscious, 
Deleuze and Guattari state: 'How very strange this domain seems, simply 
because of its multiplicity - a multiplicity so complex that we can scarcely speak 
of one chain or even of one code of desire' (ibid. 38). The process involved is 
described as analogous to that which causes an infant's regurgitation of surplus 
milk (ibid. 41). Deleuze and Guattari insist that this illustrative example is drawn 
from a different register but not intended metaphorically: 'The desiring-machine 
is not a metaphor' (ibid.). It is univocity and radical immanence that prevent the 
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unconscious being reduced to an operation specific or unique to language or 
signification. This is the naturalism that Cox (ibid. 207, 215) identifies in both 
Nietzsche and Deleuze. In a treatment of Kafka's Joseph K (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1975 /1986) , the unfaithful recorder is one who remains in the same 
register, tells only one story, and defies the conditions by which information is 
legitimised (Gardiner 2007: 244). It is not about pure textuality. 'To withdraw a 
part from the whole, to detach, to "have something left over" is to produce, and 
to carry out real operations of desire in the material world' (ibid.). 
Hence, Deleuze and Guattari (1972 / 2009:43) write of 'polyvocal and 
transcursive inscriptions' on the surface of the body without organs and Joyce's 
process of re-embodying - a 'reweaving' of fragments that defy any totalisation 
and affirm the irreducibility of multiplicity. Any search for a unifying final signified 
or meaning is futile. This is also why Deleuze emphasises the productive nature 
of texts - their capacity to affect; and why Cixous (2007: 1 3 - 1 4 ) meditates on 
the status of it. The hidden referent sought in Freudian analysis can never be 
found because, for Cixous and Deleuze-Guattari, it simply is not there. There is 
only a continuous process of becoming, repetition with difference in the 
distancing of the plural self from what it has been told to be in the past and is 
supposed to be in the future according to the Law of the Father (Lacan 1966: 
852) in its numerous guises. In Derridan terms, it is an endless differing and 
deferral of being (1981b: 43, 2000a: 282 - 305). For Nietzsche, we must 
struggle to make the force of an alternative interpretation felt; for Deleuze and 
Guattari (1975 / 1986: 19), we must make one register strange through its 
translation into another; and for Derrida (1992: 191 -199) we must understand 
that all narrative or Law begins with fiction. We are not required to dig ever 
deeper in search of a Real buried meaning, or to wait to remember what we 
234 
cannot yet know because we cannot remember what it is that we do not yet 
know as Platonic (re)collection would have it (Hale 2003: 40 - 41). Why then do 
I fear my writing has not passed through Plato's Idea and passed the test of 
divine perfection? Who will say if it is a pale imitation - a false copy and not the 
Real thing? 'We want to dig past, mine and blast our way back to the original 
autographs and eventually to the breath of God. Or the death of God. 
Metaphysics is violent indeed' (ibid. 42). For Deleuze, we can never truly begin, 
or authentically repeat, only try to repeat a copy of a copy of a copy (1969 / 
1990: 303); hence the concept of the folding of meaning that prevents repetition 
from being taken as a matter of identity and contradiction (1968 / 2004: 77). But 
we still write and interpret as if Paradise existed - a land before 'innocence and 
guilt, before good and evil, before knowledge of the original and the copy' (Hale 
ibid. 46). 
Hale asks what it is to represent - to 're-pre-sent: the present already 
given in the past and given again in the future' and suggests it is Deleuze and 
Guattari's War Machine - the endless return of becoming where the present 
never is because it is always slipping into the past and not yet realised in the 
future (ibid. 46 - 47). I mention this now because I still have not outlined 
Deleuze's take on memory. But I want to provide a context for my examples of 
important Derridan metaphors; they are highly evocative of bygone presents -
say 'veil' and I immediately think of Patti Smith and Robert Mapplethorpe 
(Institute of Contemporary Arts London UK 1983). Memory is powerful. The veil 
is the 'secret of a face which is no longer even a face' (Derrida 2002: 317); it is 
the unattainable and impenetrable Present, Real, Thing we want to tear the veil 
from in order to uncover an original pristine state but cannot. It is what Hale 
then identifies as Kant's sense - the boundary between things and propositions, 
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the impenetrable boundary between the concept and the thing-in-itself that 
connects mind and matter, subject and object, self and world (ibid. 48). Sense 
as in perception (the senses), and meaning and reason (the concepts we 
apply), are summarised by Hale thus: 'Our senses connect us to the world of 
things but forever bar our way to knowing those things apart from that very thing 
that connects us to them' (ibid.). Cixous disagreed when she (re)membered 
'finding her way along the perfumes' of an Algerian market (c/ p. 226). The 
Kantian kingdom of purity is policed by this veil (ibid. 49) which 'hides, shelters, 
protects' (Derrida ibid. 315) what is purportedly unreachable. Writing here is the 
production of veils that, according to Derrida, we are condemned and 
commanded to produce (2002: 316 - 317). Yet he too says: 'Of course, I still 
dream of resurrection' (ibid. 351): veil-fatigue. I know this feeling. I have already 
said that life was easier as a devout disciple of scientific, and then structuralist, 
Marxism; before I became the Fallen - the guilty, as feminist theory shook my 
faith and the tongues of Babel lashed my flagging conviction. I find my way 
along the perfumes of texts these days; it is how I found Deleuze and why I felt 
that I had always known him. Life changes when the only question is: What 
Does This Text Do? What Affects Are Produced? For whom? It is terribly sad -
for me that is, that he never did write the book he had planned on Marx. How I 
would have enjoyed that text - the Book He Didn't Write. I always detect a 
lingering fondness when Marx is mentioned or invoked. Am I imagining that? Is 
it my own nostalgia speaking? The point is to change it! If only I really knew 
what /f was. Back then it was an era, a life, a becoming, a totalisation in both of 
Deleuze's senses. I recall many nights of undergraduate reading trying to 
convince myself of the materiality of language. Coward and Ellis (1977) helped. 
And Patti Smith: Jesus died for somebody's sins.... but NOT MINE (Horses, 
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1975). I floated like a signifier after that. Until Deleuze, that is, who offered an 
exorcism and a baptism, not one or the other but both all at once. 
Which brings me to the promised metaphors that constitute an 'endless 
circumscribing' of faith (Hale 2003: 51) because to do othenwise - to posit the 
Truth, is not possible. I like this idea. I need something sacred, however slippery 
and necessarily evasive that thing is; it stops being sacred when I try to put it 
into words. It is about affect and retaining some mystery in life; and both 
Nietzsche and Deleuze knew just how big such small words can be. Should I 
ask: What is Called Sacred? Like Heidegger (1976) writing about thinking, then 
follow Hale (ibid. 56) in wondering: did he mean the word or the thing, or 
thinking as a calling? What happens when I try to define or circumscribe what I 
hold sacred? - becoming with nature and the poetic, the self-eviction that is 
becoming (Braidotti ibid. 306). It is the self-eviction that I hold sacred. How 
would I capture 'holey space' (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 537) -
Derridan gaps in meaning, escapes from the fixity of meaning, hunger for the 
eviction of socially ascribed identities, the desire for no identity at all, for a blank 
space to be filled at a later date? I do not try. I rely instead on it and it then 
makes sense - a gossamer film of sense, a fine line that is a surface 
demarcating sense from non-sense (Deleuze 1969 / 1990: 66 - 67) that is really 
a folding (1986 / 2006: 8 0 - 8 1 ) in which affect and the other are deeply 
implicated. Mapplethorpe pierced his nipples on camera. I cried when he died. I 
felt betrayed when Patti turned religious. So what would happen if I tried to write 
it down - to pin it down? Derrida wrote: 'Sometimes only a pen, but just as well 
a stylet, or even a dagger' (1985: 176) and 'the pen, when you have followed it 
to the end, will have turned into a knife' (1981a: 300). That same pen is the 
'very possibility of change' (Cixous 1976: 879). 
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Sexual and biblical metaphors proliferate as Derrida demonstrates the 
violence that naming and writing involve when we strive for Truth: 'The styled 
spur traverses the veil [ ] it tears it in order to see or produce the thing in itself 
(1981a: 188). For all its violence, such writing is doomed to fail for Derrida; to 
succeed would be tantamount to an impossible self-rape. We can cut and tear 
all we want but all we can ever do is roll in the folds that join anc/divide (Hale 
ibid. 55) - folds on the plane of immanence or the tissue of sense; so the 
relentless thrusting forward of the pen in a quest for certainty (Hale ibid.) - for 
presence, for the final word, is distinctly phallogocentric (ibid.). 'With pointed 
little daggers, stylus, needles we poke and push, stitch and sew on this veil 
what we covet, what we desire and what we crave. In a word: our passions' 
(ibid. 57). Aristotle claimed to know what Man desires: the certainty of 
knowledge (ibid. 54). But do we find it when we mark the blank whiteness of a 
page? When so many gaps and spaces remain? Meaning could not be located 
there if this were not the case. I still read symptomatically; it became a habit that 
Althusser and Balibar (1970: 28) instilled and that the Deleuze who wrote in 
1968 and 1969 has reinforced. We all seek meaning through the gaps and the 
silences of the text. Today I look for meaning and affect, but it depends on the 
writing as to which is most precious. I look for pedagogic and political 
implications too. Poststructuralist feminist theory undermines thinking that 
denies the corporeal basis of thought, that cuts and tears, and implies a 
prescriptive rigidity that militates against inclusion. 
'Not being able to distinguish, attribute, appropriate, separate was 
scandalous in my youth. Love without racial differences. Without sexual 
differences. I owe all my fears and books to my short-sightedness. The 
dreams turned up. More strangers. It took me a while to welcome them' 
(Cixous 2007: 17) 
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The medusa laughed for many reasons and asked if Derrida's 'love and 
murder* (1981a: 213), and Bataille's guilt (1961 / 1988), was all there is. Cixous 
told and showed ways in which writing can be suffused with life and creative 
uncertainty, not preoccupied with death and guilt: 'It was a way of going without 
telling. It was a way of going which doesn't mean getting there' (2007: 17). So 
did Deleuze (1968 / 2004) and Deleuze-Guattari (1980 / 2004). Much later 
Cixous writes: 
'I have deposited in the Bibliotheque Nationale in my name and under 
this name a certain number of texts, especially some of the youngest -
which one might perhaps call the oldest - that I doubted when first they 
came to me, came like letters from a foreign county on my paper, were 
books and that I could pass as their author' 
(2007: 11) 
It is precisely this de-centring, de-individualisation or deconstruction of the 
knowing subject and a valorisation of chance in the becoming of the subject that 
Badiou (1997 / 2000: 3) criticises in Deleuze and Guattari. Chance is evidenced 
in the non-expository, open-ended or exploratory style of Cixous that welcomes 
strangers as they arhve unannounced. Inspired by the writing of Clarice 
Lispector (Cixous 1979: 117), this style reveals an imperative to remain in the 
present and live every moment. Memories evoked by association or that arrive 
by chance form part of that present. As Cixous states: 'You don't choose whom 
to be haunted by' (2007: 12). Nietzsche adopted the image or metaphor of the 
agon - or contest (Acampora 2002: 1 - 4) to convey the non-teleological 
processes involved in the struggle of 'contestants' or forces for interpretative 
ascendancy, i.e. to challenge both the onto-theological positing of divine 
purposive construction and the positivistic emphasis on predictive calculability. 
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Nietzsche's 'divine accidents' (1968: III iv) affirm that becoming is a 'game of 
chance and necessity' (Cox ibid. 211); chaotic becoming is non-purposive 
becoming. It is chance that is affirmed in the formation of assemblages 
conceived as interactive relationships, co-functioning, or sympathetic symbiosis 
(Dema 2007). 
'Life is not your history—those who have no charm have no life, it is as 
though they are dead. But the charm is not the person. It is what makes 
people be grasped as so many combinations and as so many unique 
chances from which such a combination has been drawn. It is a throw of 
the dice which necessarily wins, since it affirms chance sufficiently 
instead of detaching or mutilating chance or reducing it to probabilities. 
Thus through each fragile combination a power of life is affirmed with a 
strength, an obstinacy, an unequalled persistence in the being' 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1977 / 2002: 5) 
Excessive stratification that works to limit connectivity, or slow the 
continual productive breaking down of assemblages, constitutes a denial of the 
logic of becoming and the inevitable role of chance in assemblage formation 
and deformation (Dema ibid. para. 8). Becoming involves chance encounters, 
but more importantly, it implies dissolution of the subject-object dualism. The 
lines of flight or escape thereby generated cannot be predicted as A becomes B 
at the very moment B is itself taking a line of flight and becoming something 
else; it is mistaken therefore to view this process as an exchange: 'with Mozart's 
birds it is the man who becomes a bird, because the bird becomes music' (ibid. 
73). The concept of intersubjective economy in Cixous aims to capture a similar 
constructive or generative dissolution. Given that Cixous rejects the emphasis 
on death and guilt in philosophic thinking and writing, I note that Badiou (ibid.) 
detects a similar fixation in Deleuze and Guattari's work and questions their 
vitalist orientation: 
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'if the event of thought is the ascetic power of letting myself be chosen 
(the Deleuzian form of destiny) and being borne, qua purified automaton, 
wherever hubris carries me; . . . and if, therefore, powerful inorganic life 
is the ground both of what arrays me in my limit and of what incites me, 
insofar as I have conquered the power to do so, to transcend this limit: 
then it follows that the metaphor for the event of thought is dying, 
understood as an immanent moment of life' 
(Badiou ibid, cited in Dema ibid. para. 13) 
It seems that Badiou, in a manner evoking the concept of phallogocentrism, 
simply cannot tolerate the implied loss of sovereign control (as in a rationally 
informed free will) that a theory of radical de - subjectification entails. There is a 
conflation of theory and subjective experience of ourselves here that Deleuze 
and Guattari avoid. It is a confusion of Braidotti's self-eviction in becoming with 
self-abandonment as a conscious self - selected or initiated state - an act of 
free will with an ontological condition. Badiou appears unable to grasp the 
distinction between a philosophical principle and a political imperative, or how 
they might be related, even though this is precisely the criticism levelled at 
Deleuze. As a former Marxist, I have no such problem. Badiou perversely 
appropriates Deleuze's argument that death as deformation is logically and 
empirically integral to the process of becoming and wilfully misapplies it; and 
Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal is similarly appropriated and misused. 
Dema (ibid. para. 14) rejects the interpretation of the virtual as destiny, or an 
operation of pure chance that precludes any determination, as does Protevi 
(2009). Badiou's mention of the ascetic ideal of purity is notable however; in 
discussing becoming that involves the inorganic and ethical agency, Badiou 
refers to unnatural or monstrous couplings (Dema ibid.). I sense here that the 
traditional metaphysical division of the human into half-Man and half-beast, with 
its concomitant denigration or suppression of the corporeal, is rearing its head. 
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And that Badiou's focus on the inorganic as prohibiting ethical agency is 
disingenuous, or rather, it is morality (normative prescription) and not ethics that 
is ultimately at play. Dema challenges the charge of vitalism made against 
Deleuze and Guattari by Badiou and argues that a strategic vitalism is present 
in their writing (ibid. para. 19). It is a (re)worked version of vitalism however. And 
I follow Cixous here in wanting to preserve, and sometimes savour, some 
mystery of life. Must I strive to become a Badiou-style automaton that seeks to 
know everything? When Cixous suggests that others might prefer the word 
'diabolical' where she adopts 'divine' (2007: 25), I take this as an affirmation of 
corporeality and contingency, and a demand for freedom from the form of logic 
that Badiou deploys as a sparring contestant determined to have the last word. 
Badiou also asserts that the virtual implies a wholesale disengagement from 
reality (Dema ibid. para. 14). How easy it is to invalidate through the invocation 
of psychosis. Whose reality is this? And is not the boundary between sanity and 
madness as fine a tissue as that between sense and non-sense? In Nietzsche, 
reality is simply a quantity of force (Deleuze 1962/ 1983: 40). 
For Deleuze, as for Nietzsche, all knowledge is interested and therefore 
ultimately strategically creative, including empiricism (1969 / 1990: 1 7 - 1 8 ; 
1990 /1995: 122; Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 54) where 'the aim is not to 
rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under 
which something new is produced (creativeness)' (Deleuze and Parnet 
2002: vi i). Passionate relational learning is celebrated and not denigrated as a 
deviant mode of academic life, as Deleuze's writing on Spinoza indicates; it is a 
Spinoza that denounces 'all that separates us from life' and 'all the falsifications 
of life' (1970 /1988: 26), i.e. those values and abstractions which disparage life 
such that: 'we can only think of how to keep from dying, and our whole life is a 
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death worship' (ibid.). Passionate learning is positively embraced: 'Spinoza is 
the Christ of philosophers, and the greatest philosophers are hardly more than 
apostles who distance themselves from or draw near to this mystery' (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994: 60). I have sought to reproduce the humility evidenced here 
when engaging with Deleuze, despite my pen relentlessly - phallogocentrically, 
thrusting forward so often in its fearful attention to prevailing assessment 
criteria. As Spinoza would have it, I am an effect and not a cause; the latter 
belief results in an illusion of consciousness simply because my thoughts and 
actions affect me (Roffe 2010), even though I am produced as a thoroughly 
socially embedded subject through a folding of the outside. Both Spinoza's 
dictum and self-production as folding mean that my academic concerns are 
theoretico-practical, i.e. about understanding the forces at play in my thinking, 
seeking joyful relations and creative engagement, and rejecting transcendent 
distinctions that inhibit my learning. Most of all, my writing should evoke the 
sense of movement that I want my learning to be (1990 / 1995: 25 - 33). It must 
be allowed to dissent. 
'If you're talking about establishing new forms of transcendence, new , 
restoring a reflective subject as the bearer of rights, or setting up a 
communicative intersubjectivity, then it's not much of a philosophical 
advance. People want to produce "consensus", but consensus is an ideal 
that guides opinion, and has nothing to do with philosophy' (ibid. 152) 
Or with learning, I would add. It is no stranger to neoliberal managerialism 
however (Davies 2005). Cixous, like Nietzsche and Deleuze, understood that 
we need polemic and faith: 'I admit I asked God for help. God is created for 
these sorts of struggles. Fear makes him necessary' (2007: 18). Perhaps this is 
my calling as a mature doctoral student who has too many places to set in her 
dining hall of personally seminal texts - to always be a dissenting voice. And 
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DISSENT MATTERS. It can take many forms. Braidotti raises another 
dimension of nomadism by proposing nomadic concepts - those which 
transgress disciplinary boundaries (ibid. 23). 
The history of philosophy has always been the agent of power in 
philosophy, and even in thought. It has played the repressors role: how 
can you think without having read Plato, Descartes, Kant and Heidegger, 
and so-and-so's book about them? A formidable school of intimidation 
which manufactures specialists in thought - but which also makes those 
who stay outside conform all the more to this specialism which they 
despise. An image of thought called philosophy has been formed 
historically and it effectively stops people from thinking' 
(Deleuze and Parnet 2002:13) 
All thought is politicised for Deleuze and 'stupidity' is the privileging of a 
priori ways of relating to the world - particularly those excluding corporeality 
(1953 /1991:109) and reifying a world in flux (1962 / 1983: 106). I think, but 
cannot really know, that I found Cixous (1976) compelling because, like 
Deleuze, she showed and told. Deleuze wrote about women reclaiming their 
bodies and politics, but also supported Cixous when she failed to acquire the 
profile within academia that her writing warranted. Deleuze very publicly 
credited Cixous with inventing a new way of writing that demanded a different 
way of reading (1972 / 2004: 230 - 231). Following Deleuze's death, Derrida 
(2001: 192 -195) wrote: 'I'm going to have to wander all alone'. It was this 
relational character of thinking and learning I sought to express in my textual 
eruption earlier; and the consequent difficulty, or impossibility, of identifying -
chronologically or otherwise, all those events and textual relations that have 
influenced my doctoral experience and resulted In a text that shows the 
immanent activity of association (1953 / 1991: 25) not just my academic craft. 
The rhizomatic text has no structuring principle that rigidly determines its 
244 
content and form. Such writing is therefore the poststructuralist unsaid of the 
neoliberal managerialist academic regime. It shows a multiplicity of affective 
connections, allows the writing to wander, and feels the 'vibration' of concepts 
which, contra scientific functions, are non-propositional (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 117); it is evocative of naturalism as Lucretius conceived it. Naturalism 
here refers to the potentially demystifying or de-mythologizing role of philosophy 
as a denouncement of 'the forces which need myth and troubled spirit in order 
to establish their power' (1969 / 1990: 278) - that negate life. Roffe (ibid.) 
reminds me that Deleuze's naturalism should not be understood as opposed to 
constructivism. Deleuze states: 'Naturalism [ ] directs its attack against the 
prestige of the negative; it deprives the negative of all of its power; it refuses the 
spirit of the negative the right to speak in the name of philosophy' (ibid. 279). 
The pertinent issue for thinking is not the stupidity of others but what makes 
stupidity possible (1968 / 2004: 189); any originary myth instituting dualisms 
that function as normative prescriptions qualifies as stupid in this sense. I need 
alternative images of thought, different logics of practice, and rhizomatic modes 
of writing precisely because hegemonic ones operate at a social and 
unconscious level; they function 'all the more effectively in silence' as the 
exercise of power (ibid. 207). This is why I think of my doctoral writing here as 
The Thesis I Don't Write, and show - perhaps more accurately, the tension 
between The Thesis I Do Write and The Thesis I Should Write. 
On the subject of naturalism, had I remembered everything that I had read in 
The Logic of Sense (1969) before inviting Butler and Protevi to an allocated 
place at the table of my epistemological conundrum, I might have written very 
differently. But I did not. Instead I reproduced their characterisations of 'a' 
position relating to biological reductionism. This writing is included here 
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because it was my thinking at the time of writing - yet another episode in my 
singular doctoral experience where I have been troubled by a tension between 
an ethical mode of writing and the 'adversarial paradigm' (Moulton 1993: 149) 
academia valorises. Memory is powerful. It has taken a long time, and copious 
writing, to reach a point where I feel able to revisit Deleuze's take on time and 
memory without complicating matters too much with an abusee's valorisation of 
truth and integrity, and without invoking the thoughts that Badiou (ibid.) 
sarcastically says Deleuze says I must wait for like an automaton. I am with 
Deleuze on this one. I do not conjure thought and memory at will. I only wish I 
did. So the singular doctoral experience that is mine, and only mine, has indeed 
become a 'laying bare' (Cixous 1976: 881) of issues in my learning that may or 
may not be relevant to others. This learning is evidence of the chaos that 
'complicates everything' and 'expresses the perpetual displacement of sense' 
which is the cosmos of that learning (Deleuze ibid. 150, 151). My thesis 
suggests that 'difference resists its yoke' (ibid. 155). The prevailing middle 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 242) precludes a conventional conclusion 
with key arguments forcibly stated in a manner that would contradict the 
nomadic learning and related writing practice which I have shown here. To think 
is to create 'but to create is first of all to engender "thinking" in thought' (Deleuze 
ibid. 185) through shocking encounters. It now seems inevitable that those 
encounters which forced my thinking long ago would trouble my writing here. 
Once I stopped perceiving the doctorate as delivery of a fixed result - as a 
thinking and writing space, it became what Deleuze terms a 'free ground' - one 
in which a dogmatic image of thought no longer prevails: becoming - scholar 
can be likened to becoming-mad on this account, or what happens when the 
self contemplates itself outside of tired epistemological frames (ibid. 190). 
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Artaud knew this, and this is why Deleuze saw a nascent transcendental 
empiricism in the writing of the former (ibid. 185). 
Finally, I come to Deleuze's (re)working of the language of memory. As 
always, my reading has been interested and I will attempt to address loose 
ends - those questions which I anticipate others may ask. Why, for example, 
have I not drawn heavily on Kristeva's concept of the subject-in-process in 
discussing Cixous? I can explain this prejudice with reference to traditional 
treatments of the writing of Proust - specifically his novel In Search of Lost 
Time (1913 - 1927), and to Deleuze and Guattari's (1975 /1986) philosophical 
engagement with that text. Deleuze is ultimately concerned with the micro-
political aspects of memory - becoming as the overcoming of memory; both he, 
Guattari, and Cixous reject the Freudian tradition that encourages reductive 
readings of Proust - those which purportedly identify a preoccupation with 
death In his texts and that are fascistlcally denigratory (imply a desire for power 
over another). Kristeva (1996) reads Proust as displaying a depressive, morbid 
and erotic attachment to the past and to death, and Bataille (1988) finds Proust 
striving to achieve a state of pure dissatisfaction; the Freudian death-drive is 
pivotal in such analyses. Deleuze, by contrast, transforms the death instinct by 
refuting the Freudian model of conflicting drives where the tendency to 
regression, as the impulse to return to an inanimate state of matter, is a 
necessary component in a posited energetic duality. This confllctual 
oppositional model of the unconscious is based on a scientific objective 
determination of death and is replaced in Deleuze with an unconscious that 
questions and problematlses. Deleuze offers a non-material concept of death as 
the non - being wherein every affirmation is nourished (1968 / 2004: 138) and 
one that corresponds to the 'the pure form - the empty form of time' (ibid. 137). 
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This (re)working of the Freudian death instinct desexualises Eros such that the 
positing of erotic attachments to, or unhealthy fixations with, the past is 
prohibited. Deleuze and Guattari (1972 / 2009: 298, 330) dismiss the death 
drive as a transcendental or abstract principle, and later suggest that Proust 
was not intending to somehow regain time but to become the 'master of speeds 
to the rhythm of his asthma' (1980 / 2004: 300). This notion of different speeds 
derives from Bergson (1896 /1994) and bears on how Deleuze thinks of 
memory and time. The latter is the power of difference or becoming whereby we 
move from the virtual to the actual (differenciation) - from what Colebrook (ibid. 
33) describes as all the potential creations and tendencies to actualised events. 
The time we experience is radically split in consequence, i.e. there is pure time 
or pure memory which is virtual, and actual lines of lived time (ibid.). Yet the 
former must coexist with what we take as the present or that present would 
never pass. We can therefore think of pure memory or pure time as a condition 
of experience. Pure time can also disrupt our everyday world as when a 
singular memory from the past becomes intrusive. It is precisely because 
memory is real and coexists virtually with the present that such disruption 
occurs. 
The writing of Cixous (2007) is suggestive of time as a flow where virtual 
memories are actualised as she writes - it is a movement between the virtual 
and actual in her own becoming and testimony to the transformative power of 
writing; her texts are mercifully devoid of the self-justificatory argumentation that 
Reason, and neoliberal managerialism, has demanded of us. We glimpse 
'schizzes' (Deleuze and Guattari 1972 / 2009: 266) or mobile fragments of a 
nomadic subjectivity in flux, creative lines of flight, and divergent series of 
becomings. I decided not to repress all the memories that arrived uninvited as I 
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read and wrote. Contra Freud, we repress because we remember and do not 
remember because we repress (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 18). Why should I 
repress or exclude such memories when their inclusion demonstrates the very 
philosophical concepts that inform the writing? Similarly, I also elected not to 
exclude powerful signs from the world around me - as if the doctoral experience 
occurred in some hermetically sealed space or vacuum. Earlier allusion to the 
sexual abuse crisis in the Catholic Church may have struck some readers as an 
inappropriate Deleuzo-Guattarian translation, and others as linked by 
association to the abuse of academic power (Richardson and St. Pierre 2005: 
965 - 966); or as a rejection of the Law of the Father (Lacan ibid.) in its many 
guises. But I was living in Afhca at the time of writing and wholly dependent on 
a world television news service that is highly repetitive in its broadcast content. 
There was no escaping this topical issue. Nor did I want to. The feminist 
poststructuralist imperative - say the unsayable, evolved with good cause and is 
even more relevant when many believe that the child protection box is now 
ticked and indifference to the plight of child abusees is the less 'self-indulgent' 
option. What happened to heart (Pelias 1999) and the crisis of Reason 
(Merleau-Ponty 1960 /1964)? To speak the unspeakable is to challenge the 
familiar scenario: 'I spoke to no one for fear "it" showed' (Cixous 2007: 14). And, 
of course, the nagging irony since I began writing about my doctoral experience 
is that I have indeed excluded much personal material according to pre-existing 
academic writing conventions, even as I have written an academic text about 
those who have successfully defied them. 
I shall address memory and 'speeds' or duration by considering time and 
movement. 'What we call wheat is a contraction of the earth and humidity, and 
this contraction is both a contemplation and the auto-satisfaction of that 
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contemplation' (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 96). The human organism is constituted 
by numerous such processes that render action and the active subject possible. 
Yet these 'thousands of little witnesses' or 'selves' remain 'hidden' to that 
subject even as they permit a sense of 'self; as Deleuze states: 'it is always a 
third party that says "me"' (ibid.). Contraction and contemplation, as conceived 
by Deleuze, clearly involve differing speeds or durations - different presents, 
depending on the species, organism, and part of the organism: 
'All our rhythms, our reserves, our reaction times, the thousand 
intertwinings, the presents and fatigues of which we are composed, are 
defined on the basis of our contemplations. The rule is that one cannot 
go faster than one's present - or rather, one's presents' (ibid. 98) 
It is need that marks the limits of a variable present: 'The present extends 
between two eruptions of need and coincides with the duration of a 
contemplation' (ibid.). The living present is the domain of passive syntheses - of 
need and habit. Deleuze emphasises this does not imply passive receptivity of 
sensation but the problematisation of a field - a 'question-problem complex' 
related to the exigencies of life (ibid. 99) where both organic and psychic life are 
held to rest upon habit. Hence the 'larval subject' or the 'dissolved self; 
contractile contemplation constitutes the organism itself before it constitutes 
sensation: 'the world of passive syntheses constitute the system of the self, i.e. 
'the self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification' (ibid. 100). In 
this sense, the body or human organism is indeed anterior to language (c/ p. 
59), but Deleuze suggests that there is a self whenever a 'contracting machine' 
that draws a difference from repetition is functioning. The passive synthesis of 
habit constitutes time as a living present but one that passes; consequently, 
Deleuze argues that there must be another time in which the first synthesis of 
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time can occur - habit as the foundation of time requires a ground, and it is 
memory that is held to ground time (ibid. 101). Active synthesis implies the 
active faculties of 'reflective representation, memory, and intelligence'; to 
contemplate is to question (ibid. 99). Deleuze distinguishes however between a 
derived active synthesis and a more profound passive synthesis of memory: 'It 
is memory that grounds time', or memory that is the fundamental synthesis of 
time which constitutes the being of the past - 'that which causes the present to 
pass' (ibid. 101). 'The past is not the former present itself but the element in 
which we focus upon the latter'; the 'was' is the past in general while what 'has 
been' is the particularity that we focus on (ibid.). The past in general is the pure 
or transcendental a priori past that is the condition of possibility of our 
experience of a 'present present' and of the reproduction of a former present; 
when we focus upon a former present, that former present is present in the 
'present present', so we cannot visualise the relation between these different 
presents as successive instants in a linear conception of time, but should 
instead think of an 'embedding' of presents and a 'present present' that reflects 
itself at the same time that it forms the memory of a former present (ibid. 102). 
Deleuze draws on Bergson (1896 /1994) in exploring the paradoxes involved in 
thinking time and memory: the past is not constituted through the arrival of a 
new present, since again, if this were required the former present would never 
pass: 'No present would ever pass were it not past "at the same time" as it is 
present' (ibid. 103). Hence the first paradox of contemporaneity of the past with 
the present that it was: 'Every present passes, in favor of a new present 
because the past is contemporaneous with itself as present'; the second 
paradox is that of coexistence - if each past is contemporaneous with the 
present that it was, then 'all of the past coexists with the new present in relation 
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to which it is now past' (ibid.). For Bergson, Deleuze states, the 'present 
present' Is simply the entire past in Its most contracted state; the past is the 
synthesis of all time of which the present, and the future, are only dimensions -
it no longer exists but 'insists' as the final ground of the passage of time (ibid.). 
This is why Deleuze speaks of a past that never was present; it never was in 
the sense of not being formed 'after' (Ibid. 104). It is posited as an 'already-
there' or presupposed; the new present emerges through the contraction of the 
past - the third paradox of pre-existence. The fourth paradox Involves an Infinity 
of levels; Deleuze invites us to consider what we call repetition within a life or 
destiny - the sense of successive presents that play out the same life: 
'Destiny never consists In step-by-step deterministic relations between 
presents which succeed one another according to the order of a 
represented time. Rather it implies between successive presents non-
localisable connections, actions at a distance, systems of replay, 
resonances and echoes, objective chances, signs, signals and roles 
which transcend spatial locations and temporal successions. We say of 
successive presents that they play out the same thing, the same story, 
but at different levels: here more or less relaxed, there more or less 
contracted. This is why destiny accords so badly with determinism but so 
well with freedom: freedom lies in choosing levels' (Ibid. 105) 
Our empirical presents are constituted by these relations of succession and 
simultaneity, of contiguity, causality, resemblance and even opposition; the 
noumenal character of those presents derives from relations of virtual co-
existence between the levels of a pure past, each present being no more than 
the actualisation or representation of one of these levels (ibid.). 'In short, what 
we live empirically as a succession of different presents from the point of view 
of active synthesis is also the ever - increasing coexistence of levels of the past 
252 
within passive synthesis' (ibid.). Deleuze is referring here to an illustrational 
diagram provided by Bergson and this is outlined below. 
Both Bergson and Deleuze want to challenge the Kantian conception of 
time. Kant developed a linear model that placed events in time through the 
imposition of an a priori form on sensory experience, thereby replacing the 
cyclical notion of time where it is events that are constitutive of time. Since 
logically nothing can return on this Kantian account, an active process of 
synthesis is required that allows us to make sense of events and Deleuze terms 
this memory. Deleuze argues that both circular and linear models reduce 
repetition to the law of the identical, thus rendering repetition a secondary 
process in relation to time; the former entails the synthesis of difference into 
identity and the second necessitates such a synthesis. For Kant, the active 
synthesis involves a radical splitting or fracturing of the subject into the '1' of 
memory as the process of synthesis and the passive self that experiences 
sensations; defining the passive self purely in terms of receptivity assumes that 
sensations are already formed before being organised according to the a priori 
forms of their representation (Kantian space and time); it also means that Kant 
unifies the passive self by depriving it of the activity of synthesis (ibid. 121). 
Contra Kant, Deleuze defines receptivity as the formation of numerous local 
selves according to the processes of contemplation or contraction; this account 
allows for the possibility of experiencing sensations, the power of reproducing 
them, and the valuation of pleasure that underlies the passion of repetition 
(ibid.). Deleuze's dissolved self is therefore somewhat different to the fractured 
but unifying and therefore transcendent self of Kant. Having examined the first 
synthesis of time: that of habit and the cyclical model of time, where time is 
constituted as a living present through a passive foundation on which past and 
253 
future depend, and a second: that of memory, where time is the pure past and 
the ground that permits the passing of one present and arrival of another, 
Deleuze proposes a third where time is constituted as the future (ibid. 117). The 
latter is derived from Nietzsche's eternal return and it accords with a Deleuzean 
ontology in which nothing repeats as a return of the identical and everything 
differs from itself: 'The subject of the eternal return is not the same but the 
different, not the similar but the dissimilar, not the one but the many' (ibid. 153). 
The time of the eternal return is that of the future, and of novelty and becoming. 
It is movement. It is where repetition functions as a condition for action. 
Roffe (2010) summarises Deleuze's treatment of Proust (ibid.) as diametrically 
opposed to a phenomenological method, and as an anti - logos, since a static 
transcendental ego that functions as the necessary unifier of experience is 
precluded. Instead, there is a receptive subject that is responsive to sensuous 
signs, and one that (re)creates experience through differing and unique 
interpretations of that experience. In this context, Deleuze follows Nietzsche in 
criticising previous philosophical images of thought for a 'tracing' method, and 
for the promotion of a model of recognition of the Same. The former implies that 
empirical consciousness and common sense inform philosophical concepts of 
the self in line with political orthodoxy, while the latter, following Bergson, 
confuses recognition of an object with thinking: 
'we may as well distinguish between two kinds of recognition - that of the 
cow in the presence of grass and that of a man summoning his 
memories: the second can serve no more than the first as a model for 
what it means to think' (ibid. 171 - 172) 
Hence: 'Recognition, everyday banality in person' (ibid. 171). In Kant, the 
transcendental synthesis of apperception is directly induced from an empirical 
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apprehension, and the empirical subject is replaced with a self that is fractured 
in linear time; the latter involves a pure time thereby linking the Kantian subject 
with the second synthesis of time Identified by Deleuze. I found this second 
synthesis problematic when first reading Deleuze on time and memory; my 
instinctive reaction, as always, was to consider the implications for abusee 
testimony and I could not get further than depiction of the present-past as a 
construction of a moment which logically could not have occurred. My 
understanding now is that if memory relates to a present that has never truly 
been present, this is due to the radical fracturing of the Kantian subject whereby 
the active synthesis of instants produces meaning from passing moments 
through the retrospective construction of a form in-itself of things which did not 
exist in that form prior to the representational operation (Roffe 2010). The 
feminist movement changed my interpretation of events -1 looked back at past 
events and made sense of them differently. The events themselves had not 
changed and yet somehow they had in that process. To go backwards is to go 
forwards. Bergson might say: duration equals memory plus the absolutely new 
(Lawler 2003: ix). 
Deleuze (1966 /1991) looked back to Bergsonism whilst around him 
others, like Derrida, entered language as the Heideggerian house of being, or 
rejected the mystery of life in favor of the rigorous science of Husserlian 
phenomenology (Lawlor and Moulard 2010). I appreciate Bergson's frustration 
with dualisms and attempts to trouble the idealism - realism divide that we are 
still obliged to speak to or position ourselves in relation to (Soulez and Worms 
2002: 124). The difference between matter and memory is one of degree - both 
involve images and appearance is all we have; the image is more than a 
representation and less than a thing (Lawlor 2003: 9, 42). For Deleuze (1991: 
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1 1 5 - 1 1 8 ) , Bergsonism insisted on the primacy of memory and on the 
multiplicity of the data of consciousness, and therefore offered an alternative to 
a phenomenology that privileges perception and presupposes a unified 
consciousness to which discrete sensory data is presented. This multiplicity of 
data is what Bergson terms duration and it is thoroughly temporal, in opposition 
to the Kantian organisation of sensory data by an assumed unitary subject with 
an innate cognitive capacity to impose spatial and temporal categories in an 
invocation of a 'pure and empty form of time' (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 108). 
Bergson differentiates between perceptual images that are present, actual, and 
extended and memory images which are past, virtual, and unextended. Bergson 
is able to define consciousness and freedom through the separation of time and 
space; it is in the duration that we can speak of the experience of freedom 
precisely because we are able to evoke and insert memory images into the 
temporal flow where nothing is immutable (Lawlor ibid. 53; Lawlor and Moulard 
2010). Time is mobility; it is moving on; freedom is mobility. The subject does 
not stand outside either the real or the flow of time. For Bergson however, the 
image that differs from others is that of the body. It is another image in the 
continuity of perceived things but we also experience affect: 'Yet there is one 
image that contrasts with all the others in that I know it not only from the outside 
by perceptions, but also from the inside by affections: it is my body' (1896 / 
1994: 169). 
The concept of qualitative multiplicity is one of the concepts used to 
explain the embedded character of the relation of the subject with - not to, the 
world. Such a temporal multiplicity implies heterogeneity, interpenetration, 
continuity, progression, and not juxtaposition and dialectical negation (ibid.). An 
image that Bergson deploys to illustrate this phenomenon is that of an 
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encounter between two people involving sympathy; a heterogeneity of feelings 
is involved which defies any neat separation out of emotions as discrete 
juxtaposed and sequential components of the event. Duration here can be 
partially explained with reference to another of Bergson's images - that of a 
tape being drawn between two spools (1946 /1992: 164 -165). Bergson points 
out however that this image is potentially misleading as it implies a homogeneity 
such that the tape could be replayed and remain the same, whereas he wants 
to emphasise that no two moments in conscious being can be identical. This 
illustration is highly pertinent to Bergson's take on memory. Duration implies a 
conservation of the past and difference as we do not simply re-cognise the 
same experience; instead, our memory expands as time moves on and new 
moments are added. The past is not static and unchanging in this sense. Lawlor 
and Moulard (ibid.) offer a further example: Tuesday is different from Monday 
because Monday only includes itself and Sunday, while Tuesday includes itself, 
Monday, and Sunday. Duration is memory, or the prolongation of the past into 
the present, on this account. In another image, that of an elastic band being 
stretched to a point that represents our 'now', Bergson invites readers to focus 
on the action of the hand doing the stretching; the movement (duration) is 
continuous, differentiating or heterogeneous, yet indivisible (ibid. 165). Just as 
Nietzsche questioned the division of matter and motion, Bergson argues that 
the object can only be abstracted from a movement or duration which is 
continuous in an operation that erroneously negates or subordinates time (Ibid.). 
Hence duration is pure mobility which no image can adequately capture and, of 
course, it is the latter part of this argument that Deleuze (1985 / 1989) 
challenges in his second text on cinema. The colour spectrum is also discussed 
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by Bergson however in order to underline tlie paradoxical nature of qualitative 
multiplicities: there is unity in multiplicity (Lawlor and Moulard ibid.). 
Bergson is critical of institutional pressures to spar over concepts and 
take sides (1946 / 1992: 175 - 176), but this tendency is attributed, as it Is in 
Nietzsche and American pragmatism, to the relative status of knowledge and 
crucially to its interested nature. Both Nietzsche and Bergson however seek to 
go beyond a pragmatic ontology. Bergson introduces the concept of intuition 
(1896 / 1994: 184 - 185) and consequently adopts the phrase 'true empiricism' 
(1946 /1992: 175). Intuition is described as sympathy (ibid. 159) or an entering 
into the infinity of durations (material and otherwise) that the flux of becoming is. 
It is an intuition of what is other and through which we become. In Deleuzean 
terms, we can only ever contract a part of this flux and never grasp it as a whole 
without resort to transcendence (to God, Self, or World) and the order of the 
Same, thereby stifling novelty. Intuition is memory, not perception, for Bergson; 
and as with Deleuze, it is representationalism that must be overcome - the 
separation of subject and object, of external observer and the 'out there', of 
mind and inert matter. So Bergson replaces perception with the image in order 
to move beyond the idealism and realism divide; matter is not reduced to our 
representations nor is it endowed with the power to create representations in 
our minds - perception is thereby 're-attached' to the real (Lawlor and Moulard 
2010). We convert images of duration into interested representations through 
selection, but the image is held to exist virtually in that representation, hence 
the 'necessary poverty' (1896 / 1994: 38) of the perception of conscious beings 
for Bergson. 
'If you abolish my consciousness ... matter resolves itself into vibrations, 
all linked together in uninterrupted continuity, all bound up with each 
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other, and travelling in every direction like shivers [ ] In just the same way 
the thousands of successive positions of a runner are contracted into one 
sole symbolic attitude, which our eye perceives, which art reproduces, 
and which becomes for everyone the image of a man who runs' (ibid. 
208 - 209) 
Unlike habit-memory (the body's memory of acquired sensory - motor 
movements), the pure memory of personal history is both unconscious and 
mobile, as Bergson's image of the cone (ibid. 152, 162) is designed to suggest. 
'Contemplation' (ibid. 163) here is the integral movement of memory between 
thought and action, where thinking is the process by which the unconscious 
pure memory moves forward into singular images and the movement is one 
from duration - multiplicity and interpenetration, to fragmentation; and it is 
always potential or virtual. A second movement is required - that from these 
singular images to the generalities that precede action - 'contraction' (ibid. 168). 
The same movements occur in literary creativity. Bergson explains habit-
memory in corporeal and spatial terms - as attention to the practical necessities 
of life. This accounts for continuity but not for diversity, discontinuity and 
creativity; hence Bergson's attempt to evolve a philosophy that accounts for 
both. It is intuition which provides us with knowledge of what Bergson (1911 / 
1998) terms the elan vital-\he creative impulse common to all of life. 
Mechanism is rejected as teleological, as in Nietzsche and Deleuze, and 
Bergson (ibid.) explains diversity and species differentiation on a similar scale to 
Deleuze and Guattari (1980 / 2004: 68) using the concept of complexification of 
life, whereby the human species is said to have required a somewhat different 
relation between consciousness and matter to survive. Lawlor and Moulard 
(ibid.) suggest that the intelligence Bergson attributes to the human species is 
intended in a pragmatic sense - as a relation with the real rather than an 
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intellectualism or the dogmatism so criticised by Nietzsche. Bergson also 
argues for the virtual persistence of instinct, and it is this that enables intuition to 
constitute our way of becoming with the world. Nevertheless, human 
intelligence is analytic in its practical orientation, dealing with quantitative 
multiplicities characterised by homogeneity, and thereby results in a tendency 
for us to lose touch with the vital impulse. Creative and spiritual modes of 
knowing and relating are compromised accordingly and it is only when vital 
interests are threatened that the tendency to intuition predominates. 
Another element of Bergson's criticism of Kant resonates with Deleuze's 
conception of chaos; order is not imposed but involves a duality of order and 
disorder just as the notion of chance requires that of necessity (1896 / 1994: 
232). Bergson (ibid. 268) argues for the complementarity of differing modes of 
knowing and different types of knowledge, just as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) 
do not denigrate science and recognise its pragmatic function. Yet ultimately, it 
is intuition, literary and artistic creativity that are favoured as in Nietzsche, since 
they can bring us closer to the vital impulse and therefore to what Bergson 
terms absolute knowledge. Like Nietzsche, Bergson will charge philosophy with 
(re)engaging with the creative impulse. Bergson however is seeking to connect 
the life of the spirit with that of matter in order to establish the absoluteness of 
knowledge (defined by its coincidence with absolute becoming), and to do so 
through realisation of the complementarity of metaphysical thought and 
scientific knowledge (Lawlor and Moulard 2010). When Deleuze declares 
himself to be a metaphysician and a vitalist, it is this Bergsonian project that he 
evokes, and a Bergsonian conception of metaphysics not the reified categories 
of Kant. The same divergence in philosophical thinking is evidenced in 
Bergson's criticism of Kantian morality (1935 / 1977) which is portrayed as a 
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closed repressive morality born of a static religion, and associated with 
maintaining social cohesion to avert threats to social stability. In an analysis that 
evokes the concept of projection, Bergson suggests that the suppression of 
intuitive ways of knowing that pragmatic analytic intelligence demands, and 
ensuing separation from the creative impulse, results in the externalising of a 
fear of disorder. Such fear stems from one's own illicit desires and an 
excessively punitive morality that limits deviation through moral obligation. For 
Bergson, Kantian valorisation of the rational derives from a psychological error 
that is then translated into a universal moral theory, but the basic desire for 
community and related inclination to conformity this entails is retained. 
Fabulation refers to the production of hallucinatory images of a god who 
watches over us and provides the security that Nietzsche identifies as a basic 
human need. The 'impetus to love' is, by contrast, associated with an open 
morality and dynamic religion that is genuinely inclusive or universal and 
derived from 'creative emotions' (Bergson ibid. 96). Unlike emotions which are 
responses to a sign, such as sight of a loved one, creative emotion occurs in 
the absence of such signs and finds expression in creative production. 
Creativity here implies disequilibrium given the disruption to habitual intelligence 
which embeds us in concrete life, and it is noteworthy that Bergson looks to 
madness as a heuristic to account for such states as do Deleuze and Guattari 
(1972 / 2009). The source of creative emotions is intuition, and for Bergson, 
such experiences are mystical, spiritual, and result in action; they are therefore 
associated with religion which is not doctrinaire but open to the impulse of life. 
Contra analytic pragmatic intelligence which forecloses creative emotions, the 
latter can enrich the former through processes such as contraction and 
condensation. Bergson maintains that the two sources of religion and morality 
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(desire for community and creative emotions) should be thought of as a duality 
of forces - as complementary expressions of life (ibid.). While Lawlor takes up 
the Deleuzean focus on Matter and Memory that permits Bergson's philosophy 
to be read as one of immanence, McLachlan (2005: 365) argues that Two 
Sources of Religion (Bergson 1935 / 1977) calls into question the relation 
between immanence and transcendence - a claim supported by noting the 
influence of Bergsonism on Levinas (whose concept of fecundity is derived from 
Bergson's elan vital). 
Deleuze and Guattari address the human need for security indirectly 
(1980 / 2004: 298) when warning against over de-territorialisation that might 
result in a regression into the undifferentiated. Lawlor (2003: 62) notes the 
absence of a theory of alterity in Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari. I suggest 
however that the concept of becoming as symbiosis (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 
52) renders this unnecessary, as does a monism that permits becomings with 
the inorganic and non-human: 
'If everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or organized, 
on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life. In short the 
life in question is inorganic, germinal, and intensive, a powerful life 
without organs, a body that is all the more alive for having no organs' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980 / 2004: 499) 
The human subject is however a 'monstrous being' insofar as it can occupy a 
more considerable place in time than in space; Deleuze writes of an enlarged 
perception, one enlarged 'to the limits of the universe' and that 'breaks with the 
identity to which memory rivets it' (1998: 71). Deleuze and Guattari (ibid. 206) 
also warn of the danger of falling into the black hole of involuntary memory and 
of becoming as forgetting (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 66). What is suggested here is 
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that art is mistakenly associated with memory when in fact what is experienced 
as remembering is another form of becoming. The mastery of speeds referred 
to earlier is about movement or mobility and the development of new registers 
of thought and action: 
'The question of speed is important and very complicated as well. It 
doesn't mean to be the first one to finish; one might be late by speed. 
Nor does it mean always changing; one might be invariable and constant 
by speed. Speed is to be caught in a becoming that is not a development 
or an evolution. One would have to be like a taxi, a waiting line, a line of 
flight, a traffic jam, a bottleneck, green and red lights, slight paranoia, 
difficult relations with the police. Being an abstract and broken line, a 
zigzag that slips "between"' 
(Deleuze and Parnet Ibid. 40 - 41) 
Speed can perhaps be explained by reference to a passage entitled Memories 
of a Plan(e) Maker (Deleuze and Guattari ibid. 292 - 300) where two types of 
plane are contrasted. The plane of transcendence is described as a 'hidden 
principle' or transcendent compositional principle; It can only be Inferred but 
'causes the given to be given' and exists as a supplementary dimension (n + 1) 
to that to which it gives rise; it is a design or mental principle that is teleological 
and concerns the 'development of forms and the formation of subjects' (ibid. 
293). This is a plane that concerns structure and genesis: 'Life plan(e), music 
plan(e), writing plan(e), It's all the same: a plan(e) that cannot be given as such, 
that can only be Inferred from the forms it develops and the subject it forms' 
(ibid.). The thesis that I did not write would have begun with a key proposition or 
argument to be unfolded, fleshed out, and supported throughout a text that 
positioned me as a knowing academic subject with a pre-defined and readily 
Identifiable position on Deleuzean and Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy. Instead, 
I have sought to be the master of the speeds of the rhythms of my own learning 
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and lay bare the collective assemblages (past and present) within which I have 
become. Perhaps learning is only haecceities where: 'Nothing develops, but 
things arrive late or early, and form this or that assemblage depending on their 
compositions of speed' (ibid. 294). Nevertheless, I feel that my impulse to 
experiment and show the fragmented status of the learning subject has been 
limited by my own sedimented assumptions about academic writing that 
presuppose a unified learning Self and a style of writing that demonstrates the 
'upright nature' (Deleuze 1968 / 2004: 172) of its Being. 
So it would be misleading to present my writing here in illustration of the 
second type of plane - that of consistency or composition, posited by Deleuze 
and Guattari. This plane is one of immanence and also referred to as the plane 
of Nature, of non-contradiction, of non-consistency, and an abstract design 
rather than a mental one: 'Its number of dimensions continually increases as 
what happens happens' (ibid. 295). It is thus: 
'a plane of proliferation, peopling, contagion; but this proliferation of 
material has nothing to do with an evolution, the development of a form 
or the filiation of forms. Still less is it a regression leading back to a 
principle. It is on the contrary an involution, in which form is constantly 
being dissolved, freeing times and speeds' (ibid.) 
If it is a 'fixed' writing plane, Deleuze and Guattari also insist that fixed does not 
mean immobile here: 'it is the absolute state of movement as well as of rest, 
from which all relative speeds and slownesses spring, and nothing but them' 
(ibid.). It is Aeon - a non-pulsed and floating time, experimentation against any 
kind of interpretation (ibid.). It is a 'war machine' that defies the 'harmonious 
development of form and a regulated formation of the subject' and that may 
cause a 'confusion of feelings' (ibid. 296). Nietzsche is mentioned, not because 
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his aphoristic style speaks of fragmentation, but because of his freeing of non-
pulsed time - 'Ecco Homo has only individuations by haecceities' (ibid. 296 -
297). The objective of the plane of immanence is 'nonvoluntary transmutation' 
and the production of different affects upon each reading (ibid. 297). 
Although these two planes are initially presented as an opposition, Deleuze and 
Guattari (ibid. 297) insist that we continually move from one to another -
between stratification and destratification: 
'The plane of consistency is the body without organs. Pure relations of 
speed and slowness between particles imply movements of 
deterritorialization, just as pure affects imply an enterprise of 
desubjectification. Moreover, the plane of consistency does not pre-exist 
the movements of deterritorialization that unravel it, the lines of flight that 
draw it and cause it to rise to the surface, the becomings that compose it. 
The plane of organization is constantly working away at the plane of 
consistency, always trying to plug the lines of flight, stop or interrupt the 
movements of deterritorialization, weigh them down, restratify them, 
reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of depth. Conversely the 
plane of consistency is constantly extricating itself from the plane of 
organization causing particles to spin off the strata, scrambling forms by 
dint of speed or slowness, breaking down functions by means of 
assemblages or microassemblages' (ibid. 297 - 298) 
This notion could be read as evocative of a Nietzschean contest of forces, 
Bergson's duality offerees, the Derridan and Althusserian duality of presence 
and absence, and a Bergsonian method of constructing abstract poles but 
subsequently positing a duality offerees that has been attributed to Platonic 
method (Lawlor and Moulard 2010). I once read it against a sociological frame 
and described it as a Weberian abstract or ideal continuum. My understanding 
of rhizomatic thinking and theoretical assemblages is that such linkages are 
appropriate. It is about connections not intellectual purity. And yet, I am still 
somehow troubled by such a strategy. It felt infinitely preferable to produce 
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independent papers on feminist poststructuralist theorising for example, where I 
could go, or become, with the flows and intensities and not get caught up in 
anguish about ultimate incompatibility. Such a strategy would have expressed 
my fragmented self (academic and otherwise) and appreciation of Gannon's 
refusal to be pinned down. I wanted to explore the ever-enlarged perception 
that is my academic subjectivity without the pressures created by my 
internalisation of the ascetic ideal long ago, and the epistemological 
conundrums that so frequently follow from that embedding in the pedagogical 
culture of yesteryear. 
My learning has been rhizomatic. I have gone willingly with Deleuze, to 
Cixous whom he supported, to Nietzsche and to Bergson whose work 
influenced him. Bergson rejected the prioritisation of language over intuition, the 
former being viewed as a product of human sociality that, perhaps in the 
manner of Cixous, downplays the immediate data of consciousness and the 
senses. I end here with two quotations from Braidotti whose 'positions' at the 
time of writing capture something of the tensions that my own mobilisation of 
the concept of theoretical assemblage has generated: 
'The subject is but a force among forces, capable of variations of 
intensities and inter-connections and hence of becomings. These 
processes are territorially-bound, externally oriented and more than 
human in span and application. I am not saying this in a spirit of 
conceptual purity, as nothing could be further removed from my hybrid 
nomadic habits. It is rather of great importance to us all that we do not 
mistake Deleuze's call for active dis-obedience on the anti-Oedipal model 
for conceptual confusion and theoretical anarchy. Deleuze is an 
extremely rigorous thinker - the greatest of his generation and a towering 
figure in world thought. The least we can do to do justice to his work is to 
be as careful with our readings as he was with his writings. The best way 
to explore this difference between Deleuze and the linguistically-based 
thinkers of difference like Lacan and Derrida is to look at their respective 
philosophies of time. Divergent temporalities are at work: psychoanalysis 
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is caught in the backward-looking authority of the past. Let us think, for 
instance, of the role of memories in the constitution of neuroses and, 
through the necessary mechanisms of repression, of the subject itself. 
The hysteric is per definition the one who suffers from unsustainable 
memories. Rhizomatic thought, on the other hand, is future-bound and 
relies on a revised version of the Bergsonian continuous present in order 
to sustain a vision of desire as plenitude, affirmation and becoming' 
(2005/2006: para. 19). 
'Bio-centred posthumanism and non-western neo-humanism can be 
travelling companions along productive axes of transposition. The point 
of this cartographic move, which aligns theoretically diverse positions 
along the same axis, is to facilitate the transposition of the respective 
political affects that activate them. I do like putting the "active" back into 
"activism". This transposition is like a musical variation that leaps across 
scales and compositions to find a pitch or a sharable level of intensity. 
What matters to my thought is the affective dimension, the affinity, not 
the political or theoretical correctness' (ibid. para. 26). 
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Conclusion(s) 
In my introduction, I characterised the doctoral student as a singularity 
produced through the play offerees that constitutes the supervisory 
assemblage, and subsequently distinguished rhizomatic and arborescent 
assemblages, presenting my current supervision as illustrative of the former and 
markedly different from a doctoral experience In the 1990s in its capacity to 
support research and learning as informed experimentation. 
I adopted abuse - specifically physical violence, as a heuristic in a non-
linear nomadic process of inquiry that permitted a very personalised or singular 
consideration of the materialism - idealism dichotomy. The concept of univocity 
became pivotal in resolving an affective tension as I moved between disciplines 
and particularly after I joined a Faculty of Education where no one 
epistemological paradigm prevailed. Theoretical loyalties are matters of Identity, 
and I was not satisfied with arguments that there are differing ways of knowing 
the world (e.g. loglco-sclentific or narrative), or with a linguistic constructivism 
that reduces both the social and natural worlds to forms of narrative. 
I explored criticisms of hylomorphism and found them relevant across the 
disciplines that I know and love (sociology, animal behaviour, and most recently 
educational philosophy and theory) and other interests such as trauma theory 
and art. Hence: my depiction of the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage as a site 
where learning is something that occurs with not to the student; my refusal to 
see my relationship to the natural material world as one of linguistic 
construction; my experimentation with a poetic - philosophical style of writing 
that is suggestive of the flux that I experience learning, nature, and language to 
be; my frustration with obligatory invocations of embodiment; and my intended 
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future research into a philosophy of science that speaks to all of my interests 
and undermines any tendency to portray them as homogenous enterprises 
organised around a single epistemological antagonism. 
Non-linear writing permits issues to be addressed in novel ways and 
novelty here, I emphasise, also means new for the student concerned. The text 
was intended to be mac/7/y7/c - embodying and performing its pedagogical 
import, yet not merely an address to the elect - those already familiar with the 
perspectives, concepts and vocabulary mobilised. I clearly favour doctoral 
pedagogic practice that fosters the capacity to resist orthodoxies of any 
persuasion. Hence my writing reflects a conviction that the passional - polemical 
and poetic - philosophical are no more or less relevant to this objective than 
other modes of academic writing. The freedom to engage in informed 
experimentation with differing modes does however require supervisory support 
and collaboration. My own experience has been that this process of supported 
experimentation has enabled me to clarify my thinking and write with greater 
clarity for publication purposes concerning reflective practice, student writing 
and pedagogic strategy. 
The resistance to pre-given normative models of supervision, research 
and the doctoral experience evidenced in my writing is linked to the theme, or 
rhizo-structural thread, of madness which I have pursued across the thesis, and 
to the intensive style of writing which I sometimes adopt. The latter conveys the 
affective absorption in ideas that I want my learning to be - but I am also 
following Isabelle Stengers in seeking to put the adventure back into science. 
This claim may seem incongruent given my concern with the poetic or aesthetic. 
Yet as Gilles Deleuze has observed, what we now regard as scientific 
orthodoxy may once have been rejected as madness or irrationality. Laurel 
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Richardson and Van der Kolk have not, to my knowledge, been charged with 
lunacy; but neither has avoided accusations of disciplinary heresy. 
Nomadism and phrases like creative escape should not be interpreted as 
implying complete absence of determination; hence my reference to the knots 
of arborescence inevitably found in rhizomes in the opening plateau. And my 
interest in the concept of the mesopolitical as the level or site of practice where 
creative engagement is more likely to be with very detailed institutional 
regulations and procedures; and where creative problem solving is specific to 
both milieu and student. It is illuminating to consider the pedagogic practice of 
Deleuze in this respect. Whatever his wider political objectives, the practices 
which he introduced may not strike us as particularly radical today. I understand 
that these included the setting up of lectures as debates in order to disrupt the 
image of teaching and learning as a matter of faithful transmission. I sought to 
introduce the spirit of such an exercise in the plateau on Butler and Protevi. 
Learning is, as Stengers argues following Deleuze, more a matter of relay 
transmission - picking up the baton and mnning with it rather than striving to 
faithfully recreate it. And, of course, this creativity in thought is not confined to 
any one field of knowledge. 
The rhizomatic supervisory assemblage functions to support relay 
transmission as the production of creative solutions. But Stengers, like Braidotti, 
also insists that the pedagogic role is one of ensuring the art of dosage -
insisting on engagement with what might othenA/ise be over hastily rejected. The 
somewhat repetitive nature of the earlier plateaus, which draw on critiques of 
neoliberal managerialism, illustrates this point as I was often left asking: So 
what? What next? Where to from here? I conclude from this experience that the 
concept of the meso level is just as applicable to thinking - to knowledge 
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production undertaken by the doctoral student which has to be naore than the 
restatement of dichotomised positions. This is why Stengers interprets the final 
collaborative text of Deleuze and Guattari as an honouring of what made 
philosophy a matter of Identity and an affective adventure for Deleuze - why he 
chose to do philosophy. It was a classroom encounter with Plato. 
I too felt the need to honour those thinkers that captured my imagination 
in my youth, and some that did not, and was able to do so by conceiving the 
thesis as a body-without-organs, as a site of inscription for affective 
connections. I mention Marx, De Beauvoir, and many others in this context. 
Stengers shocked me in also suggesting that Guattari did not, in fact, co-author 
What is Philosophy? It was the same impulse to honour the latter's contribution 
to his thinking that prompted Deleuze to add Guattari's name. And this act 
ensured an enduring reminder of his conviction that knowledge production is a 
question of heterogenesis. This was defined in my introduction as something 
new created in between two or more terms which nevertheless retain their 
heterogeneity, when I stated the key proposition which has informed this thesis: 
a rhizomatic supervisory assemblage operates heterogenetically to support 
knowledge-seeking as an ongoing creative relational process. Many of my 
sedimented assumptions about doctoral pedagogy, and previously 
unquestioned theoretical loyalties, were challenged through this relational or 
collaborative exercise. I conclude that the rhizomatic supervisory assemblage is 
one where the tensions between such assumptions and loyalties are free to 
multiply and complicate a student's thinking. This is where the productiveness 
of my current supervision lay, rather than, as I once expected. In sharing 
closely-matched interests with a single supervisor. 
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